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Summary (English)
This Ph.D. thesis focuses on the demand-side management in electricity markets and a
new player in the market – an aggregator of flexible demand. The thesis consists of three
independent chapters investigating the entrance of this new player in the power markets
from different angles: focusing on the aggregator, a large power consumer and a producer.
The first chapter, “Aggregation of demand-side flexibility in electricity markets: the effects
of portfolio choice”, analyses the performance of the aggregator depending on its portfolio
choice. I have investigated several portfolios of different flexibility sources: electrical vehi-
cles, heat pumps and/or home appliances like washing machines, dryers and dish washers.
I have used Nord Pool power market data for Denmark’s bidding area DK2 to identify the
effects of the portfolio choice on the imbalance payments and compensations to consumers
that provide flexibility. The results show that different compositions of flexibility sources
lead to different imbalance payments and compensations to consumers. However, there is no
significant additional value of having an access to all types of flexibility sources unless there
is a fixed contract cost. This suggests that the aggregator would choose to specialise in cer-
tain types of flexibility sources. Also, I find that the incentives for consumers to participate
in demand-side management programs might be not sufficient, since the compensation for
the provided flexibility is very low.
The second chapter, “Cooperative governance structures in flexible electricity demand ag-
gregation”, written together with Per J. Agrell, focuses on the aggregator’s presence in
the intraday power market from a perspective of a large power consumer that has flexible
load. We examined whether the cooperative governance structures could bring value to the
market participants and final power consumers compared to the situations where demand
flexibility is traded individually or via the investor owned aggregator. We found that if a
large consumer has a possibility to form a cooperative with other large consumers and share
fixed flexible demand coordination and market access cost, the consumer would receive the
highest profit. When there is no such possibility, a large consumer would offer its flexibility
to the aggregator, since the transaction cost related to trading the flexibility individually
is too high. In this case, the aggregator would absorb the profit. The results show that
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cooperative governance structures lead to lower equilibrium market prices and the highest
consumer surplus.
The third chapter, “Flexible electricity demand aggregator in the intraday market: Who
gains?”, studies the aggregator’s presence in the intraday market from the producer’s per-
spective. I investigated whether the flexible demand aggregator’s presence in the intraday
market can lead to a lower consumer surplus of power buyers and a higher profit for the
producer. I found that under certain market conditions and producer’s marginal cost in
different hours, the producer benefits from being in a competition with the aggregator and
the consumer surplus is lower compared to the situation when the producer is a monopolist.
However, under favourable market conditions, all market participants can benefit from the
aggregator’s presence in the intraday market.
iv
Resume´ (Danish)
Denne ph.d.-afhandling fokuserer p˚a efterspørgselsstyring p˚a elektricitetsmarkedet og en ny
spiller p˚a markedet – en aggregator for fleksibel efterspørgsel. Afhandlingen best˚ar af tre
selvstændige kapitler, der undersøger den nye spillers indtræden p˚a elektricitetsmarkederne
med et anderledes fokus, nemlig p˚a aggregatoren, storforbrugeren af el og producenten af
energi.
Det første kapitel, “Aggregeringen af efterspørgselssfleksibilitet p˚a elektricitetsmarkederne:
Effekter af porteføljevalg”, analyserer aggregatorens ydelse afhængig af porteføljevalget. Jeg
undersøger flere porteføljer inden for forskellige kilder til fleksibilitet; elektriske køretøjer,
varmepumper og/eller h˚arde hvidevarer som fx vaskemaskiner, tørretumblere og opvaske-
maskiner. Jeg anvender Nord Pools markedsdata for Danmarks prisomr˚ade DK2 til at
identificere de effekter, porteføjevalget har p˚a afvikling af ubalancer og kompensation til
fleksible kunder. Resultaterne viser, at forskellige sammensætninger af kilder til fleksibilitet
fører til forskellige afviklinger af ubalancer og kompensation til forbrugerne. Der er derimod
ingen betydelig merværdi i at have adgang til alle typer af kilder til fleksibilitet, medmindre
aftaleomkostningerne er faste. Dette antyder, at aggregatoren ville vælge at specialisere
sig i bestemte typer af kilder til fleksibilitet. Derudover konstaterer jeg, at incitamenterne
for forbrugernes deltagelse i programmer for efterspørgselsstyring ikke er tilstrækkelige, da
kompensationen for forbrugernes fleksibilitet er meget lav.
Det andet kapitel, “Selskabskonstruktioner inden for aggregeret fleksibel efterspørgsel p˚a
elektricitet”, skrevet i samarbejde med Per J. Agrell, fokuserer p˚a aggregatorens tilstede-
værelse i intraday-elektricitetsmarkederne fra den fleksible storforbrugers synsvinkel. Vi
undersøger, hvorvidt selskabskonstruktionerne kan tilføre værdi til markedsdeltagerne og
slutbrugerne sammenlignet med de situationer, hvor fleksibiliteten handles individuelt eller
via den investorejede aggregator. Vi konstaterer, at hvis en storforbruger har mulighed for
at skabe et kooperativ med andre storforbrugere og koordinere den fleksible efterspørgsel og
markedsadgangsomkostningerne, vil det generere det størst mulige overskud. N˚ar der ikke
er mulighed herfor, vil storforbrugeren tilbyde sin fleksibilitet til aggregatoren, da transak-
tionsomkostningerne for at forhandle fleksibiliteten individuelt er for høj. I dette tilfælde
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sluger aggregatoren overskuddet. Resultaterne viser, at selskabskonstruktioner fører til la-
vere ligevægtsmarkedspriser og det højeste konsumentoverskud.
Det tredje kapitel, “Aggregator for fleksibel elektricitetsefterspørgsel p˚a et intraday-marked:
Hvem vinder?”, undersøger aggregatorens tilstedeværelse p˚a intraday-markedet fra et for-
brugerperspektiv. Jeg undersøger, hvorvidt aggregatoren for fleksibel efterspørgsel kan føre
til et lavere konsumentoverskud for elforbrugere og et højere overskud for producenten.
Jeg konstaterer, at under visse markedsforhold og producentens grænseomkostninger p˚a
forskellige tidspunkter taget i betragtning, vil producenten drage nytte af at konkurrere
mod aggregatoren, og konsumentoverskuddet er lavere sammenlignet med, hvis producen-
ten havde monopol. Alle markedsdeltagere kan dog under gunstige markedsforhold drage
nytte af aggregatorens tilstedværelse p˚a intraday-markedet.
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Introduction
Worldwide attention and discussions on climate change has increased the importance of
further development of the energy sector, which has become one of the key topics of the
governments’ agendas. The EU 2030 Energy Strategy has set a target to increase the share
of renewable energy as a proportion of final power consumption at least up to 27% (European
Commission, 2014). This will contribute to reducing green house gas emissions, but also
create new issues for the power system stability due to large share of variable wind and
solar production. Smart grid and electricity demand-side management is seen as one of the
ways to deal with the system stability problems and, therefore, is widely discussed among
practitioners, academics and policy makers.
There is a great number of finished or ongoing smart grid projects in Europe. According
to the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s science and knowledge service
(2017), there are 950 Research & Development (R&D) and Demonstration projects with
a total budget of 4,97 billion Euros. One fourth of this amount represents the financing
of demand-side management projects. According to the same source, among the biggest
investors are distribution system operators, information and communications technology
companies and universities. Consumers’ flexibility is the focal point of such projects as eFlex
carried by DONG Energy Eldistribution A/S, TotalFlex under the Energinet.dk’s ForskEL
programme, EcoGrid EU by Energinet.dk and iPower (DONG Energy Eldistribution A/S,
2012; TotalFlex, 2017; Energinet.dk, 2014; iPower, 2017; Hansen and Borup, 2014).
This Ph.D. thesis consists of three independent chapters on energy economics and a general
conclusion. Even though each chapter is written as an independent research paper, all of
them focus on electricity demand-side management and a new player in the electricity mar-
kets – an aggregator1 of flexible demand. Each chapter analyses the entrance of this new
player in the market from different perspectives. The first chapter takes the aggregator’s
perspective and investigates the effects of different compositions of flexibility sources in the
aggregator’s portfolio on its performance. The second chapter takes a large electricity con-
sumer’s perspective and analyses three options to trade flexibility: offer flexibility directly
1Eurelectric (2014) defines an aggregator as “a market participant that combines multiple customer loads
or generated electricity for sale, for purchase or auction in any organised energy market”.
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to the market, offer it to the aggregator, which would trade on the large consumer’s behalf,
or join a cooperative of other large electricity consumers willing to engage in flexibility trad-
ing and share related market costs. The third chapter takes a power producer’s and other
electricity market participants’ perspective and examines market equilibrium outcomes and
the resulting changes due to the aggregator’s entrance to the market. All three chapters use
a game theoretic approach and provide numerical estimations based on Nord Pool power
markets, in particular Denmark’s bidding area DK2.
In 2014, The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) presented an advice paper
contributing to “assistance for NRAs [National Regulatory Authorities] and MS [Member
States] on how to encourage the participation of demand-side resources in their markets and
networks” (CEER, 2014). It highlights the aggregator’s importance in enabling demand-side
management to participate in wholesale markets and indicates that the aggregator’s role is
not clearly defined yet. Since then a lot of studies have had the aggregator as a central
figure pooling certain types of flexibility sources, such as electric vehicles (EVs) in Finn
et al. (2012), Di Giorgio et al. (2014), Neaimeh et al. (2015) or Bessa and Matos (2014), or
heat pumps (HPs) in Rankin et al. (2004), Papaefthymiou et al. (2012), Alaha¨iva¨la¨ et al.
(2017) or Arteconi et al. (2016). The first chapter supplements the ongoing discussion about
the aggregator’s role in electricity markets and, unlike other studies, investigates whether
targeting several types of small flexibility providers could bring additional value in terms of
balance management and excess flexibility selling for balancing purposes. Results suggest
that with no fixed contract cost there is no significant value in combining all flexibility
sources in one portfolio, thus, the aggregators are likely to specialise.
The second chapter, coauthored with Per J. Agrell, examines cooperative governance struc-
tures in the intraday electricity market. The main difference between a cooperative and an
investor owned firm is that a cooperative does not have a profit maximisation motive of
its own, but instead it represents several individual interests of its members (Trifon, 1961).
According to Bonus (1986), being a member of a cooperative allows lower transaction cost,
which leads to increased benefits compared to the individual activities in the market. Thus,
another way to pool the flexibility of large consumers is to allow them to form a cooperative.
We have investigated the intraday market outcomes under two flexibility pooling options:
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the aggregator and the cooperative. Similarly like Zugno et al. (2013), we found that the
aggregator absorbs the profit of large consumers offering their flexibility to the aggregator
unless they have an option to form a cooperative and compete with the aggregator. Finally,
the possibility to bid directly in the intraday market is not attractive to large consumers
since the market barriers are too high – relatively large transactions cost and high minimum
bid sizes.
The third chapter reveals that the aggregator’s presence at the intraday market may have
both positive and negative effects on the rest of the market players. In contrast to many
studies, for example, Hatziargyriou et al. (2010), Adika and Wang (2014), Frew et al. (2016)
or Alaha¨iva¨la¨ et al. (2017), focusing only on the benefits of flexible demand aggregation,
I found that under certain market conditions, i.e. certain demand and marginal cost of
power production in different hours, the market participants, including power buyers, may
be better off in a monopoly of the producer than under the producer’s and the aggregator’s
competition.
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the flexible demand aggregator’s
effects on the power markets and welfare of electricity consumers. The scale of interest
in the demand-side management topics only confirms its importance for future power sys-
tems. However, there are still many aspects that need to be analysed, such as consumer
compensation schemes, and all possible advantages and disadvantages should be determined
before the demand flexibility can be successfully used guaranteeing the stability to the power
system and lower prices to power consumers.
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Chapter 1
Aggregation of demand-side flexibility in electricity
markets: the effects of portfolio choice
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Aggregation of Demand-Side Flexibility in Electricity
Markets: the Effects of Portfolio Choice
Ieva Linkeviciute∗
September 27, 2018
Abstract
Aggregation of demand-side flexibility for balancing purposes is seen as a way to cope
with the challenges imposed by increasing share of renewable energy sources in the
future power system. The value of demand-side flexibility attracted attention of re-
searchers and industry some time ago. However, there is still a lack of discussion
whether the composition of various flexibility sources could bring additional value in
optimising schedules of flexible load. This paper examines the role of flexible demand
aggregators and the effects of their portfolio choice on imbalance payments and com-
pensations to flexibility providers. It also proposes a game theoretical model, which
allows to determine optimal flexible load schedules ensuring the highest savings on
imbalance payments. Seven scenarios, representing portfolios with different composi-
tions of flexibility sources, were set to investigate the Nordic power market. Results
show that the aggregator’s payments in balancing market and compensations to con-
sumers for provided flexibility depend on the type of flexibility sources in the portfolio.
Also, the difference between forecasted and actual reductions in imbalance payments
is affected by the portfolio composition. However, with no fixed contract cost, there
is no significant value in combining all flexibility sources in the portfolio. This means
that in order to maximise the value of flexible demand the aggregators might choose
to specialise in certain types of flexibility sources.
Keywords: demand-side management, flexibility, aggregation, electricity market
JEL classification: C61, C63, C72, L94
∗Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelaenshaven 16 A, 1st floor, DK-2000
Frederiksberg, Denmark.
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1 Introduction and literature review
Increasing share of variable renewable energy sources in power systems, lower generation
predictability and related balancing issues have heightened the need for enabling demand-
side flexibility in electricity markets. Today, small residential and commercial consumers are
still facing a number of barriers in accessing markets where they could trade their flexibility
– quantities are too small to meet the bidding requirements at the intraday or balancing
markets, market membership fees are too high for a small consumer and the lack of knowl-
edge and time for trading prevents from entering these markets. Therefore, aggregation of
demand-side flexibility has become an important topic among academics, policy makers and
businesses. This paper examines the role of flexible demand aggregators and the effects of
their portfolio choice on imbalance payments and compensations to flexibility providers.
The European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E) defines
balancing as “all actions and processes, on all timelines, through which TSOs ensure, in a
continuous way, to maintain the system frequency within a predefined stability range [...]”
(ENTSO-E, 2014a). Everyone, who is connected to the grid, is responsible for their own
imbalance and pays imbalance payments for any discrepancies between scheduled and actual
consumption (production). However, small consumers delegate this task to the retailer,
who either handles it himself or finds a Balance Responsible Party (BRP). In the end, final
consumers are charged for this service accordingly (Eurelectric, 2014).
Balancing services can mean both balancing energy, which is energy used by a TSO to
balance the power system, and balancing capacity, which is a reserved capacity hold by
a balancing service provider, which has an agreement with a TSO to bid a corresponding
volume of regulating energy for an agreed period of time. Balancing services can be provided
by flexible producers, energy storage facilities, as well as flexible consumers. Thus, flexible
demand is one of the competing flexibility sources, extending the list of possible flexibility
providers.
One could argue that small consumers cannot provide all types of flexibility. The balancing
of production and consumption can be differentiated by time, i.e. hours-ahead (replacement
reserves, activation within hours), minutes ahead (frequency restoration reserve, activation
10
within 15 minutes) and seconds ahead (frequency containment reserves, activation within
30 seconds). These reserves can be provided by generators, storage and demand response.
Small flexible consumers might find it challenging to react within seconds. However, if the
consumption is based on thermal storage, such like refrigerators, ovens or heat pumps, this
type of reserve can be served by small consumers too.
Currently, the traditional suppliers of flexibility in the balancing market are thermal power
plants. In the future, these conventional sources of flexibility might become more costly since
they would be utilised at lower rates due to an increasing share of renewable energy sources
(Katz, 2014). Thus, new flexibility sources should be introduced into the power system. In
order to do that, ENTSO-E is preparing the European network code on electricity balancing,
which should facilitate the participation of all flexibility providers, including demand-side
response, in the balancing market (ENTSO-E, 2014a).
Studies show that flexible consumption of households can contribute to the power system
balancing. Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning have high potential in providing fast
demand response (Ali et al., 2015; Lu, 2012). Electric vehicles and refrigerators are also
good candidates for flexible demand (Short et al., 2007; Nguyen and Le, 2014).
Although smart metering installation will eliminate one of the main barriers to use small
consumers’ flexibility, there are more obstacles to overcome. For example, it is important
for the consumers to accept this new technology, understand it and have their anxiety about
risks of participation mitigated (Park et al., 2014). Also, informational links between the
power market and consumers’ meters should be created (Katz, 2014). For further discussion
about demand response challenges and benefits see O’Connell et al. (2014).
In the recent years, a number of studies have focused on optimisation frameworks for flexible
demand aggregators participating in power markets. In some of these studies, the aggre-
gator is an existing player in the market, for example supplier, which requires only minor
adjustments to the current market model (Katz, 2014); in others, it is a newly introduced
player acting as an intermediary between the flexibility providers and the power market
(Agnetis et al., 2011).
The value of aggregation has been estimated in the current Nordic power market framework
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by Roos et al. (2014), in addition, real life demonstrations have been performed to show
the value of aggregated flexibility by Biegel et al. (2014a). So far, however, little discussion
exists about the effects of the aggregator’s portfolio composition, i.e. combination of various
sources of flexibility, like electric vehicles (EVs), heat pumps (HPs), and smaller home
appliances. It is still not clear, whether the aggregator should specialise in certain types of
flexibility or if it should construct a diversified portfolio to maximise the value.
There are two ways to modify the demand curve. The first is to shift the consumption to
other periods of time; the second is to curtail the consumption during peak hours.1 In this
paper, the former approach has been chosen to optimise consumption schedules, as it is
not straightforward to determine consumers’ opportunity cost of lowering the consumption
without an option to restore it later. In some cases, for example, changing the load of
thermal units like refrigerators or heat pumps, shifting the consumption may increase total
consumption due to restoring the required temperature levels. However, in others cases,
shifted consumption of such appliances as washing machines or dish washers does not depend
on the time of consumption.
In this study, the analysis of portfolio choice is based on game theory, which has been widely
applied in demand-side management models by, for example, Saad et al. (2012); Fadlullah
et al. (2013); Mohesian-Rad et al. (2010); Zugno et al. (2013); Kim (2014). Game theory
has a great potential to analyse demand-side management problems, because optimal load
schedules can be obtained by analysing the best strategies of all participants in the system
that have different objectives. Thus, game-theoretical tools are very useful for designing
incentive schemes for consumers.
The interactions between two main players, i.e. the aggregator, which is also the balance
responsible party, and the consumer, include information sharing about flexible consumption
schedules and sending price incentives for load shifting. Both players solve their optimisation
problems: the aggregator maximises the expected market profits by using demand-side
flexibility to lower imbalance payments and selling the excess flexibility in the market, while
the consumer minimises the cost of consumed electricity. The aggregator does not have
1One should be aware that demand response may also increase the consumption when power prices are
low due to increased renewable energy generation.
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complete market information about regulating energy prices, nor imbalances for the next
hour, which means that the actual gain and the expected result of the optimisation differ.
All flexibility sources have different characteristics and it is impossible to rank them without
a deeper analysis and actual real life simulations. Therefore, seven scenarios with different
portfolio compositions were set to investigate the effects of portfolio choice in the Nordic
power market.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of the aggregator in
the power market. Section 3 introduces the model setup: the aggregator and consumer op-
timisation problems, forecasting and uncertainty issues. Section 4 describes analysed cases
and scenarios, as well as the data used in simulations, while Section 5 provides simulation
results and discusses the characteristics of demand shifting in each portfolio and the aggre-
gators’ ability to trade flexibility. Finally, Section 6 concludes and suggests future research
directions.
2 Aggregator’s role
Now, some balance responsible parties have already taken the aggregator’s role and provide
different types of ancillary services aggregating smaller CHP (combined heat and power
plant) units (Energinet.dk and Danish Energy Agency, 2012). In the future, the main task
of the aggregator will be to connect small consumers offering flexibility to the power markets.
The aggregation of dispersed flexibility of households enables to use this flexibility source,
because only by aggregation it can be formed into wholesale market products (Koponen
et al., 2012). Thus, the aggregator acts as a central figure coordinating and changing
consumption schedules according to the agreed terms or by sending price signals in order
to minimise energy costs.
In some optimisation frameworks, like in Agnetis et al. (2011), the aggregator uses an
optimal schedule to place bids in the day-ahead market. Its decisions are based on forecasts
of the power price in the market and expected changes in the consumption schedules due
to price and volume signals sent to the consumer. In other frameworks, like in Biegel et al.
(2014b), the aggregator places bids in the ancillary service market for primary and secondary
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Figure 1: Aggregator’s role and its tasks in the power market: energy purchase at the day-
ahead market, formation of the flexibility portfolio, compensations to consumers for used
flexibility, information about load schedules and payments for imbalances to a TSO and the
excess flexibility provision to the regulating power market
reserves. This paper presents a model where the aggregator buys energy at the day-ahead
market before the optimisation of consumption schedules. Information about the flexible
consumption amounts and the time interval for load shifting is not always available before
the gate closure in the day-ahead market. Thus, flexibility sources are used for minimising
imbalance payments and selling flexibility at the regulating power market.
In cases where a balance responsible party also manages production side and has flexible con-
sumption sources, generating units can be kept in an optimal operating state. Consumers’
flexibility helps to reduce deviations in the system and allows to avoid high start-up cost
improving the efficiency rates of running power plants (Harbo and Biegel, 2012). However,
this paper focuses on the consumption side and the aggregator does not have generating
units in its portfolio. This also means that the aggregator faces only the regulating energy
price for consumption and, unlike in production side management case, can be compensated
for having the imbalance in the opposite direction than the system’s total imbalance.
In this model there is only one aggregator and many consumers divided in clusters depend-
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ing on the flexibility source (see Figure 1). Even though the clusters can also be formed
according to the number of people at the premises, the geographical area and their habits,
like argue Koponen et al. (2012), the model focuses on typical Danish households and the
type of appliances they own. The optimisation is carried out for all consumers individually,
but their behaviour is determined by common rules of the cluster. Although the aggre-
gator provides services to many consumers, the portfolio is relatively small; therefore, the
aggregator does not influence the regulating energy price.
If the aggregator had a bigger portfolio, it would start influencing regulating energy prices
and revenues would increase at a decreasing rate. Meanwhile, the compensation to con-
sumers would stay at the same rate of increase, as there is no impact to day-ahead prices.
The total portfolio fixed contract cost would increase with every additional contract, as it
is an increasing step function. Thus, the aggregator should carefully choose the size of its
portfolio.
If other aggregators would enter the market, the revenues from trading the excess flexibil-
ity at the market are likely to diminish, because the supply of energy would increase and
strengthen competition. In addition, the consumers would get an opportunity to switch
between the aggregators which focus on the same source of flexibility and in this way try to
increase their compensations.2 All of this would lead to lower aggregator’s profits. However,
the aggregator’s imbalance cost might decrease due to lower regulating power prices. The
aggregator’s behaviour in the presence of other aggregators and the value of demand flexi-
bility depending on the portfolio size are interesting topics that deserve a separate study. As
this paper focuses on different sources of flexibility and its value to the aggregator, the model
setting is chosen to be relatively simple and reflects only the effects of different compositions
of the aggregator’s portfolio.
The optimisation of flexible consumption is a continuous process as it does not depend on
a particular event in the system, such as a sudden shut down of a power plant or a very
high spot market price, but rather minimises the cost of energy every time the appliance is
used. Even though the aggregator has more information about the power system conditions
than the consumer, it still faces various uncertainties and calculates the expected value
2This could be another reason encouraging the aggregators to specialise in certain types of flexibility.
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of flexibility. This means that there is a risk of changing a consumption schedule in the
opposite direction than it is optimal. However, the aggregator’s portfolio consists of many
dispersed flexibility offers during the year, which allows diversifying risk of losses caused by
inaccurate forecasts. Thus, this is another quality of aggregation, which makes it preferable
to a single consumer trading small and infrequent flexibility amounts at the market.
It is hard to estimate the baseline of consumption, i.e. consumption without the flexibility
involved, when the usage of appliances depends on the consumer behaviour. For example,
the aggregator cannot make accurate forecasts of a dishwasher activation time unless the
consumer sends a notice to the aggregator that the dishes must be done within a certain
period of time. Naturally, the baseline consumption would coincide with hours when the
notice is sent, i.e. consumer’s initial thought of using an appliance. Introducing flexibility
allows the consumer to adjust consumption according to the lowest electricity spot prices.
In this case the baseline consumption (or “original schedule”, as it is called further in the
paper) for the aggregator is the consumption schedule optimised by the consumer according
to the day-ahead prices (see section 4.2 Data and Figure 6 for more details). Based on this
consumption schedule, the aggregator determines compensations for the shifted load.
The aggregator and flexibility providers enter into a contract, where they state the obliga-
tions for both parties, including compensation terms, constraints under which the aggregator
is allowed to change the consumption schedule and consumer’s obligation to provide flexi-
bility, similarly like in Harbo and Biegel (2012).
In terms of contract cost, the most favourable situation for the aggregator would be to
have one infinitely flexible consumer that could provide all energy needed to eliminate its
imbalance. However, each consumer has a limited flexibility and the aggregator has to form
a portfolio of flexible demand, where the number of consumers depends on the flexibility
source. Thus, contract cost affects the ranking of the aggregator’s portfolios and a high
number of contracts may reduce the value of otherwise effective flexibility source.
Compensation rates for the consumer’s provided flexibility can be flat or flexible. A flat
rate, or a capacity payment, means that the aggregator pays a fixed compensation for a
specified time period for a specified capacity of flexibility. Meanwhile, a flexible rate, or an
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energy payment, is used when the aggregator compensates only for the flexibility that has
been actually used. Also, consumers can be offered a combination of these two payments.
In the model, a flexible rate regime is chosen to reflect the market value of flexibility.
According to Broberg and Persson (2016), consumers want to be compensated differently
depending on the flexibility source and time during the day. For example, consumers are
more willing to allow direct control of their heating systems instead of other home appliances,
such as washing machines, dryers and dish washers. Evening peak consumption hours are
less flexible and need larger compensation. Also, age, gender, income and the number of
persons in a household also affect their compensation preferences. However, to determine
exact disutility functions reflecting all these variables would require a thorough analysis of
consumers’ behaviour.
3 Model setup
The model is set using a leader-follower structure that is a characteristic of Stackelberg games
(von Stackelberg, 2011)3. In this hierarchical game, the leader, i.e. the consumer, announces
his or her strategy in advance. After receiving this information, the aggregator maximises
its utility. Thus, the consumer’s task is to choose a strategy such that the aggregator’s
response yields the largest possible payoff for him or her. When the equilibrium is reached,
neither the consumer nor the aggregator is willing to change the load scheduling strategy.
The nomenclature is presented in Table 1.
The process of aggregating and trading the flexibility of consumption is illustrated in Figure
2. It includes the following stages:
• Initial state The aggregator has already purchased energy at the day-ahead market
Est to cover the demand for the next day. Decisions about the amount of energy are
based on consumption forecasts.
3Translation from the German language edition: “Marktform und Gleichgewicht” (1934), Springer-Verlag
Wien
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Table 1: Nomenclature
Nomenclature
T total number of time periods in the optimisation (total number of hours)
t time index (a number of hour), t ∈ (1, 2, . . . , T )
K total number of consumers in the aggregator’s portfolio
i consumer index, i ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,K)
J total number of flexibility sources in the portfolio
j index of flexibility source, j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , J)
li,t total load of the i’th consumer in hour t
linfi,t inflexible load of the i’th consumer in hour t
lfi,t flexible load of the i’th consumer in hour t
pst day-ahead price in hour t
Uai,j,t i’th consumer’s utility of using j type of appliance in hour t
V ai,j,t i’th consumer’s value of using j type of appliance in hour t
γi,j,t compensation factor for i’th consumer’s j type of appliance, γi,j ∈ [1; 2]
mi,j,t
number of times the aggregator has used the i’th consumer’s flexibility of type
j in the whole optimisation period up to and including hour t
Ci total consumer’s cost of consumed electricity in the optimisation period
pfi,j,t price of j type flexibility in hour t for consumer i
Est energy purchased by the aggregator at the spot market for period t
put electricity up regulation price in period t
pdt electricity down regulation price in period t
Eut up regulation energy purchased by the aggregator from a TSO for period t
Edt down regulation energy purchased by the aggregator from a TSO for period t
lut
up regulation energy sold by the aggregator at the ancillary services market in
period t
ldt
down regulation energy sold by the aggregator at the ancillary services market
in period t
It imbalance the aggregator has in period t
cc the aggregator’s fixed contract cost
Cc total fixed contract cost for the aggregator’s portfolio
puforecast,t the aggregator’s electricity up regulation price forecast for time period t
pdforecast,t the aggregator’s electricity down regulation price forecast for time period t
puactual,t actual electricity up regulation price for time period t
pdactual,t actual electricity down regulation price for time period t
eut random error variable for up regulation price in period t, e
u
t ∈ [−0, 05; 0, 05]
edt random error variable for down regulation price in period t, e
d
t ∈ [−0, 05; 0, 05]
Iforecast,t the aggregator’s forecasted imbalance in period t
Iactual,t actual aggregator’s imbalance in period t
ei,t random error variable for the imbalance in period t, ei,t ∈ [−0, 1; 0, 1]
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• Stage 1 The consumer optimises his/her flexible consumption according to the known
day-ahead prices and sends a notice to the aggregator indicating the amount of avail-
able flexibility in consumption, i.e. the amount of energy and time when this energy
should be used, together with the time interval for allowed deviations.
• Nature After the gate closure of the day-ahead market, some unexpected events
lead to deviations from the aggregator’s forecasted demand schedules. This causes
imbalances for the aggregator.
• Stage 2 After receiving the consumer’s notice with the “original” consumption sched-
ule, the aggregator optimises it according to the expected imbalance situation it fore-
casted (imbalance amounts It depending on the actual consumption lt, up and down
regulating prices put and p
d
t , and the dominating direction of the system’s total imbal-
ance). If there are deviations from the “original” consumption schedule sent by the
consumer, the aggregator sends a notice to the consumer with desired changes in the
“original” consumption schedule and offers of compensations (flexibility price pfi,j,t).
The aggregator knows the consumer’s utility function.4
• Stage 3 The consumer decides whether to accept the offer, i.e. the flexibility price
for all offered flexibility and changes in the “original” consumption schedule. The
consumer does not have information about the aggregator’s expected imbalance situ-
ation. The consumer always fulfils his/her obligation to provide flexibility, there are
no penalty fees.5
• Stage 4 The aggregator uses flexibility to minimise its imbalance payments, sells the
excess flexibility at the ancillary services market and pays compensations to consumers.
• Stage 5 Revelation of actual aggregator’s imbalances It, regulating energy prices put
and pdt , and the dominating direction of the system’s total imbalance.
4The consumer and the aggregator reach an agreement about compensation rates when signing the
flexibility provision contract. Thus, γi,j,t is known in advance and depends on the number of times when
the flexibility was used. Nevertheless, the aggregator can never be completely sure about its consumers real
disutility of shifting the consumption which is hard to evaluate in monetary terms. Therefore, the consumer
could use this asymmetric information to increase his/her compensation rates.
5As the load shifting processes are assumed to be automated, the probability of the consumer violating
the agreement is relatively low. However, introduction of penalty fees is quite common in load shifting
simulations.
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Figure 2: Timeline: stages reflecting the process of aggregating, optimising and trading
demand flexibility
The algorithm of the model is presented in Figure 3 and illustrates the stages of the model.
The following sections focus on a consumer’s and the aggregator’s optimisation problems,
also discuss uncertainties and forecasting issues.
3.1 Consumer
Let i, i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , K) be the set of consumers in the aggregator’s portfolio, where K is the
total number of consumers. The total load li,t of the i’th consumer in hour t is composed of
two parts: inflexible load linfi,t and flexible load l
f
i,t, i.e. li,t = l
inf
i,t + l
f
i,t. Since the inflexible
load cannot be shifted, I have focused only on the flexible part lfi,t. Each consumer is charged
the day-ahead price pst for each kilowatt hour of his/her consumed electricity.
3.1.1 Sources of flexibility
The consumer offers the flexibility of consumption of five flexibility sources: washing ma-
chines, clothes dryers, dish washers, heat pumps and electric vehicles. All of them have
different consumption patterns, i.e. time when the flexibility is offered, the amount of flexi-
bility and the time interval for possible shifting of consumption. Based on the characteristics
of flexibility sources, the consumers are divided into three clusters:
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Figure 3: The algorithm of the simulations reflecting the sequence of forecasting processes
and actors’ decisions
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• those who offer the flexibility of small home appliances: washing machines, clothes
dryers and dish washers (the need to use these appliances is stochastic, the amount of
offered flexibility of one appliance is relatively small, appliances are usually used during
the day time and the time interval for possible shifting of consumption is medium, 3-6
hours);
• those who offer the flexibility of heat pumps (available only seven months per year, 24
hours per day, the amount of available flexibility is correlated with outside tempera-
ture, the time interval for shifting the consumption is relatively shorter, 3 hours);
• and those who offer the flexibility of their electric vehicles (the flexibility is available
only at night, the offered amount is relatively large and time period for shifting is the
longest, 10 hours).
In the model, the source of flexibility is denoted by j, j ∈ (1, . . . , J). The values of j depend
on a particular scenario and the flexibility sources included in the aggregator’s portfolio and
J indicates the total number of flexibility sources in the portfolio.
3.1.2 Consumer’s utility
The i’th consumer’s utility of using an appliance that provides flexibility is denoted by Uai,j,t
and the cost of using the appliance in hour t is the product of electricity day-ahead price
and the amount of energy used in hour t, i.e. pst l
f
i,j,t. Thus, the value of using an appliance
in hour t is
V ai,j,t = U
a
i,j,t − pst lfi,j,t. (1)
Since the focus is on consumption shifting but not on consumption curtailment, the exact
utility of using the appliance Uai,j,t is not important. For example, if the consumer wants to
wash dishes, the satisfaction of clean dishes will be the same and will not depend on the
particular time within the allowed time interval for shifting the consumption. This means
that if the washing is moved by n, n ∈ (0, 1, . . . , N), hours, where N is the maximum number
of hours indicating the interval within the consumption can be moved, the utilities Uai,j,t and
Uai,j,t±n will be equal. Instead we should analyse the disutility of shifting the consumption
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within the indicated period of time. Unlike the utility of using the appliance Uai,j,t, the
value V ai,j,t differs for every hour within the shifting period, because the cost of energy
pst l
f
i,j,t depends on consumption hour t. When the consumer optimises his/her consumption
schedule, he or she chooses the highest value of using the appliance V ai,j,t within the allowed
time interval for shifting the consumption. Due to shifting the consumption by n hours to
hour t± n, the change in consumption value can be written as
V ai,j,t − V ai,j,t±n = (Uai,j,t − pst lfi,j,t)− (Uai,j,t±n − pst±nlfi,j,t±n). (2)
Since Uai,j,t = U
a
i,j,t±n and l
f
i,j,t = l
f
i,j,t±n
6, we get
V ai,j,t − V ai,j,t±n = (pst − pst±n)lfi,j,t. (3)
This difference in values can be seen as a disutility of shifting the consumption. However,
due to shifting the consumption, the consumer not only incurs higher cost of energy, but
also experiences some level of discomfort, for example, uncertainty of the exact time when
the dishes are washed. The level of discomfort increases with the increasing number of times
when the consumption has been shifted.7 To account for the increasing discomfort, I have
introduced a compensation factor γi,j,t, γi,j,t ∈ [1; 2]. Let mi,j,t be the number of times the
aggregator has used the i’th consumer’s flexibility in the whole optimisation period up to
and including hour t. γi,j,t can be written as
γi,j,t = 1 +
1
Mi,j
mi,j,t, (4)
where Mi,j is the total number of times the i’th consumer can offer his or her flexibility
in the whole optimisation period. Thus, every time the aggregator uses the flexibility, the
consumer’s discomfort and, therefore, compensation factor to the consumer is increasing at
a constant rate 1/Mi,j. This means that the compensation factor is 1/Mi,j × 100 percent
higher comparing to the previous time of shifting the consumption. The compensation to
consumer for shifting his/her consumption for the mi,j,t’th time can be written as
lfi,j,tp
f
i,j,t = l
f
i,j,t(p
s
t − pst±n)γi,j,t, (5)
6Here, it is assumed that due to consumption shifting the required amounts of energy are the same in
both hours for all flexibility sources including the heat pumps.
7Harbo and Biegel (2012) also argue that contract settlement cost may depend on the flexibility utilisation
extent.
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where pfi,j,t is the flexibility price offered to the i’th consumer for the flexibility source j.
From (5):
pfi,j,t = (p
s
t − pst±n)γi,j,t. (6)
One one hand, if compensations are too low, consumers have no incentive to offer their
flexibility of consumption. On the other hand, if compensations get too high, the aggregator
cannot use the offered flexibility because the cost of shifting load exceeds its value. Thus,
the higher compensation factor would encourage consumers’ participation, but also would
result in lower use of flexibility. In the results section of this study one can see that with
the current form of compensation factor only half of the available flexibility is actually
used, while the compensation amounts to consumers are very small. Therefore, changing
the compensation factor to one or another direction would either diminish already low
compensations to consumers or reduce the actual use of flexibility even further.
The presented concept is similar to the proposal by Harbo and Biegel (2012), where they
suggest the “N-curtailment contract”. This contract has a limited number of activations,
n, and a compensation for curtailment is increasing with the number of activations. Thus,
the consumer is compensated progressively with activation. Harbo and Biegel (2012) also
propose a fixed reservation payment at x0 DKK after which follows an activation fee of
(x1, . . . , xn) for the following n activations.
3.1.3 Consumer’s optimisation problem
The objective function of the i’th consumer offering flexibility of the source j is the min-
imisation of the cost of the electricity consumed by providing as much flexibility of the
consumption as possible, given by
Ci(l
f
i,j,t) =
T∑
t=1
pst li,t − pfi,j,tlfi,j,t. (7)
Here, the cost of consumed electricity is equal to the sum of hourly consumed energy at
spot prices pst li,t less the revenue from the provided flexibility p
f
i,j,tl
f
i,j,t. The consumer has
no information about the flexibility price pfi,j,t he or she will be offered while making the
initial load schedule decision. Therefore, the consumer’s optimisation problem becomes
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a simple exercise of finding the lowest electricity spot prices for the time intervals with
flexible consumption. After solving this problem, the aggregator is provided with the flexible
consumption schedule. Based on this schedule and estimated savings in imbalance payments,
the aggregator offers flexibility prices for changing the initial schedule and the consumer
minimises the cost by accepting or rejecting the offer for a particular time period.
The consumer’s optimisation problem has several constraints. First, the total consumption
consists of inflexible and flexible parts:
li,t = l
inf
i,t + l
f
i,j,t. (8)
Second, flexibility can be provided only by certain home appliances, HPs and/or EVs. This
means that the amount of flexible consumption lfi,j,t depends on the power of those appliances
and the need to use them. In addition, the source of flexibility determines the time interval
for possible consumption shifting. For more details on flexibility sources see section 4.2
Data.
3.2 Aggregator
The aggregator enters into a contract with the consumer and uses demand-side flexibility to
reduce its imbalance payments and maximise the profit. In addition to the compensations
to its consumers, the aggregator faces some fixed contract cost that diminishes benefits from
the enabled flexibility. The aggregator’s optimisation problem and related contract cost, as
well as forecasting procedures are discussed in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Aggregator’s optimisation problem
The objective function of the aggregator is the maximisation of the expected market profit,
given by
Π(x,y) = E
{ K∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
pst li,t − pstEst − putEut − pdtEdt − pfi,j,tlfi,j,t + put lut + pdt ldt
}
(9)
where T is time periods in the optimisation, t – index of the time period, pst – electricity
spot price in period t, li,t – total consumption of the consumer in period t, E
s
t is energy
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purchased at the spot market for period t, put and p
d
t – electricity up and down regulation
prices in period t, Eut and E
d
t – up and down regulation energy purchased from a transmission
system operator (TSO), pfi,j,t – price offered to the i’th consumer for flexible consumption of
flexibility source j in period t, lfi,j,t is flexible consumption of flexibility source j of the i’th
consumer in period t, lut and l
d
t are up and down regulation energy sold by the aggregator
at the ancillary services market.
The aggregator’s expected market profit in hour t is equal to the revenue from the consumers
for supplied electricity
∑K
i=1 p
s
t li,t minus the cost for buying energy at the spot market p
s
tE
s
t
minus the cost for up or down regulation energy purchased from the TSO putE
u
t + p
d
tE
d
t ,
minus the payment to the consumer for the provided flexibility
∑K
i=1
∑J
j=1 p
f
i,j,tl
f
i,j,t, plus the
revenue for the excess up and down regulation energy sold at the regulating energy market
put l
u
t + p
d
t l
d
t . In a one-price balance settlement system, a load balance responsible party may
profit from its imbalance if it helps to reduce a system imbalance. Therefore, just by having
an imbalance in the opposite direction than the system’s total imbalance, the aggregator
yields profit without actually trading the flexibility with other market players. In addition,
shifted flexible demand does not influence regulating energy prices, because the aggregator’s
flexibility portfolio is relatively small.
By simplifying (9), we get
Π(x,y) = E
{ K∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
pst(li,t − Est )− pfi,j,tlfi,j,t + put (lut − Eut ) + pdt (ldt − Edt )
}
, (10)
Π(x,y) = E
{ K∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
pstIt − pfi,j,tlfi,j,t + put (lut − Eut ) + pdt (ldt − Edt )
}
, (11)
where It = lt−Est , lt =
∑K
i=1 li,t, is the imbalance that the aggregator has in period t. Here
x = {pfi,j,t, Eut , Edt , lut , ldt } is the aggregator’s set of decision variables and y = {lfj,t} is the
i’th consumer’s one.
To solve the optimisation problem the aggregator has to take the following constraints into
account:
Eut =
 Est − lt if Est − lt ≤ 00 if Ets − lt > 0 (12)
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Edt =
 Est − lt if Est − lt ≥ 00 if Ets − lt < 0 (13)
(12) and (13) reflect imbalance definition, which says that if the planned consumption Est
purchased at the spot market is less than the actual consumption lt, i.e. the imbalance is
negative, the aggregator must buy up regulation power. If the imbalance is positive and the
actual consumption is smaller than expected, then the aggregator must buy down regulation
power (Energinet.dk, 2008). Other constraints, such as time intervals for potential shifting
of consumption and flexibility amounts, depend on a particular flexibility source. More
detailed information is provided in section 4.2 Data.
Final problem formulation, including the consumer’s problem, can be written as
max
x
Π(x,y)
s.t. (12), (13)
y solves min
y
C(x,y)
s.t. (8),
specific flexibility source constraints.
(14)
The Stackelberg game can be formulated mathematically using bilevel programmes, which
are mathematical programmes that contain optimisation problems in their constraints. The
leader’s, the aggregator’s, problem is called the upper-level problem and the follower’s, the
consumer’s, problem is called the lower-level problem. One solution method of this bilevel
problem is to use Extended Mathematical Programming (EMP) tool, which formulates
the bilevel problem as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).
The reformulation is made by replacing the lower-level problem by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Afterwards, such problem can be solved using already existing solvers, for
example, those available within GAMS (GAMS, 2018).8
In this study, due to the model complexity, the solution is obtained numerically. The chosen
approach allows to track all changes in the system during the simulation and provides the
whole system’s view at any point in time.
8For similar problems see Zugno et al. (2013) and Luo et al. (1996).
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3.2.2 Contract cost
The aggregator pays compensations to its consumers based on the market value of the
flexible consumption and the amount of used flexibility. This means that, unlike in the flat
tariff case where the consumers are offered a fixed payment every month, the flexible tariff
requires more aggregator’s resources for settlement process and maintaining transparency
(Harbo and Biegel, 2012).
Let cc be the aggregator’s fixed contract cost. Thus, the total contract cost for the portfolio
of consumers is equal to the product of the contract cost cc and the total number of con-
sumers in the portfolio K, Cc = ccK.
9 As a result, the aggregator’s profit in each scenario
is reduced by the total contract cost of the portfolio.
3.2.3 Uncertainty and forecasting
While maximising its profits, the aggregator faces uncertainty in regulating energy prices,
the direction of regulating energy for the whole system and its imbalance amounts. Thus,
in order to make an optimal flexible load scheduling decision it uses forecasts.
The aggregator’s forecasts for up and down regulating prices are simulated using the fol-
lowing formulas:
puforecast,t = (1 + eu,t)p
u
actual,t (15)
pdforecast,t = (1 + ed,t)p
d
actual,t (16)
where puforecast,t and p
d
forecast,t are up and down regulating energy prices for the time period
t, puactual,t and p
d
actual,t – actual up and down regulating prices for the time period t, eu,t
and ed,t – error variables for up and down regulating prices, which are random variables
uniformly distributed in the interval [-0.05, 0.05] for the time period t. Thus, it means that
the forecast has a maximum error of 5%.
Often the dominating direction of the system’s total imbalance does not change for several
hours. Therefore, the aggregator’s forecast is based on the information about the dominating
9It is assumed that the consumer needs a contract for every source of flexibility he or she is offering.
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direction in previous hours. For example, if the whole system needed up regulation in
the previous hour, the aggregator expects that the system will need up regulation in the
current hour, too. However, the aggregator may predict the coming change in the system’s
imbalance direction from up and down regulation prices and their movement towards the
spot price for that hour. So, when there is a change in the dominating direction, the system’s
total imbalance direction is predicted correctly with a probability of 1/3, as there are three
possible outcomes: the system might need up regulation, down regulation or it is balanced.
In a one-price system, the imbalance price for consumption depends on the dominating
direction of the system’s total imbalance but not the aggregator’s imbalance. In case the
system is balanced, the imbalance price for consumption is equal to the spot price.
It is also assumed that the aggregator forecasts its imbalance with a maximum deviation of
10% from the actual imbalance for every hour. The aggregator’s forecast is simulated using
the following formula:
Iforecast,t = (1 + ei,t)Iactual,t (17)
where Iforecast,t and Iactual,t are the aggregator’s forecasted and actual imbalance in the period
t, and ei,t is a random variable for the imbalance error, which is uniformly distributed in
the interval [-0.1, 0.1] for the time period t.
Even though forecasting the imbalances and regulating prices for the next hours is a com-
plicated task for the aggregator, the errors in obtaining these values are chosen to be low.
The reason is that the expected and the actual imbalance payments differ significantly when
higher error values are chosen for simulation, which leads to a situation when the aggrega-
tor is incapable to reduce its actual imbalance. Figure B.4 and Figure B.5 in Appendix B
provide results for four scenarios with a larger imbalance price forecasting error.
4 Case study description
The following case study description defines cases and scenarios for flexible demand simu-
lations and provides all necessary data.
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Figure 4: Scenarios reflecting different compositions of the aggregator’s portfolio
4.1 Cases and scenarios
Simulations are run for two cases. Case 1 examines the variations in consumption and
available flexibility during the year. However, time for running the optimisation for the
whole year increases significantly with every additional appliance. Thus, Case 2 with a
shorter period of one week is used to investigate the effects of a higher number of flexibility
sources. The week is chosen to reflect the winter maximum when the consumption and,
therefore, imbalances are highest. According to the ENTSO-E guidelines for the system
adequacy forecasts (ENTSO-E, 2014b), the winter peak is calculated for the third Wednesday
in January (the third week in 2014). However, in 2014, weather temperature was lower in
week 4, which results in higher consumption of electricity. Thus, week 4 was used for one
week simulations in Case 2. In the model, the cases are reflected in T , which is the total
number of time periods in the optimisation: in Case 1, T = 8760; in Case 2, T = 168.
Seven scenarios are used in order to analyse the effects of different portfolio compositions
on the value created by enabling demand flexibility. All scenarios are presented in Figure 4.
The total amount of flexible consumption in the portfolio is divided equally between three
consumer clusters providing flexibility from various sources. For example, in Scenario 1 the
aggregator has only those consumers who have EVs. Scenario 2 includes only those, who
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have HPs. Scenario 3 analyses flexibility provided by smaller home appliances, where it
is again divided equally between washing machines (WMs), clothes dryers (DRs) and dish
washers (DWs). Scenario 4 comprises all types of flexibility: here one third of flexibility
comes from EVs cluster, one third from HPs cluster and the rest from the small home
appliances cluster. In the model, the source of flexibility is denoted by j, while J reflects
the total number of flexibility sources types in the portfolio. For instance, in Scenario 1, the
flexibility is provided only EVs, therefore, J = 1. Meanwhile, in Scenario 4, the aggregator
has an access to all five types of flexibility sources and J = 5.
4.2 Data
The model was applied using the Nordic power market and Denmark’s bidding area DK2
data for 2014. Electricity spot and regulating energy prices, the dominating direction of
the system’s total imbalance, as well as the hourly consumption for each bidding area, are
available on the Nord Pool website.
Total annual consumption and its distribution between various household appliances deter-
mine the amount of flexible demand. An average Danish household of three persons living
in a house consumes approximately 4500 kWh per year (Dong Energy, 2013). Flexible
consumption of washing machines, clothes dryers and dish washers is a part of this total
consumption. However, electric vehicles and heat pumps are still used moderately; there-
fore, the energy used for transportation and heating purposes is not reflected in data from
2014 (see Appendix A Figure A.2). This is corrected by increasing the average annual total
consumption of 4500 kWh by the average consumption of electric vehicles and heat pumps.
An average annual consumption of one unit of each flexibility source is presented in Figure
5.
The value of aggregated demand flexibility depends not only on the total annual flexible
consumption, but also on hourly consumption patterns during the year. Table 2 shows
flexibility sources’ consumption patterns and time periods for possible shifts in consumption
schedules.
According to the Dong Energy household’s consumption report (Dong Energy, 2013), on
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Figure 5: Average annual consumption of one unit of flexibility source (Case 1)
Table 2: Flexible consumption patterns, amounts and time periods for potential shifting
Flex. source Consumption pattern
Flexibility amount per
time
Flexibility time period
WM 5 loads per week 0,87 kWh 6 hours per load
DR
Correlated with washing machine’s schedule, 3 loads per
week
2,5 kWh 3 hours per load
DW 3 loads per week 1,98 kWh 6 hours per load
HP
Correlated with outside temp., turns on 8 times per 24
hours, 7 months per year
varies with temp. 3 hours
EV Plugged-in for 10 hours every night 7,8 kWh 10 hours per night
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average, a washing machine is used 5 times per week and it requires around 0,87 kWh of
electricity per load. Since the washing cannot be interrupted, 0,87 kWh corresponds to
flexibility provided in a block of two hours t and t + 1 (lfi,j,t = 0, 5 kWh and l
f
i,j,t+1 = 0, 37
kWh). In this model, it is assumed that the consumer may accept to delay washing, however,
the clothes must be washed no later than six hours after the notice of washing was sent.
This means that there is a six hour time period within which the aggregator can shift
the consumption. Similarly, a clothes dryer is, on average, used three times per week and
consumes 2,5 kWh per load (lfi,j,t = 2, 5 kWh). Its usage is correlated with the schedule of
a washing machine. A dish washer uses 1,98 kWh of electricity per load (lfi,j,t = 1, 98 kWh),
three times per week, with a six-hour period of flexibility.
Consumption schedules for washing machines, clothes dryers and dish washers during the
week are generated using a random variable. However, there are some constraints that
must be satisfied. For example, the consumer cannot send the consumption notice for the
aggregator during the night hours, i.e. from 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.; a clothes dryer must
be loaded no later than two hours after the washing is done, or, if it was finished during the
night, between 6:00 to 8:00 a.m..10
An HP is turned on only seven months per year, i.e. from October until May. On average a
120 m2 house for heating uses 2800 kWh per year. Unlike with other appliances, the hourly
consumption varies and depends on the outside temperature: cold winter days significantly
increase the need for heating. Thus, the load curve is negatively correlated with the outside
temperature (see Appendix A Figure A.3). It is assumed, that the HP is turned on for one
hour in a three-hour interval and there are no changes in total consumption level of the HP
due to moving heating processes in time.
The consumer agrees to keep an EV plugged-in for ten hours, from 9:00 p.m. till 7:00
a.m.. According to Denmark’s Ministry of Transport (2012), the average Dane travels 39
km a day. An electric vehicle consumes about 20 kWh/100 km, which means that the
aggregator has 7-8 kWh of flexible demand each night and about 2840 kWh per year. An
EV must charge for approximately 4 hours (lfi,j,t = 1, 95 kWh in each hour), as the maximum
10Other rules guarantee that there cannot be more than two loads per day for washing machines and only
one load per day for a dish washer. Also, there cannot be more than three days without washing dishes and
more than two days in a row of using a dish washer.
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Table 3: The number of appliances in each scenario in Case 1 (Case 2)
Scenario EV HP WM DR DW
1 18 (214) - - - -
2 - 18 (68) - - -
3 - - 73 (764) 43 (444) 54 (561)
4 6 (71) 6 (23) 24 (255) 14 (148) 18 (187)
5 9 (107) 9 (34) - - -
6 9 (107) - 36 (382) 21 (222) 27 (280)
7 - 9 (34) 36 (382) 21 (222) 27 (280)
boundary for charging is 2.2 kW (Hennings et al., 2013). However, the charging of EVs can
be interrupted, which means that the consumer will choose four hours during the night,
when the day-ahead prices are the lowest.
The scheme for possible schedules for each flexibility source type is presented in Figure 6.
For example, there are 5 possible schedules for washing. Let’s assume that, according to the
day ahead prices, the cheapest option to wash clothes is in hours t+ 3 and t+ 4. Then, the
schedule with the lowest cost of using the flexibility source is called the “original” schedule
and is sent to the aggregator. Each consumer has his/her individual consumption schedule.
Case 1 and 2 represent two portfolio options with different total flexibility amounts. In Case
1 the aggregator has an access to 50 MWh of flexibility per year, while in Case 2 it gathers
10 MWh per week, which allows for a larger number of flexibility sources. The number of
appliances is determined by each unit’s annual and weekly consumption accordingly. As
HPs use much more energy during week 4 in winter, the number of HPs is relatively lower
in Case 2 (see Figure 7 and Table 3).
It is assumed, that the aggregator has 1000 households. Hourly consumption of one house-
hold is derived using the load curve and the annual electricity consumption in the DK2
bidding area. The load curve is corrected for increased consumption due to HPs and EVs.
Further, the load curve is used to model the aggregator’s imbalance, which is equal to 2%
of its consumers’ consumption (see Appendix A Figure A.4). Usually, the aggregator’s im-
balance is in the same direction as the whole system. Therefore, in imbalance simulations
it is assumed that it may be in the opposite direction only 5% of the time.
In Denmark, a fixed supply contract charge for a typical household (4.000 kWh/year) is
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Figure 6: Possible schedules for each flexibility source type
35
Figure 7: Average weekly consumption of one unit of flexibility source (Case 2)
Table 4: Total number of contracts in each scenario, Case 1 and Case 2
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7
Case 1 18 18 170 68 18 93 93
Case 2 214 68 1769 684 141 991 918
around 9 DKK per month (d0-28 per week or d14-52 per year) (Kitzing et al., 2016).
However, the aggregator is already billing its consumers and an increase in the fixed contract
cost should account only for additional resources used to track offered flexibility amounts
and calculate compensations according to the market prices. Therefore, the fixed contract
cost for flexibility (further – fixed contract cost) is relatively small compared to the total
fixed supply contract cost.
To investigate the effect of fixed contract cost on the aggregator’s profit in each scenario,
I used a range of fixed contract cost per consumer: d0,00-d0,015 per week in Case 2; and
d0,00-d0.55 per year in Case 1. The total fixed contract cost depends on the total number
of contracts in a portfolio, presented in Table 4.
5 Results
Simulations are run on a laptop with an Intel Core i3 1.70 GHz processor and 4 GB memory
using Wolfram Mathematica 10.3. The output for Case 1 and Case 2 includes hourly pay-
ments for regulating energy before and after the optimisation, compensations to consumers,
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Table 5: Actual and forecasted reductions in total imbalance payments (Case 1 and Case 2)
Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Actual reduction in total imb. payments, % 5,1 4,7 7,4 5,7 4,9 6,4 6,2
Forecasted reduction in total imb. payments, % 7,3 8,1 10,2 8,5 7,7 8,8 9,2
Actual reduction in total imb. payments, d 57,1 52,1 81,8 63,8 54,6 70,9 68,4
Forecasted reduction in total imb. payments, d 71,78 79,53 100,53 83,73 75,66 87,06 90,93
Difference in differences, d 14,68 27,38 18,74 19,88 21,03 16,15 22,50
Case 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Actual reduction in total imb. payments, % 3,0 5,1 3,4 3,9 4,1 3,1 4,2
Forecasted reduction in total imb. payments, % 3,8 12,1 4,4 6,7 7,9 4,1 8,2
Actual reduction in total imb. payments, d 1,06 1,80 1,20 1,36 1,43 1,09 1,47
Forecasted reduction in total imb. payments, d 1,21 3,85 1,42 2,14 2,53 1,29 2,61
Difference in differences, d 0,15 2,05 0,21 0,78 1,10 0,20 1,15
consumers’ profit, shifted energy amounts and optimised consumption schedules for each
flexibility source unit. Also, simulations reflect the difference between forecasted and actual
outcomes of the optimisation. In the following sections the results do not include fixed
contract cost incurred by the aggregator. This allows to compare different compositions of
portfolios based on provided flexibility characteristics only. The impact of the fixed contract
cost on the imbalance payments reduction is analysed in the last section.
5.1 Reductions in imbalance cost
Results show that in all scenarios for Case 1 and Case 2 the imbalance payments after the
optimisation are lower than before (see Figure 8). In Case 1, the actual total imbalance
payment for year 2014 before the optimisation is equal to d1112,31, and after the optimisa-
tion it varies between d1030,52 and d1060,16 depending on the scenario. In simulations for
one week the number of appliances is larger, so the percentage drop is even higher – from
d35,29 to d21,23 – d28,21 (see Table 5).
Figure 8 also shows that different compositions of flexibility sources – EVs, HPs, washing
machines, clothes dryers and dish washers – influence the aggregator’s payments in balancing
market. The results in Case 1 and Case 2 are consistent – the best choice for the aggregator
seems to be a portfolio with consumers that have small home appliances, which corresponds
to Scenario 3, and the least attractive is a portfolio with those that have HPs, i.e. Scenario
2. In further analysis, the focus is set on Case 2, where the number of appliances is higher.
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Figure 8: Total imbalance cost before and after optimisation (Case 1 and Case 2)
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In Scenario 3, the actual total imbalance payment is lowered by 40%, while in Scenario 2
the reduction is only 20%. Using the flexibility of consumers that have EVs, i.e. Scenario 1,
imbalance payments are 36% lower. All other scenarios are combinations of flexibility sources
and their results are close to the average outcomes of the first three scenarios. This means
that there is no obvious benefit from the portfolio diversification. Even though combining
various flexibility sources with different patterns of flexible demand in one portfolio increases
time when flexibility is available for reducing imbalances, it does not bring additional value.
Therefore, the aggregator might find it beneficial to specialise in certain types of flexibility
sources.
5.2 Compensations to consumers
Only less than half of available flexible consumption is actually shifted (see Table 6): of 10
MWh, available during one winter week, the aggregator moves only 4,229 – 4,989 MWh.
During the whole year, the percentage share is even lower. The reason for this low usage of
available flexibility is that the compensation exceeds the imbalance payment savings or the
consumption schedule is in line with the optimal schedule in the first place.
Table 6: The amount and a number of hours of shifted flexible consumption, imbalance
savings-shifted consumption and compensation-shifted consumption ratios (Case 1 and Case
2)
Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Shifted consumption, kWh 16988 20208 15926 17270 18277 16427 17693
Number of hours with shifted consumption 968 1316 5313 5083 2051 5235 5120
Imbalance savings-shifted consumption ratio, d/MWh 6,63 4,26 8,13 6,34 5,44 7,45 6,16
Compensation-shifted consumption ratio, d/MWh 3,27 1,68 3,00 2,64 2,45 3,13 2,29
Case 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Shifted consumption, kWh 4590 4989 4229 4464 4687 4427 4443
Number of hours with shifted consumption 22 56 122 126 62 124 125
Imbalance savings-shifted consumption ratio, d/MWh 4,26 3,06 7,37 4,90 3,72 5,64 5,14
Compensation-shifted consumption ratio, d/MWh 1,51 1,64 4,04 2,41 1,61 2,71 2,84
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Figure 9: Compensations to consumers and savings on payments for imbalance (Case 2)
As we can see from Figure 9, compensations to consumers for provided flexibility also differ
depending on a scenario (see Appendix B Figure B.2 for Case 1). The highest compensations
are paid for flexibility of small home appliances (d17,10), the lowest – to EVs’ owners
(d6,91). Even though the expenses for flexibility in Scenario 3 are largest, the amount of
shifted consumption is smallest (see Table 6). However, the value of this shifted consumption
is highest. This means that the consumption pattern of small home appliances allows to
use their flexibility when the differences in regulating energy, as well as spot prices, are
the largest. Thus, the most expensive type of flexibility is the most effective one too. On
average, for every megawatt hour of small home appliances’ flexibility the aggregator pays
d4,04 (see Table 6) and this saves d7,37 in imbalance payments, so it gains d3,33. The
gain of shifting one megawatt hour of HPs’ consumption is only d1,42 and corresponds to
the lowest savings among all scenarios.
However, with the current disutility function, consumers’ profit is too low to incentivise them
to provide flexibility. Table 7 shows that for one week in winter all consumers together could
earn from d0,02 to d0,26. During one year, i.e. in Case 1, 18 owners of electric vehicles
share d4,61 and 170 people, who have one of the small home appliances, gain only d8,41.
Even if the aggregator would agree to double the compensations and reduce its profit to
minimum, most likely the sum would be too low to attract flexibility providers. Hence,
if the aggregator decides to target small consumers, in addition to financial incentives, it
should consider other ways to incentivise consumers to participate, for example, additional
service offers.
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Table 7: Consumers’ profit and a number of contracts in each portfolio (Case 1 and Case 2)
Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Consumer profit, d 4,61 7,87 8,41 6,78 6,15 6,43 7,97
EV 4,61 0,00 0,00 1,54 2,30 2,30 0,00
HP 0,00 7,87 0,00 2,50 3,85 0,00 3,85
WM, DR, DW 0,00 0,00 8,41 2,74 0,00 4,12 4,12
Number of contracts 18 18 170 68 18 93 93
EV 18 0 0 6 9 9 0
HP 0 18 0 6 9 0 9
WM, DR, DW 0 0 170 56 0 84 84
Case 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Consumer profit, d 0,02 0,12 0,26 0,13 0,07 0,14 0,19
EV 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00
HP 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,06
WM, DR, DW 0,00 0,00 0,26 0,09 0,00 0,13 0,13
Number of contracts 214 68 1769 684 141 991 918
EV 214 0 0 71 107 107 0
HP 0 68 0 23 34 0 34
WM, DR, DW 0 0 1769 590 0 884 884
5.3 The effects of consumption patterns
The length of the time interval for consumption shifting is a very important factor in opti-
mising consumption schedules. Differences in prices increase significantly in longer periods
and this makes it possible to use flexibility more effectively. Table 8 illustrates that the
longer the period for possible consumption shifting, the higher the standard deviation of
spot and imbalance prices for consumption. In this aspect, HPs and clothes dryers are less
attractive flexibility sources, while EVs’ performance seems to be the best.
Table 8: The average moving standard deviations of spot prices and imbalance prices for
consumption during the year for three time periods
3 hours 6 hours 10 hours
Average moving standard deviation of spot prices 2,01 3,32 4,48
Average moving standard deviation of imbalance prices for consumption 4,57 6,79 8,48
However, the value of flexibility also depends on the time of the day, when it is offered. The
standard deviations of regulating energy prices are significantly higher during the day (on
average d9,81 during all days of the year) compared to 10 hours at night (on average d6,43),
when consumers are charging their electric vehicles. Therefore, from this perspective, EVs
is a less attractive flexibility source comparing to small home appliances, often used during
the day time, or HPs, available at all times during the heating season.
41
Figure 10: Shifted consumption patterns during one week in winter (Case 2)
Consumption shifting patterns for one week in winter are illustrated in Figure 10. It is
easy to distinguish the first three scenarios of EVs, HPs and small home appliances. In
Scenario 1, consumers are optimising the charging schedules for their EVs according to the
spot prices for the next day. Charging can be interrupted, therefore, consumers choose four
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hours when the spot price is lowest. This means that all owners of EVs charge their cars
at the same four hours during the ten-hour interval at night, when their electric vehicles
must be plugged-in. After receiving consumers’ schedules, the aggregator checks forecasted
regulating energy prices in the ten-hour interval and decides in which hours the consumption
should be shifted. Consequently, if the change in regulating energy prices is larger than the
change in spot prices plus the compensation to consumers, all available flexibility in those
hours is used.
Thus, the maximum number of hours when the demand curve is adjusted during the night is
eight. The graph for Scenario 1 shows that charging was shifted only four nights during the
week. Negative values indicate consumption reduction: for example, all the consumption in
hour 48 (417 kWh) is moved to hour 47. Consequently, because of the identical schedules of
all consumers we can see only huge and very fragmented shifts in EVs’ power usage. There
are only 22 hours during this week, when the demand curve was adjusted for balancing
purposes (see Table 6).
In Scenario 2, we can also observe similar amounts of energy being shifted during the week.
These amounts are not identical, as in Scenario 1, because the consumption of heat pumps
depends on the outside temperature. However, the pattern is quite similar. Consumers are
optimising heating schedules for three-hour intervals during the week. Thus, their schedules
become identical when they choose the cheapest hours to consume. As a result, in this
scenario, due to more often and shorter available flexibility intervals, i.e. three hours eight
times per day instead of one interval of ten hours, the aggregator changes the demand curve
maximum 16 hours per day. In this particular winter week the aggregator changes the
consumption in 56 hours.
Scenario 3 shows more dispersed consumption shifting. This is mainly due to stochastic
needs to use small home appliances. In this portfolio, there are many consumers who offer
smaller flexibility amounts and their consumption schedules differ, in contrast to the first
two scenarios. Also, when the aggregator is moving the consumption of washing machines
or dish washers, it has to move a block of two hours of flexibility, as those appliances cannot
be interrupted once started. As a result, we can see smaller adjustments of consumption
(up to 200 kWh) that are more frequent and take place in 122 hours during the week.
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In Scenario 4, where the aggregator has all types of flexibility sources in its portfolio, we can
distinguish features of consumption schedule adjustments from the other three scenarios.
There are still a few larger shifts of demand, but changes in consumption are dispersed
the most (126 hours). However, the results show that this better distribution of flexibility
offers does not compensate for the lower effectiveness of EVs and HPs in terms of the total
imbalance payments reduction.
The shifted consumption graphs for scenarios 5, 6 and 7 are provided in Appendix B Figure
B.1 and illustrate combinations of the first three portfolios. Once again, we cannot distin-
guish any advantage of having a better diversified portfolio in terms of various flexibility
sources.
5.4 The effects of forecasting errors
The aggregator does not have complete information about the market. Hence, another factor
influencing payments for imbalance is the ability to forecast regulating prices, the direction
of regulating energy for the whole system and the aggregator’s imbalance amounts. Even
though the aggregator’s forecast has high accuracy, the difference in forecasted and actual
imbalance payments without optimisation is off by 9%. After the optimisation, the difference
depends on the flexibility source.
Table 9: The amount of shifted consumption during the hours with incorrect direction
prediction (Case 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The amount of shifted consumption, kWh 1253 1312 921 1048 1080 1124 1074
Table 9 shows that the aggregator is shifting HPs’ consumption the most, but this brings
only moderate savings on imbalance payments. This could mean two things. First, the
differences in regulating energy prices are not so big during flexible demand shifting periods.
Second, the consumption is shifted more often than in other scenarios and forecasting errors
are reducing gains in those hours where the consumption is moved.
When we look at the aggregator’s expected and actual reductions in total imbalance pay-
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Figure 11: Differences in forecasted and actual reductions in total imbalance payments after
optimisation (Case 2)
ments, we see that the largest gap between those values is for HPs scenario (see Figure 11).
Thus, the second argument seems more applicable in this case. Results shows that in the
hours when the aggregator’s forecast fails to predict the direction of regulating energy needs
the flexibility from HPs is used the most (1,312 MWh) comparing to other scenarios (1,253
MWh in Scenario 1 and 0,921 MWh in Scenario 3, see Table 9). This in part explains why
the gap between forecasted and actual savings in the portfolio with HPs is biggest. However,
we should also look at the value of not optimally shifted consumption. Even though the
amount of shifted energy during the hours with incorrect direction prediction is smallest for
small home appliances scenario, the difference in monetary terms is lowest in EVs scenario
(see Figure 11). This is related to the consumption pattern of each type of flexibility source
and the fact that, on average, the flexibility of small home appliances is offered when the
differences in regulating energy prices are larger. Therefore, shifting the consumption of
these appliances in the opposite direction than it is optimal causes larger negative effect to
imbalance payments reduction.
However, not only errors in the forecasted dominating direction, but also errors in fore-
casted regulating energy prices diminish possible savings on imbalance payments. These
discrepancies might lead to shifting the consumption in the opposite direction than it is
optimal or the actual imbalance savings might not outweigh the compensation for changing
the demand curve.
In terms of the forecasting errors’ influence on the optimisation, the results are consistent
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for a longer period too (see Appendix B Figure B.3). In Case 2, the differences in differences
between actual and forecasted total imbalance payments before and after optimisation show,
that the aggregator is too optimistic about imbalance savings in all scenarios. The mildest
effect of forecasting errors can be noticed in Scenario 1, only d1,83 in Case 2 and d14,68 in
Case 1, the strongest – in Scenario 2, d7,73 in Case 2 and d27,38 in Case 1.
5.5 Trading at the regulating energy market
A one-price balance settlement system allows the aggregator to make a profit when it has
an imbalance in the opposite direction than the dominating direction of the system’s total
imbalance. Thus, in this case, the aggregator does not have to participate in the regulating
energy market in order to benefit from excess demand flexibility. However, we still can see
how much energy it would offer at the regulating energy market, in case of two-price balance
settlement system (see Table 10).
Table 10: Potential energy offers at the regulating energy market (Case 2)
Orig. imb. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Potential offers at the regulating energy
market, kWh
410 5558 4326 3699 3747 4421 4141 3457
Number of hours with offers placed 9 22 34 45 44 39 44 43
In the model, the aggregator’s imbalance before the optimisation is allowed to be in the
opposite direction than the whole system 5% of the time. In Table 10 we see, that this
happens in nine hours during the week. Thus, the aggregator is able to sell 410 kWh of
flexible demand at the regulating energy market even before accepting flexibility offers from
the consumers. After the optimisation, the amount of offered energy at the market depends
on the scenario and hence on shifted flexible consumption patterns.
The largest hourly shifts in demand appear in Scenario 1. Very fragmented and large offers
of EVs flexibility mean that the main part of the shifted energy is used for trading in the
market, but not to reduce the aggregator’s imbalances. In 22 hours during the week, the
aggregator can sell around 5,6 MWh of energy at the regulating market. In contrast, the
portfolio with small home appliances in Scenario 3 is more suitable for imbalance reduction,
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as flexibility offers are smaller but occur more frequently. The aggregator can place bids
accounting for a total of 3,7 MWh in 45 hours during the week.
According to current regulations, bids that are smaller than 10 MWh are not accepted at
the regulating energy market. This means, that it would be easier for the aggregator to
place a bid if it would have a portfolio of EVs instead of small home appliances.
5.6 Impact of fixed contract cost
Fixed contract cost has a considerable influence on the aggregator’s profitability and can
change its preferences with regard to portfolio composition. For example, due to a large
number of contracts in Scenario 3, where the aggregator uses small home appliances’ flexi-
bility, the level of fixed contract cost, naturally, has the biggest impact (see Figure 12 and
Figure 13). When the cost level reaches d0,482 per year in Case 1 and d0,009 per week in
Case 2, the savings in imbalance payments are outweighed by the fixed contract cost and
the aggregator should revise it’s portfolio: the composition or the number of contracts (see
Table 11).
Figure 12: The impact of fixed contract cost on imbalance payments reduction, Case 1
Figure 12 shows that in the longer run (Case 1 representing the whole year), when the fixed
contract cost becomes relatively high, a portfolio of EVs (Scenario 1) provides the largest
net benefit of using flexibility. Meanwhile, portfolios that include small home appliances
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Figure 13: The impact of fixed contract cost on imbalance payments reduction, Case 2
(Scenario 3, 4, 6 and 7) are the least attractive, since the number of contracts and the
total contract cost is large. In the short period (see Figure 13), situation is similar: with
relatively high fixed contract cost the benefit of small home appliances’ flexibility cease to
outweigh fixed contract cost sooner that in other portfolios that does not include this source.
However, in the analysed winter week, the number of heat pumps is the lowest comparing
to other sources of flexibility, leading to lower total fixed contract cost and the highest net
benefit of using their flexible load. In this case, fixed contract cost can be the highest among
all portfolios, d0,104, and still sustain a non-negative profit from shifting the consumption
of heat pumps (see Table 11).
In Figure 12 and Figure 13 we can distinguish contract cost intervals indicating the best
portfolio choice for the aggregator. In Case 1, when the cost is relatively low, cc ∈ [0; 0, 141),
the aggregator would choose a portfolio with small home appliances’ flexibility. When
the cost is in the interval cc ∈ (0, 141; 0, 184), the aggregator prefers a portfolio of mixed
flexibility sources: small home appliances and EVs. And finally, when the cost gets relatively
high, cc ∈ (0, 184; 3, 172), the portfolio of EVs is the most attractive. If the contract cost
rises even higher, then aggregator should reduce the number of contracts in its portfolio and
look for the most profitable option to shift flexible consumption. In Case 2, when the cost
is in the interval cc ∈ [0; 0, 001), the aggregator prefers a portfolio of small home appliances,
when cc ∈ (0, 001; 0, 038) – a portfolio of EVs, and when cc ∈ (0, 038; 0, 104) – a portfolio of
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HPs.
The analysis suggests that under certain fixed contract cost levels a portfolio with mixed
types of flexibility sources can be superior to the one with a single type of flexibility source.
However, in both investigated cases, most of the time the aggregator chooses a single type
of flexibility source in which it would specialise depending on the fixed contract cost level.
Table 11: Maximum fixed contract cost to keep non-negative profit from shifting the con-
sumption depending on a scenario and case, d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Case 1 3,172 2,897 0,481 0,939 3,035 0,762 0,736
Case 2 0,059 0,104 0,008 0,016 0,070 0,013 0,011
6 Conclusions and discussion
This paper focuses on the role of flexible demand aggregators and the effects of their portfolio
choice on imbalance payments and compensations to flexibility providers. A game theoretical
model has been used to simulate optimal flexible load schedules yielding the highest savings
on imbalance payments. The model has five stages in which the consumer schedules his or
her flexible load based on day-ahead prices, and the aggregator decides what flexibility prices
would incentivise the consumer to shift flexible load and reduce payments for imbalance.
The effects of different portfolio compositions are reflected in seven scenarios. Nordic power
market data for Denmark’s DK2 price area, as well as specific technical data for appliances
and typical usage of appliances in Danish households allow to achieve realistic outcomes of
demand-side flexibility employment for balancing purposes.
Results show that different compositions of flexibility sources (EVs, HPs, washing machines,
clothes dryers and dish washers) influence the aggregator’s imbalance payments and com-
pensations to consumers for provided flexibility. A portfolio of small home appliances seems
to be the most attractive option for the aggregator. Moreover, it also yields the highest
payoffs for the consumers. However, in all scenarios the compensation for the shifted load
is too low to incentivise consumers to participate in flexibility trading. Consequently, ag-
gregators might have to find other ways to encourage consumers to offer their flexibility, for
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example, promote additional services.
An important factor in optimising consumption schedules is the length of the time interval
for the flexible load shifting. Differences in regulating energy prices increase significantly in
longer periods and higher volatility enables to yield higher savings on imbalance payments.
However, this is not a sufficient characteristic for the flexibility source to be the most
effective. The effectiveness also depends on time when the flexibility is offered. Results
indicate that flexibility offers during the day time are more valuable than at night. This is
also related to the fact that price differences are larger during the day time.
With no fixed contract cost, there is no indication that portfolio diversification, in terms of
different flexibility sources, could bring additional value in reducing imbalance payments.
Therefore, the aggregators might choose to specialise in certain types of flexibility sources
that have a potential for maximum savings. However, if the aggregator incurs fixed contract
cost, under certain cost level, the mix of different flexibility sources can be beneficial. Also,
with increasing fixed contract cost, the aggregator might switch from one type of flexibility
to another.
The difference between the forecasted and the actual reductions in imbalance payments is
also affected by the portfolio composition. Portfolio of EVs allows to predict the reductions
in imbalance payments with the smallest error, while the forecasted outcomes of HPs portfo-
lio are the least accurate. In the latter scenario, frequent changes in consumption schedules
lead to lower actual savings due to an increase in forecasting errors.
In a one-price balance settlement system the aggregator does not have to participate in the
regulating energy market in order to benefit from excess demand flexibility. However, this
model allows to determine potential flexibility trades in case of two-price balance settlement
system. Due to the largest hourly shifts in load schedules, EVs’ flexibility can be traded
the most. Furthermore, high value of minimum bid size, determined by current regulations,
causes more difficulties for the aggregator to place bids of dispersed small home appliances
flexibility than that of more fragmented but larger in size EVs’ flexibility. Thus, since
diversification results in more dispersed flexibility offers, they are more likely to be used for
imbalance payments reductions than excess flexibility trading.
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There are several directions for future extensions of this research. In the future, increased
renewable energy integration will change electricity prices and therefore potential value of
demand-side flexibility. Modelling possible future scenarios would allow the aggregators to
choose the best investment strategy and evaluate related risks. Aggregators could also be
BRPs responsible not only for the consumption but also for the production side. Moreover,
different portfolio compositions and introduction of penalties for not delivered flexibility
could lead to different bidding strategies in the balancing market. This model is applied for
the Nordic power market, thus, different geographical areas and peculiarities of other power
markets could generate different outcomes. Also, the aggregator’s decisions could be influ-
enced by its behaviour in the day-ahead and intraday markets. From the consumer’s point
of view, different disutility functions or other contracts for changing flexible consumption
schedule could also be investigated.
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Appendix A Additional information about data
Figure A.1: Compensations to consumers and savings on payments for imbalance (Case 1)
Figure A.2: DK2 area hourly consumption in 2014
55
Figure A.3: Modelled HP load and actual outside temperature in 2014
Figure A.4: Modelled aggregator’s hourly imbalances
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Appendix B Additional results
Figure B.1: Shifted consumption patterns during one week in winter (Case 2), Scenarios 5,
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Figure B.2: Compensations to consumers and savings on payments for imbalance (Case 1)
Figure B.3: Differences in forecasted and actual reductions in total imbalance payments
after optimisation (Case 1)
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Figure B.4: Total imbalance cost before and after optimisation (Case 2) with a maximum
of 20% error in the imbalance price forecast
Figure B.5: Total imbalance cost before and after optimisation (Case 2) when the aggregator
takes the previous hour data for the imbalance price forecast
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Abstract
With an increasing share of renewable energy sources, the need for demand flexibility
is growing. Large consumers have a potential to provide this flexibility to the market,
however, in order to do that, they need right incentives and a favourable environment.
This paper examines whether the cooperative governance structures in flexible elec-
tricity demand aggregation and trading could bring value to the market participants
and final power consumers comparing to situations, where demand flexibility is traded
individually or via the investor owned aggregator. We provided numerical estimation
using Nord Pool intraday market data for DK2 price area in Denmark. We found
that the cooperative of large consumers would offer the lowest price and the largest
quantity of flexible demand in the long run. Moreover, sharing the fixed flexible de-
mand coordination and market access cost would result in the highest profit for large
consumers, giving the necessary incentives to stay in the market.
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1 Introduction
Recent development in power systems resulting from green energy oriented policy and in-
creasing share of renewable energy sources among power producers bring some new chal-
lenges in sustaining power system stability and efficiency. However, advancing technologies
create a favourable environment for the new market participants who were not able to pro-
vide balancing services or adjust the consumption according to the system’s needs and trade
their flexibility in the market.
The intraday market, which is a place to trade power closer to the real time and adjust
traded volumes in the spot market according to the forecast corrections, will play a more
important role in the future, since the production of intermittent renewable energy sources
complicate the forecasting process. Demand-side management is more suitable for providing
a short-term flexibility up to hours before the actual consumption (Linkenheil et al., 2017).
Thus, the intraday market has a great potential in accommodating demand flexibility of
large consumers who want to trade flexibility on their own, because the reaction time for
the load adjustments is relatively long, comparing to markets for regulating power.
The potential for available flexibility can be distinguished between installed capacity, theo-
retical, technical, economical and achievable potential (Grein and Pehnt, 2011). Theoreti-
cal potential is characterised by typical daily, weekly and annual available load variations.
Technical potential takes into account technical aspects of load shifting, while economical
potential reflects only the cost-effective part of load shifting. Finally, achievable potential
accounts for various barriers limiting the access to the flexible load, such as market require-
ments, lack of knowledge and experience of the potential flexibility providers. Thus, the
practically available flexible load is significantly lower compared to its installed capacity.
Demand-side flexibility providers can be divided into three groups: small consumers, such
as households, large (commercial) consumers, such as supermarkets, hospitals, universities,
and industrial consumers. In terms of theoretical potential, they differ in terms of their
flexible load profiles. Usually, industrial consumers with energy-intensive processes are able
to offer constant amounts of flexibility in each hour of the year, while households’ and large
consumers’ flexible load varies depending on the season, weekday and hour during the day
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(Grein and Pehnt, 2011). For example, residential demand-side management programmes
are analysed based on active occupancy profiles by Lo´pez-Rodr´ıguez et al. (2013), and one
of the factors that influence large consumers’ load is their working hours. The sources
of flexibility for residential consumers include electric vehicles, washing machines, tumble
dryers, dish washers, heat pumps and refrigerators; for large consumers the common source
is cooling and heating activities.1 However, this paper does not consider the hourly, weekly
or annual variability of flexible load and analyses a certain point in time, where the access
to shiftable load is guaranteed from a technical perspective and limited only to economic
incentives.
Demand-side flexibility and price elasticity of electricity demand are closely related. The
elasticity of price depends on time and in a long term the demand is more elastic than
in a short term. One explanation could be that in a long term consumers can adapt to
price changes and change their consumption habits, appliances or use new technologies.
Also, consumers’ response to price changes vary between different consumers: in general,
small consumers are less price elastic than large consumers. Price elasticity can also be
different for different price ranges. For instance, when large industrial consumers face high
prices, their price elasticity increases. Elasticity can be influenced by the type of tariff
that consumers are charged. For example, when small consumers are charged using real
time pricing, they tend to respond to prices less than when they are charged using a time-
of-use tariff. One reason could be that consumers understand time-use-tariff better and,
therefore, adjust their consumption.2 Thus, small and large consumers may need different
compensation mechanisms to ensure their willingness to provide flexibility.
Even though small consumers have a potential for offering flexibility, their individual vol-
umes are too low to place a bid at the market. Furthermore, the gain from this activity
would be moderate considering required time and effort. Therefore, the aggregation of flex-
ible demand and trading on behalf of small consumers became a widely discussed approach
to deal with market access issues for this segment. European Energy Regulators state that
“there should be a requirement that all consumers have the opportunity to participate in
1For further discussion on demand response potential in Europe see Grein and Pehnt (2011).
2For more detailed discussion about price elasticity and electricity demand response see Risø National
Laboratory, Ea Energy Analyses, RAM-løse edb report on demand response in Denmark (Andersen et al.,
2006).
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all relevant markets <...>” and they “recognise the benefits of introducing independent
aggregation3 and propose that MSs [Member States] enable independent aggregation, un-
less a national implementation assessment suggests an alternative that better serves sys-
tem efficiency and can be implemented effectively” (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators (ACER) and Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), 2017). Thus,
independent aggregators are seen as a first choice for aggregating flexibility.
Large consumers, on the other hand, have the potential to trade in the market on their
own, since they can meet the minimum bid requirements for some hours during the day.
Despite that, it is still not clear, what is the best strategy for the large consumer: to trade
individually, access the market via the investor owned aggregator or form a cooperative
of large consumers, where the members share part of the cost but can freely choose the
volumes they want to deliver. Thus, this paper investigates whether cooperative governance
structures have an advantage in aggregating and trading flexible electricity load at the
intraday market comparing to cases where there is no coordination or where the coordinator
is owned by investors.
The model is illustrated by providing a numerical estimation. Due to the complex expres-
sions of the equilibrium outcomes, it is not easy to identify winners and losers in all analysed
scenarios. By showing a numerical example representing the intraday market trading in one
hour and market players’ participation cost in Nord Pool power market, we evaluate po-
tential benefits and losses for different market players depending on the chosen governance
structure. The input data is chosen carefully to reflect a real world trading in Nord Pool
power market.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section
3 presents the model, i.e. the coordination game and the players. Equilibrium analysis in
every scenario is provided in section 4. In section 5, we show the numerical estimates of our
model, also include the sensitivity analysis of the main input variables. Finally, in section
6, we make the conclusion and suggest possible directions for future research.
3According to the European Energy Regulators, “independent aggregator” is ”an aggregator that is not
affiliated to a supplier or any other market participant”. (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER) and Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), 2017)
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2 Literature review
Intermediation and cooperation are concepts worth focusing on while analysing the emerging
changes in energy markets. Intermediary can be defined as an entity, which is a link between
different actors, such as producers and end-users (Grandcle´ment et al., 2015). However, the
concept of intermediation has evolved with time. According to Saglietto (2017), commer-
cial intermediation started with the commercial travellers in the Middle ages, then mafia
intermediation emerged in the 1900, followed by financial intermediaries (banks) in 1970,
logistic intermediaries (brokers) in 1980, economic (intermediary agents) in 1990, electronic
(e-intermediary) in 2000 and finally cultural and legal intermediation in 2010. All these
types of intermediation, however, have the same function – they all coordinate and control
physical, financial, informational or cultural flows, processes and activities (Saglietto, 2017).
A wide range of intermediary types result in a large number of studies on intermediation.
An interested reader is referred to Appendix A for a more detailed intermediation literature
review. This study focuses on intermediation in power markets, where the aggregator acts
as a link between large consumers and the intraday market.
Among many services provided by intermediaries4, the reduction of transaction cost com-
pared to the situation where the parties interact directly, can increase social welfare. The
concept of transaction cost was introduced by Coase (1937) as “a cost of using a price mech-
anism”. This cost includes search and information, bargaining and decision, and policing
and reinforcement costs. According to Coase, transaction cost can help to explain the emer-
gence of firms. Transaction cost analysis became a more popular topic with Williamson’s
work. Williamson studied “the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task
completion under alternative governance structures” and came to a conclusion that “gover-
nance structures that have better transactional cost economizing properties will eventually
displace those that have worse”(Williamson, 1981). He also claimed that there are two
sides of vertical integration: on the one hand, when the transactions are organised within a
firm, decision rights are centralised and this reduces bargaining cost and the risk related to
bargaining impasse; on the other hand, the executives may extract rents in inefficient ways.
4See Saglietto (2017)
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Therefore, the choice of conducting transactions in the market or within a firm depends on
the net effect of this trade-off (The Economic Sciences Prize Committee, 2010).
According to Joskow (2005), currently, there is no unified theory of vertical integration,
as some theoretical works advocate the benefits of vertical integration due to increased
efficiency, and others highlight the drawbacks of anticompetitive foreclosure5. Tirole (1988)
claims that even though a vertical integration is usually efficient from the viewpoint of
the integrated parties, it does not consider the interests of consumers, i.e. third parties.
Although a vertical integration often brings positive externalities to consumers, for example,
it can help to avoid excessive contraction of output, a public intervention might be needed to
correct some negative externalities. However, it is not easy to tell when a vertical integration
is anticompetitive. Hart and Tirole (1990) present a theoretical model that shows how
vertical integration influences competition in upstream and downstream markets, also, they
identify conditions under which market foreclosure is a consequence or a purpose, or both, of
a vertical integration. This paper studies vertical integration in power consumers’ flexibility
trading and market outcomes for market participants and final consumers.
Intermediaries can not only reduce the transactions cost but they can also offer services
that require knowledge and expertise in a particular field. Therefore, intermediation seems
to have a great potential in complex energy systems where the participation of distributed
energy sources is expected to increase in the future. As flexibility trading is not the main
activity for the large consumers, the aggregator’s services may seem as an attractive option
to participate in the intraday market. Therefore, a vertical integration is a likely outcome
in this situation. Nevertheless, this is not the only way to access the market.
In some hours, the requirement of a minimum bid size may prevent some consumers from
bidding directly at the market. Here, cooperation of several consumers and coordination of
their actions would help to overcome this obstacle. Moreover, sharing the transaction cost
would bring an additional benefit to the members of a cooperative. The International Co-
operative Alliance (2018) provides the following definition of a cooperative: “a co-operative
5Tirole (1988) distinguishes between two kinds of market foreclosure. In the first one, the sectors (down-
stream or upstream) is already monopolised, and the monopolist goal is to exploit its monopoly power
efficiently. In the second one, neither of sectors is monopolised. In this case, the foreclosure increases the
monopolisation of one of the sectors.
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is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic,
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically-
controlled enterprise.” The first successful cooperative enterprise, The Rochdale Society
of Equitable Pioneers, was founded in 1844 and was based on the ideas of Robert Owen
(Balnave and Patmore, 2012). Also, it had a clear set of principles, that later were adopted
by the International Co-operative Alliance.6 A more detailed review of different kinds of
cooperatives, such as worker, consumer, marketing, social, new generation cooperatives,
etc., is provided by Altman (2009).
Aggregation, coordination and cooperation are quite popular terms among the demand-
side management researchers. For example, benefits of cooperative demand response for
households are estimated by Rieger et al. (2016). Lopes et al. (2016) introduce the concept of
Cooperative Net Zero Energy Community, which improves load matching in the community.
Zhu et al. (2016) look at the demand-side management as a control networked evolutionary
game, where the actions of cooperative communities can increase common benefits even if
the majority of the communities are non-cooperative.
From a more technical perspective, Sanjari and Gharehpetian (2014) analyse frequency
stability in islanded microgrids and how cooperative distributed energy resources’ controllers
can keep the microgrid stable. Hosseinimehr et al. (2017) investigate the control of battery
energy storage units within a microgrid and show that cooperative control can help to avoid
power imbalance in the system. Similarly, Huang et al. (2017) are also looking at cooperative
control of charging and discharging multiple energy storage units, which mitigates regulation
issues in the power system. Cooperative control of storage systems is also discussed by
Moradi et al. (2016), while semi-cooperative schemes for scheduling flexible load of electric
vehicles are analysed by Omran and Filizadeh (2017).
Usually, the cooperation and aggregation is seen as a solution for accumulating enough flex-
ible demand to meet the minimum bid size requirements of the market. However, strategic
6The original set of principles include: open membership, democratic control, distribution of surplus in
proportion to trade, payment of limited interest on capital, political and religious neutrality, cash trading,
and the promotion of education (Balnave and Patmore, 2012). Later, several of them were revised and
the current set of principles is: voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, member
economic participation, autonomy and independence, education, training and information, cooperation
among cooperatives, and concern for community (The International Co-operative Alliance, 2018).
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bidding at the market is another stream of research where cooperation might be useful. For
instance, Srinivasan and Woo (2008) show that in a competitive power market, individual
buyers can use cooperative strategies, form groups and adjust their demand curves in this
way reducing cost with minimum loss in the utility of consumption. Nevertheless, little
attention has been given to the use of cooperatives in power trading.
In this paper, we focus on cooperation of large consumers offering their flexibility at the
market, i.e. trading and competing with a bigger aggregator. Similarly, like in cooperative
structures in the trucking industry analysed by Agrell et al. (2017), where cooperative
governance is compared to integrated and Cournot-competition settings, and the analysis of
cooperative organisation in supply chains when the market is an oligopoly with a competitive
fringe, like in Agrell and Karantininis (2000), we propose a model to compare the cooperative
governance to integrated and Stackelberg competition settings. The main contribution of
this paper to the existing literature is the introduction of cooperative governance structures
in power markets and a realistic estimation of potential benefits using Nord Pool intraday
market data.
3 Model
Let N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of large consumers and M ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,m} – the set of
small consumers. The aggregator of flexible demand is denoted by A. Market participants
are trading a homogeneous good, i.e. electricity, at the intraday market.
3.1 Electricity demand
After the day-ahead market closes, market participants adjust their production and con-
sumption forecasts and trade electricity in the intraday market. It is assumed that demand
for one hour is fixed and known in advance. The inverse demand function can be expressed
as:
p(Q) = β0 − β1Q, (1)
where β0 and β1 are constants and Q is the total power supply for one hour.
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3.2 Electricity supply
Electricity supply is determined by available flexibility of small and large consumers, which
means that there is an upper limit of volume each consumer can provide in a certain hour.
Each supplier has a quadratic cost function with a linear marginal cost.7 Large consumer’s
cost function is:
ci(qi) = 0.5αiq
2
i , (2)
where qi is the amount of flexibility of the i
th large consumer offered to the intraday market,
αiqi is a marginal cost of reducing consumption. If a large consumer places a bid at the
market directly, it also incurs variable cost of placing a bid at the market ψ and a fixed cost
of coordination of flexible demand, as well as fees for accessing the market φi.
3.3 Aggregator
The aggregator acts as an intermediary between small consumers and the intraday market,
because there is a minimum bid size requirement preventing small consumers from partic-
ipating in the market directly. So, it places bids at the market on behalf of its consumers
and in addition offers coordination services. The total available flexibility for the aggregator
qa is the sum of its small consumers’ flexibility
∑
j∈M qj. The aggregator’s cost function is:
ca(qa) = 0.5waq
2
a + ψqa + φa, (3)
where the aggregator has a marginal cost of waqa, which is a compensation to all small
consumers for reducing consumption, and ψ, variable cost of placing a bid at the market.2
φa is a fixed cost of coordinating flexible load and fees for accessing the market.
3.4 Coordination game
Model structure is shown in Figure 1. We have considered three possible scenarios that
reflect how a large consumer could participate at the intraday market. In Scenario 1,
7A quadratic cost function guarantees that the flexibility is not limitless and at a certain point it becomes
too expensive to change the consumption.
2Nord Pool is charging the variable fee of 0,11 d/MWh for trading on the intraday market. (Nord Pool,
2017b)
71
Figure 1: Three governance structures in flexible electricity demand aggregation (“C” rep-
resents large consumers, while “c” – small consumers)
large consumers are participating at the market directly and placing bids individually with
no coordination among them. The investor owned aggregator is coordinating only small
consumers and bidding on their behalf. In Scenario 2, large consumers choose to participate
at the market through the investor owned aggregator together with small consumers. This
scenario can be seen as a common agency structure, where the aggregator acts as an agent.
In Scenario 3, large consumers form a cooperative, coordinate their loads and place their
bids at the market through the cooperative, while the aggregator is competing by offering
small consumers’ flexibility at the intraday market.
Figure 2 shows the steps of placing a bid at the market in all three scenarios. In Scenario
1, we have a one-stage game, while in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 profits are maximised in
a two-stage game. The bidding sequence, i.e. whether the aggregator bids first or second,
influence the participants’ profits and offered quantities. However, the main conclusion
remains the same despite of the bidding sequence (see Appendix B).
4 Equilibrium analysis
4.1 Integrated system
Integrated system defines the first best solution. Here, the aggregator and all large con-
sumers form an entity and internalise all costs and profits. The entity places a bid at the
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Figure 2: The steps for placing a bid at the intraday market in three scenarios
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intraday market on behalf of all suppliers. As it is a large market participant, its coordi-
nation and market access cost is equal to the aggregator’s, i.e. φa. The market price is
determined by the inverse demand function p(qa+
∑
i∈N qi) = β0 +β1(qa+
∑
i∈N qi). In this
case, the identity of large consumers does not matter, therefore, we can denote the sum of
their offered volume by Qi. Since all large consumers are identical, Qi = nqi. The profit
function is concave and quadratic.
The integrated entity optimises the standard profit function:
piint(qa, qi) = (β0 − β1(qa + nqi))(qa + nqi)− 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa − n0.5αiq2i − nψqi. (4)
Proposition 1. A solution to the integrated problem:
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer is
q∗a =
αi(β0 − ψ)
waαi + 2β1(nwa + αi)
, (5)
q∗i =
wa(β0 − ψ)
waαi + 2β1(nwa + αi)
. (6)
(ii) The market price is
p∗ =
waαiβ0 + β1(nwa + αi)(β0 + ψ)
waαi + 2β1(nwa + αi)
. (7)
(iii) The profit is
piint(q
∗
a, q
∗
i ) =
nwa(β
2
0 − 4β1φa − 2β0ψ + ψ2) + αi(β20 − 2φa(wa + 2β1)− 2β0ψ + ψ2)
4αiβ1 + 2wa(αi + 2nβ1)
. (8)
4.2 Scenario 1: Direct participation
In this scenario, large consumers bid at the market directly and compete with each other and
one aggregator, which represents all small consumers. This case is modelled as a Stackelberg
game, where the aggregator is a leader. The profit function for a large consumer is
pii(qa, qi, Q−i) = (β0 − β1(qa + qi +Q−i))qi − 0.5αiq2i − ψqi − φi. (9)
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The quantity offered by a large consumer depends on the aggregator’s quantity and the
total quantity of the rest of the large consumers Q−i. The decision problem for the ith large
consumer is
pi∗i (qa, qi, Q−i) = max
qi
pii(qa, qi, Q−i). (10)
The aggregator anticipates the reaction functions of the followers, i.e. the large consumers.
The reaction functions are found by solving the following set of equations:
∂pi(qi)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
qi=q∗i
= β0 − β1(qa + 2qi +Q−i)− qiαi − ψ = 0, (11)
where 2qi +Q−i is qi(n+ 1) since all large consumers have symmetrical costs, which result
in identical solutions and Qi = nqi. Thus, the reaction function for a large consumer is
q∗i (qa) =
β0 − qaβ1 − ψ
αi + β1 + nβ1
. (12)
The aggregator’s profit function is
pia(qa, Qi(qa)) = (β0 − β1(qa +Qi(qa)))qa − 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa, (13)
where Qi(qa) is the followers’, i.e. large consumers’, quantity as a function of the aggregator’s
quantity and is equal to nq∗i (qa). The aggregator is maximizing its profit given the reaction
function of a large consumer q∗i (qa).
Proposition 2. A solution to the one-stage Stackelberg game is:
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer is
q∗a =
(α1 + β1)(β0 − ψ)
2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1)
(14)
q∗i =
β0 − ψ − β1(αi+β1)(β0−ψ)2β1(αi+β1)+wa(αi+β1+nβ1)
αi + β1 + nβ1
(15)
(ii) The market price is
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p∗ =
wa(αi + β1 + nβ1)(β0(αi + β1) + nβ1ψ) + β1(αi + β1)((β0 + ψ)(αi + β1) + β12nψ)
(αi + β1 + nβ1)(2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))
(16)
(iii) The profits for the aggregator and a large consumer are
pi∗a = −
(β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))(β0 − ψ)2
2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2(2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))2
(
w2a(αi + β1 + nβ1)−
2β1(αi + β1)(2αi + β1 + nβ1) + wa(β
2
1 − 2α2i − αi(β1 + 2nβ1))
)− φa (17)
pi∗i = −φi +
(αi + 2β1)(β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))
2(β0 − ψ)2
2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2(2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))2
(18)
4.3 Scenario 2: Aggregator’s coordination
In this scenario, large consumers trade their flexibility via an investor owned aggregator.
Here, there is a two-stage game, where the aggregator offers a contract (wai, Qi) based on
the available flexibility. The aggregator has to set such a price wai so that the participation
of large consumers would be guaranteed. We have analysed three sub-scenarios representing
different strategies of payments to large consumers:
• Scenario 2a: The aggregator offers a payment guaranteeing that a large consumer
would yield a non-negative profit.
• Scenario 2b: The aggregator offers a payment guaranteeing that a large consumer
would yield a profit that is not less than in Scenario 1, where a large consumer is
bidding at the market directly.
• Scenario 2c: The aggregator offers a payment guaranteeing that a large consumer
would yield a profit that is not less than in Scenario 3b, where large consumers form
a cooperative.
In Scenario 2, a large consumer does not incur variable cost of placing a bid at the market
ψ and a fixed cost of coordination and market access fees φi since the aggregator takes the
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responsibility to coordinate flexible demand and place bids at the market on behalf of small
and large consumers. Thus, the profit function for a large consumer is
pii(qi) = waiqi − 0.5αiq2i . (19)
The aggregator offers prices wa and wai to its small and large consumers respectively, while
φa is a common coordination and market access cost for the aggregator. We formulate the
aggregator’s profit function as
pia(qa, qi, wai) = (β0 − β1(qa + nqi))(qa + nqi)− 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa − nqi(wai + ψ). (20)
Here, the aggregator has to decide about the offer price for a large consumer and the
quantities of small and large consumers’ flexibility it wants to trade. The offer price for
small consumers is not the focus of this study, therefore, it is assumed to be known in
advance.
The decision problem of the aggregator depends on a sub-scenario:
pi∗a = max
qa,qi,wai
pia(qa, qi, wai)
s.t.
pii(qi) ≥ 0 (Scenario 2a)
pii(qi) ≥ pi∗Sc1i (qi) (Scenario 2b)
pii(qi) ≥ pi∗Sc3bi (qi) (Scenario 2c),
(21)
where pi∗Sc1i and pi
∗Sc3b
i are the maximised profits for a large consumer in Scenario 1 and
Scenario 3b respectively.
To solve this two-stage game we haved used multiplier λ and a Lagrange function L. In
Scenario 2a, a Lagrange function is
L(wai) = (β0 − β1(qa + nqi))(qa + nqi)− nqi(wai + ψ)
− 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa − λ(waiqi − 0.5αiq2i ). (22)
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In Scenario 2b, it becomes
L(wai) = (β0 − β1(qa + nqi))(qa + nqi)− nqi(wai + ψ)
− 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa − λ(waiqi − 0.5αiq2i − pi∗Sc1i (qi)) (23)
and, in Scenario 2c, it is
L(wai) = (β0 − β1(qa + nqi))(qa + nqi)− nqi(wai + ψ)
− 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa − λ(waiqi − 0.5αiq2i − pi∗Sc3bi (qi)). (24)
In Scenario 2a, a large consumer will not gain a profit because only the aggregator has
an access to the market. That creates a monopsony where the aggregator has complete
information and can reduce a large consumer’s profit to zero, allowing to cover only the
average cost. The outcome of this game is identical to the integrated system case with the
aggregator acting as an entity internalising all costs and profits.
Corollary 1. In Scenario 2a, the solution for the two-stage game is
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer is identical to the integrated
system’s solution q∗a, q
∗
i , p
∗,
(ii) The integrated system’s profit is absorbed the aggregator pi∗a = pi
∗
int,
(iii) The profits of a large consumer is equal to zero pi∗i = 0,
(iv) The aggregator’s compensation to a large consumer is
wai =
waαi(β0 − ψ)
2(2αiβ1 + wa(αi + 2nβ1))
. (25)
Proposition 3. In Scenario 2b, the optimal solution is:
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer and the price are identical
to the integrated system’s solution q∗a, q
∗
i , p
∗,
(ii) The profit for the aggregator and a large consumer is
pi∗a = −φa −
waα
2
i (β0 − ψ)2
2(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
+
α1ψ(−β0 + ψ)
waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1
−
nwa(β0 − ψ)
waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1
(− waαi + 2(nwa + αi)βi
wa(β0 − ψ) (φi −
w2aαi(β0 − ψ)2
2(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
−
(αi + 2β1)(β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))
2(β0 − ψ)2
2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2(2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))2
) + ψ
)
+
(nwa + αi)(β0 − ψ)(αiβ1(β0 + ψ) + wa(αiβ0 + nβ1(β0 + ψ)))
(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
, (26)
pi∗i = pi
∗Sc1
i , (27)
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(iii) the aggregator’s compensation to a large consumer is
w∗ai = −
2αiβ1 + wa(αi + 2nβ1)
wa(β0 − ψ)
(
φi−
(αi + 2β1)(β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))
2(β0 − ψ)2
2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2(2β1(αi + β1) + wa(αi + β1 + nβ1))2
−
w2aαi(β0 − ψ)2
2(2αiβ1 + wa(αi + 2nβ1))2
)
. (28)
Proposition 4. In Scenario 2c, the optimal solution is:
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer is identical to the integrated
system’s solution q∗a, q
∗
i , p
∗,
(ii) The profit for the aggregator and a large consumer is
pi∗a = −φa −
waα
2
i (β0 − ψ)2
2(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
+
αiψ(ψ − β0)
waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1
−
nwa(β0 − ψ)
waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1
(−waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1
wa(β0 − ψ)
(− 1
4n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2
(−2α2iφc − 2n(α2i + 6αiβ1 + 4β21)φc+
n2(2β1(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2)+
αi(−2β1φc + (β1 − ψ)2))− αi2β1φc+√
n2(−4nαiφc + 4(αi + β1)φc + n2(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2))(β0 − ψ)(αi + 2β1))−
w2aαi(β0 − ψ)2
2(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
) + ψ)+
(nwa + αi)(β0 − ψ)(αiβ1(β0 + ψ) + wa(αiβ0 + nβ1(β0 + ψ)))
(waαi + 2(nwa + αi)β1)2
, (29)
pi∗i = pi
∗Sc3b
i , (30)
(iii) the aggregator’s compensation to a large consumer is
w∗ai = −
2αiβ1 + wa(αi + 2nβ1)
wa(β0 − ψ) (−
1
4n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2
(−2α2iφc − 2n(α2i + 6αiβ1 + 4β21)φc+
n2(2β1(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2) + αi(−2β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2))− αi2β1φc+√
n2(−4nαiφc + 4(αi + β1)φc + n2(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2))(β0 − ψ)(αi + 2β1))−
w2aαi(β0 − ψ)2
2(2αiβ1 + wa(αi + 2nβ1))2
). (31)
As long as the aggregator stays in the market, the small consumers providing flexibility to
the aggregator are indifferent between Scenario 2a, 2b, and 2c, because they get the same
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payment for their flexibility in all three sub-scenarios. Thus, the profit for traded energy
is distributed between the aggregator and the large consumers depending on a scenario.
Scenario 2a is a medium scenario for the aggregator and the large consumers, Scenario 2b
is the best for the aggregator and the worst for the large consumers, as the large consumers
face losses equal to those when trading at the market individually. Scenario 2c is the best
for large consumers, because they get a highest compensation, which should guarantee that
they use the aggregator’s services instead of forming a cooperative. Accordingly, for the
aggregator, this scenario is the worst of all sub-scenarios, because the aggregator pays the
largest compensations to the large consumers. This means that by having an opportunity to
form a cooperative, large consumers can negotiate with the aggregator and receive a higher
profit. For the analysis of winners and losers in all scenarios see section 5.2 Results.
4.4 Scenario 3: Cooperative’s coordination
The third option for large consumers to trade at the intraday market is to form a cooperative.
Here, we introduce two sub-scenarios. In scenario 3a, the cooperative competes with the
aggregator. The aggregator and the cooperative are seen as equal players, therefore, they
move simultaneously. In scenario 3b, the aggregator becomes not competitive and is forced
out of the market by a more efficient cooperative.
Large consumers share the profit of the cooperative based on their contribution, which means
that the cooperative does not retain any profit for itself and only covers its coordination
cost and market access fees φc and variable bidding cost ψ. Here, we have a two-stage
game, where the cooperative offers a contract (wci(qi), qi) to its members. The cooperative’s
offered price is formulated as
wci(qi) =
pic(qa, qi +Q−i)
qi +Q−i
, (32)
where the cooperative’s profit function (excluding the payments to its members) is
pic(qa, qi +Q−i) = (β0 − β1(qa + qi +Q−i))(qi +Q−i)− φc − (qi +Q−i)ψc. (33)
Since the cooperative’s payments to large consumers depend on its members’ decisions about
the flexibility quantities, this two-stage game can be solved by focusing on a large consumer’s
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profit function
pii(qi) =
qi
qi +Q−i
((β0 − β1(qa + qi +Q−i))(qi +Q−i)− φc − (qi +Q−i)ψ)− 0.5αiq2i . (34)
The decision problem for the ith large consumer is
pi∗i = max
qi
pii(qa, qi, Q−i). (35)
The reaction functions of large consumers are found by solving the following set of equations:
∂pi(qi)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
qi=q∗i
= − 1
(qi +Q−i)2
(q3i (αi + 2β1) + q
2
i (2Q−iαi − β0 + qaβ1 + 5Q−iβi + ψ)+
qiQ−i(Q−i(αi + 4β1) + 2(qaβ1 − β0 + ψ)) +Q−i(φc +Q−i((qa +Q−i)β1 − β0 + ψ))) = 0,
(36)
where Qi = nqi. The reaction function for a large consumer is
q∗i (qa) =
n2(β0 − qaβ1 − ψ) +
√−4(n− 1)n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)φc + n4(qaβ1 − β0 + ψ)2
2n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)
. (37)
The aggregator maximises its profit
pia(qa, Qi) = (β0 − β1(qa +Qi))qa − 0.5waq2a − ψqa − φa (38)
and its reaction function is
q∗a(qi) =
β0 − nqiβ1 − ψ
wa + 2β1
. (39)
The solution for this game is found by solving the reaction functions equations simultane-
ously and is characterised below.
Proposition 5. The optimal solution in the game where the cooperative of large consumers
is competing with the aggregator is:
(i) The demand served by the aggregator and a large consumer is
q∗a =
−A+ (2waαi + (2 + n)waβ1 + β1(4αi + (4 + n)β1))(β0 − ψ)
2(wa + 2β1)(wa(αi + β1 + nβ1) + β1(2αi + (2 + n)β1))
, (40)
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where A is
A = (β21(4(αi + β1)(wa + 2β1)
2φc − 4n(wa + 2β1)(waαi + β1(2αi + β1))φc+
n2(wa + β1)(β1(−8β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2) + wa(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2)))) 12 , (41)
q∗i =
A+ nβ1(wa + β1)(β0 − ψ)
2nβ1(wa(αi + β1 + nβ1) + β1(2αi + (2 + n)β1))
. (42)
(ii) The market price is
p∗ = β0−β1
(
A
β1
− A
wa + 2β1
+ 2(β0−ψ)(αi +β1) + n(wa + β1)(wa + 3β1)(β0 − ψ)
wa + 2β1
)
1
2(wa(αi + β1 + nβ1) + β1(2αi + (2 + n)β1))
(43)
(iii) The profit for the aggregator and a large consumer is
pi∗a = −φa +
(A− (2waαi + (2 + n)waβ1 + β1(4αi + (4 + n)β1))(β0 − ψ))2
8(wa + 2β1)(wa(αi + β1 + nβ1) + β1(2αi + (2 + n)β1))2
, (44)
pi∗i = (β1(−2αi(αi + β1)(wa + 2β1)2φc − 2n(wa + 2β1)(waα2i + 2αi(3wa + αi)β1+
(4wa + 9αi)β
2
1 + 6β
3
1)φc +n
2(wa +β1)(β1(2β1(−6β1φc + (β0−ψ)2) +αi(−4β1φc + (β0−
ψ)2)) + wa(2β1(−4β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2) + αi(−2β1φc + (β0 − ψ)2))))+
An(wa + β1)(αi + 2β1)(β0 − ψ))/(4n2β1(wa(αi + β1 + nβ1) + β1(2αi + (2 + n)β1))2).
(45)
In scenario 3b, the profit function for a large consumer is
pii(qi) =
qi
qi +Q−i
((β0 − β0(qi +Q−i))(qi +Q−i)− φc − (qi +Q−i)ψ)− 0.5αiq2i . (46)
The decision problem for a large consumer no longer depends on the aggregator’s quantity,
since the aggregator exits the market due to high average cost:
pi∗i = max
qi
pii(qi, Q−i). (47)
The solution is found by solving the following set of equations:
∂pi(qi)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
qi=q∗i
= − 1
(qi +Q−i)2
(q3i (αi + 2β1) + q
2
i (2Q−iαi − β0 + 5Q−iβ1 + ψ)+
qiQ−i(−2β0 +Q−i(αi + 4β1) + 2ψ) +Q−i(φc +Q−i(Q−iβ1 − β0 + ψ)) = 0, (48)
where Qi = nqi.
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Proposition 6. The optimal solution in the two-stage game where the cooperative is the
only player in the market is:
(i) The demand served by a large consumer is
q∗i =
√
n2(4φc(β1 + αi − nαi) + n2((β0 − ψ)2 − 4β1φc)) + n2(β0 − ψ)
2n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)
, (49)
(ii) The market price is
p∗ = β0 − β1(
√
n2(4φc(β1 + αi − nαi) + n2((β0 − ψ)2 − 4β1φc)) + n2(β0 − ψ))
2n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)
, (50)
(iii) The profit for a large consumer is
pi∗i =
1
4n2(αi + β1 + nβ1)2
(−2α2iφc − 2n(α2i + 6αiβ1 + 4β21)φc+
n2(2β1((β0 − ψ)2 − 4β1φc) + α1((β0 − ψ)2 − 2β1φc))− αi2β1φc+√
n2(4φc(β1 + αi − nαi) + n2((β0 − ψ)2 − 4β1φc))(β0 − ψ)(αi + 2β1)). (51)
Since in this scenario the aggregator is forced out of the market, the flexible load of small
consumers is not used and and the consumers follow their initial consumption schedule.
Their capacity is too small to bid at the market directly, therefore, they will no longer
participate in flexibility trading.
4.5 Equilibrium quantities and prices
The expressions of equilibrium prices and quantities offered to the market seem rather com-
plicated to interpret. Nevertheless, the expressions give some insights into the aggregator’s
and the large consumers’ game. In addition, the sensitivity analysis provided in section
5.3 and Appendix D helps to determine some relations between the variables of the model
and equilibrium outcomes. The equilibrium prices and quantities in Scenario 2 are equal
to those of the integrated system. Therefore, in this subsection we are only comparing the
outcomes of the integrated system, Scenario 1 and Scenario 3.
The first insight is that the equilibrium prices and quantities do not depend on the fixed
intraday market access and flexible demand coordination cost φ in the integrated system
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and Scenario 1. This fixed cost does not influence the chosen quantity and price, but it
affects the market participants’ profit, i.e. the profit is reduced by the amount of the fixed
cost. This is not the case in Scenario 3, though, where the members of the cooperative
share the fixed intraday market access and flexible demand coordination cost φ depending
on their traded quantity. This means that their and the aggregator’s (in Scenario 3a) offered
quantities, as well as the market price, depend on the cooperative’s fixed cost φc.
The second insight is that larger variable cost of placing a bid at the intraday market
ψ reduces the quantity offered by the aggregator and the large consumers and the price
increases in all scenarios. The profit of all players becomes lower and the consumer surplus
diminishes too.
The third insight is that larger number of large consumers n reduces individually offered
quantities by the aggregator and large consumers, even though the total quantity at the mar-
ket increases. The price falls due to increased competition and consumer surplus increases
in all scenarios.
The fourth insight reveals that larger large consumer’s cost of shifting the first MW of
electricity αi reduces the quantity offered to the market. Even though the aggregator is
increasing the quantity, the total amount in the market is lower and the price goes up. This
leads to a lower consumer surplus. An interesting observation here is that, up to a certain
point, the profit of the large consumers increases with increasing αi due to a higher market
price. Thus, increasing large consumers’ cost does not harm the large consumers. On the
contrary, it increases the profit on the expense of the final consumers. However, when αi
becomes even higher, then the profit starts shrinking. Similarly, the aggregator’s payment
to small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity wa reduces its offered quantity,
increases the quantities offered by the large consumers, the total quantity in the market
decreases and the market price goes up. This harms the final consumers, as the consumer
surplus shrinks. However, in this situation, the aggregator does not yield a larger profit. Its
profit is lower because of the smaller quantity traded in the market, and the large consumers
increase their profits on the expense of final consumers.
Finally, the aggregator could leave the market and stop trading small consumers’ flexibility
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in Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. When the aggregator’s profit becomes negative, the aggregator
would exit the market in the long run. The only variable that does not affect the aggregator’s
profit in both scenarios is the large consumer’s fixed intraday market access and flexible
demand coordination cost φi. All other variables influence the aggregator’s profit at a
different rate. From the sensitivity analysis one can see that a few variables have a higher
impact to the aggregator’s decision to leave the market, i.e. larger number of large consumers
n, higher aggregator’s payment to small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity wa,
higher aggregator’s fixed intraday market access and flexible demand coordination cost φa,
higher slope of the inverse demand function β1, and lower large consumer’s cost of shifting
the first MW of electricity αi, as well as lower intercept of the inverse demand curve β0 would
lead to a situation where the aggregator leaves the market in the long run. Naturally, higher
competition, increasing cost, decreasing competitors’ cost and lower consumers’ willingness
to pay negatively affects the aggregator’s profit and may lead to exiting the market. With
decreasing β0, αi, and increasing β1, n, wa, φa the aggregator exits the market sooner in
Scenario 1, where it has to compete with large consumers bidding at the market individually.
A more detailed analysis of different scenarios is provided in sections 5.2 Results and 5.3
Sensitivity analysis.
The equilibrium outcomes of all scenarios also depend on the market size. For example, a
larger market could lead to the equilibrium where the large consumers would be able to cover
their cost when bidding individually; or, due to increased traded quantities, the aggregator
would be able to stay in the market and compete with the cooperative. However, the rating
of all analysed scenarios would not change much, except the Scenario 2b, where the large
consumers are compensated according to their potential profits when bidding individually.
This would make the Scenario 2b more attractive to the large consumers than the Scenario
2a, where the large consumers profit is equal to zero. Furthermore, Scenario 2c might
become less attractive to the large consumers, if the aggregator does not need to leave the
market in Scenario 3, as their compensations would be equal to those where the aggregator
competes with the cooperative.
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4.6 Consumer surplus
The total expected consumer utility can be written as
∫ Q
0
(β0−β1u)du, where Q is the total
flexibility offered at the market. Since the consumers pay (β0 − β1Q)Q, in equilibrium,
the expected consumer surplus is CS(Q∗) = β1
2
(Q∗)2. Thus, the consumer surplus for each
scenario depends on the amount of provided flexibility to the market. As, in the long run,
the largest quantity of flexibility is provided by a cooperative, the consumers prefer the
cooperative’s presence at the market, which increases their surplus. The least attractive
option for the consumers is to have only the aggregator, which uses its market power and
limits the amount of provided flexibility in order to receive a higher profit.
4.7 Profit distribution
Profit distribution among market players depends on the chosen governance structure. The
market power of the aggregator is reduced by the entry of large consumers directly to the
market or by forming a cooperative. The aggregator’s profit is reduced by the increased
competition. Therefore, the aggregator has an incentive to offer compensations to the large
consumers and trade flexibility on their behalf. If the large consumers face too high market
access cost and cannot trade flexibility on their own, also, if they do not have an option to
form a cooperative, all the profit would be absorbed by the aggregator and would go to its
owners. In this case the aggregator can be seen as a winner, because its profit is the highest,
the large consumers receive zero profits and the consumer surplus is the lowest. Situation
changes when the large consumers face lower market access and flexibility coordination
cost, which allows them to trade flexibility on their own. This leads to a different profit
distribution between the aggregator and the large consumers. Even though the total profit in
the system remains the same, the large consumers receive their share, equal to the potential
profit of trading flexibility directly in the market. Their share can increase even more,
when they have an option to leave the aggregator and form a cooperative, which reduces
their individual market access and flexibility coordination cost and guarantees higher profits
than bidding individually. Thus, an integrated system means the lowest consumer surplus
and highest total profits for the flexibility sellers, but the distribution of profits among the
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market players depend on the large consumers’ ability to leave the aggregator.
The profit is distributed more evenly when the market players face competition. In Scenario
1, where the large consumers are bidding directly at the market, the total system profit is
reduced compared to the integrated system and the consumer surplus increases. When
the large consumers can form a cooperative and share the market access and flexibility
coordination cost, their individual profit increases. If the market is small, the aggregator
may be forced to leave the market due to a more efficient competitor. Even though the
cooperative is the only one trading flexibility at the market, its members are still competing
in terms of their individual quantities, which does not allow the price to rise up to the
integrated system’s level. This means that the consumer surplus is much higher than in the
integrated system’s case.
5 Numerical estimates
To compare the performance under different governance structures, we have used numerical
data representing intraday market trading and players’ participation costs. Since the analy-
sis is focused on trading outcomes for one hour, we have also provided a sensitivity analysis
accounting for any changes in cost parameters, demand elasticity and the number of large
consumers in the market.
5.1 Input data
The need for demand flexibility increases during peak consumption periods when power
prices jump up due to more expensive generators being dispatched to cover the demand and
when the grid is used heavily resulting in possible congestions in certain areas. Thus, our
analysis is based on one peak load hour in Nord Pool intraday market.
European synchronous peak load in winter is calculated for Wednesdays 19:00 CET 3
(ENTSO-E, 2016). Market data is publicly available and is retrieved from the Nord Pool
database accessed via Nord Pool website (Nord Pool, 2017a). Our analysis focuses on 19:00
3From 18:00 CET to 19:00 CET.
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CET of January 4, 2017. Since market data is provided on price area level, we investigated
Denmark’s DK2 price area.
During this hour at the intraday market in DK2 price area, market participants traded 259
MWh at the weighted average price of 37,95 d/MWh. The lowest price was 32,0 d/MWh
and the highest – 42,7 d/MWh. The day-ahead price for this hour was lower – 35,55
d/MWh (36,81 d/MWh and 34,5 d/MWh one hour before and after respectively), which
means that market participants underestimated the load in their day-ahead forecasts. In
DK2 price area, the consumption was 2127 MWh, while production reached only 1651 MWh,
of which wind power accounted for 543 MWh. This resulted in import of 476 MWh.
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter β0 β1 n wa αi ψ φa φi φc
Value 42,7 0,0413 50 1,27 1,16 35,66 6,13 6,91 7,63
The values of all input parameters are summarised in Table 1. The intercept β0 and the
slope β1 of the inverse demand function are found using the intraday market data, i.e.
the minimum and maximum bid prices and the total traded quantity during one hour (see
Appendix C). In the base case, the number of large consumers participating in the DK2
price area is 50.
The aggregator’s payment to small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity wa and
the ith large consumer’s cost of shifting the first MW of electricity αi are calculated using
average differences in day-ahead prices one hour before and after the initial consumption.
The logic behind that is that the consumer has an option to postpone the consumption or
consume one hour earlier and in this way reduce the consumption (or sell energy) at the
initial consumption hour. The cost of reducing this consumption is related to the increase
in the day-ahead price in the hour where the consumption is shifted. Here, we make an
assumption that the consumer is charged according to a day-ahead price for every unit of
electricity on hourly basis. A necessary condition for demand response is smart metering,
which allows the day-ahead prices to be a substantial incentive for demand response (Katz,
2014). Thus, with advanced technology and smart meters consumers would be facing real-
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time pricing, where day-ahead prices can be used as a baseline.4 In addition, we assume
that small consumers are less flexible and require 10% higher compensations than a large
consumer. Since for a small consumer the return from providing flexibility accounts for a
smaller share of total budget than for a large consumer, a small consumer needs a higher
compensation per unit of provided flexibility to encourage the shift in consumption.
Variable cost of placing a bid at the intraday market ψ consists of Nord Pool fee of 0,11
d/MWh and the day-ahead electricity price for a particular hour, which in our case is 35,55
d/MWh. The latter cost should be included too, as the aggregator or a large consumer
has already paid for the initially planned consumption by buying electricity at the day-
ahead market. In aggregator’s case, a small consumer pays a day-ahead price for his or
her consumption and since the consumption is moved from that hour, the consumer wants
his or her money back. In addition, a consumer will ask to compensate for a day-ahead
price increase due to shifting the consumption and some payment for inconvenience, which
is denoted by wa (αi in case of a large consumer).
Finally, the fixed cost of accessing the intraday market and coordinating the flexible demand
φ varies between the aggregator, a large consumer and the cooperative. This variable
accounts for the annual market access fees by the Nord Pool which differs for large and
small market participants. Annual payment for a large participant is d12.300, while a small
participants pays only d6.000. Other fees related to intraday trading include electronic
transmission of intraday data – d1.000 (Nord Pool, 2017b). The annual fixed cost also
accounts for the salary, paid to a professional who is trading the flexible demand at the
intraday market (d25,6 hourly rate), as well as the cost of renting an office space (d64,1
per month). Here we assume that the aggregator has an advantage comparing to a large
consumer or a cooperative, since it already has employees trading at the the intraday market
and an office space. Thus, the increase in its fixed cost of salary and office space is 25%
lower than for a large consumer or the cooperative. After adjusting the annual fixed cost
for one trading hour 5, φa, φi and φc are d6,13, d6,91 and d7,63 respectively.
4The Danish Government is planning to make hourly sampled electricity meters available to all consumers
by 2020. This will make it possible to introduce a settlement method where the consumption is metered
hourly but data is read and provided to consumers only once a month. (Biegel et al., 2014)
5In total there are 8760 trading hours during the year.
89
5.2 Results
Table 2 shows the main results of all analysed scenarios. It provides the aggregator’s traded
quantity qa, the large consumers’ individual quantity qi, the total quantity offered to the
market Q, the aggregator’s profit pia, the large consumers’ individual profit pii, the total
profit in the system Π, the market price p and the consumer surplus CS.
The total traded quantity by the aggregator and large consumersQ is lowest in the integrated
system, as well as Scenario 2, 66,8 MWh, and results in the highest price for the final
consumer, 39,94 d/MWh. In contrast, in Scenario 1, where the aggregator and all large
consumers compete with each other, we see the largest quantity traded and the lowest price
– 108,50 MWh and 38,22 d/MWh respectively. However, one can see that this is not a
stable situation in the market, since all intraday market participants are facing losses and
would exit the market in the longer run. The reason is relatively high fixed cost necessary
to access the market. Perfect competition lowers the price to the level, where it is no longer
profitable to trade the flexible demand.
Table 2: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses (MWh, d, d/MWh)
qa qi Q pia pii Π p CS
Integrated system 1,20 1,31 66,80 - - 229,02 39,94 92.15
Scenario 1 1,99 2,13 108,50 -3,57 -4,09 -208,11 38,22 243.10
Scenario 2a 1,20 1,31 66,80 229,02 0,00 229,02 39,94 92.15
Scenario 2b 1,20 1,31 66,80 433,56 -4,09 229,02 39,94 92.15
Scenario 2c 1,20 1,31 66,80 87,72 2,83 229,02 39,94 92.15
Scenario 3a 1,99 2,11 107,41 -3,46 2,76 134,50 38,26 238.25
Scenario 3b - 2,13 106,69 - 2,83 141,30 38,29 235.07
Scenario 2 corresponds to the integrated system, where the aggregator acts as an entity
internalising all costs and profits. Thus, the total traded quantity and the market price for
the final consumer is the same as in the integrated system. Unlike in the integrated system
case, here we can see the profit distribution between the aggregator and large consumers. In
Scenario 2a, only the aggregator has the market access, therefore, large consumers’ profits
are reduced to minimum, just to keep them offering flexibility. In our case, large consumers
shall receive a non-negative profit, which would incentivise them to stay in the game. Con-
sequently, the aggregator absorbs all the profits 8, which is equal to the integrated system’s
8This illustrates Tirole’s and Williamson’s insights of vertical integration and the use of market power.
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profits, i.e. d229,02. In Scenario 2b, the aggregator’s profit jumps to d433,56. Here, large
consumers are offered a price that is equal to Scenario 1, where each large consumer is
bidding at the market directly. As we already know, large consumers would have a negative
profit and would stop offering flexibility to the aggregator in a longer run. This market
situation is not stable, so, to gain from large consumers’ flexibility, the aggregator would be
forced to raise the payment at least to the same level as in Scenario 2a. In Scenario 2c, the
aggregator is assuming that large consumers have an option to form a cooperative, thus, to
keep them offering flexibility to the aggregator, they must be paid at least as much as in
Scenario 3b (we will see later that Scenario 3a is not a stable market situation either). This
leaves the aggregator with only d87,72 profit and each large consumer receives d2,83.
In Scenario 3, large consumers form a cooperative and share fixed market access and co-
ordination cost. This allows to increase individual profit from d-4,09 in the direct bidding
case to d2,76 in Scenario 3a, where the cooperative competes with the aggregator. From
Table 2 we see that this is not a stable market situation, since the aggregator is receiving a
negative profit. This means that in the long run we would have a situation, that is similar
to Scenario 3b, where the less efficient aggregator is pushed out of the market and there
is only the cooperative that offers flexibility to the intraday market without competition.
Naturally, the individual profit for a large consumer increases to d2,83 and is the largest
among all analysed scenarios.
From Table 2 we can conclude, that if the aggregator is able/allowed to aggregate the
flexibility of large consumers who have an option to form a cooperative, it would choose to
pay the compensation equal to the profits of large consumers in Scenario 3b.
Consumer surplus is determined by the total traded quantity at the intraday market. Table
2 shows that the largest quantity and, accordingly, the lowest price for the final consumer is
in Scenario 1. Here, the consumer surplus reaches d243,10. Unfortunately, in this scenario
all market participants are facing losses and would stop offering flexibility in the long run.
Second largest consumer surplus is in Scenario 3a – d238,25. However, this is not a stable
market situation either, because the aggregator cannot cover its average cost and would leave
the market. Finally, in Scenario 3b, the consumer surplus is slightly lower, d235,07, but it
can be sustained in the long run. This means, that the cooperative of large consumers is able
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to offer the largest amount of flexibility at the lowest price. However, if the aggregator is
able/allowed to aggregate the flexible load of large consumers, in the long run the consumer
surplus would be the lowest, d92,15.
Table 3: The worst and the best scenarios for different market players in the long run
Scenario 1 Scenario 2a Scenario 2b Scenario 2c Scenario 3a Scenario 3b
Large consumers x* worst x best x best
The aggregator x best x medium x worst
Small consumers x best x best x worst
Final consumers x worst x worst x best
* “x” means that the equilibrium is not stable in the long run
Table 3 is a summary table showing the best and the worst scenarios for large consumers,
the aggregator, small consumer providing flexibility to the aggregator and final consumers
buying power at the intraday market in the long run. As Scenario 1, Scenario 2b and
Scenario 3a are not stable in the long run due to negative profits for some of the market
participants, only Scenario 2a, Scenario 2c and Scenario 3b are analysed further. One can
see that none of these scenarios is the best for all market participants. There is always
a trade-off and each scenario has its winners and losers. For example, Scenario 2a, where
the aggregator is trading flexibility on behalf of small and large consumers, is the best for
the aggregator and its small consumers and the worst for the large consumers and final
consumers. Meanwhile, Scenario 3b, where the cooperative is the only seller in the market,
is the best for large consumers and the final consumers. Some scenarios are equally good
or equally bad to some market participants. For instance, Scenario 2c and Scenario 3b are
equally good to the large consumers because they get the same profit in both of them. Small
consumers are indifferent between Scenario 2a and 2c, as the amount and compensation for
the provided flexibility are the same. Similarly, final consumers find Scenario 2a and Scenario
2c equally bad due to the aggregator’s market power and lower quantity of flexibility in the
intraday market. It is a likely outcome, that in the long run the aggregator would agree to
pay the large consumers a compensation, equal to their profits in a cooperative in Scenario
3b. However, this should raise the awareness of the regulatory authorities, as in this case
the final consumers would end up with the lowest consumer surplus. Moreover, the highest
welfare, i.e. the sum of the system’s profit and the consumer surplus, is reached in Scenario
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3b (d376,37).9
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
The numerical example represents one hour trading in the Nord Pool intraday market. The
conditions in other intraday markets might differ from those in Nord Pool. Also, the input
data for other hours during a year might vary from those provided in the example. Therefore,
to show the effect of changes in input variables, we have provided a sensitivity analysis. We
focus on the number of large consumers participating in the market n and the coordination
and other related fixed cost for the aggregator, a large consumer and the cooperative φa, φi
and φc (see Figures in Appendix D). We also analyse the impact of changes in the variable
cost ψ, the aggregator’s payment to small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity
wa, the i
th large consumer’s cost of shifting the first MW of electricity αi, as well as the
slope of the inverse demand function β1 and its intercept β0.
The analysis shows that the rating of scenarios for the aggregator, the large consumers
and final consumers does not depend on different values of input variables, except the new
relevant scenarios (where the market participants do not have to leave the market in the
long run) would take their place in the ranking. Small consumers, providing the flexibility
to the aggregator, however, change their preference from Scenario 3a to Scenario 1 when
the number of large consumers participating in the market n becomes larger than five.
5.3.1 The number of large consumers n
Figure D.1 shows that in all scenarios6 the total quantity and, therefore, consumer surplus is
increasing with the number of large consumers participating in the intraday market. Thus,
the final consumers would gain more if more large consumers would be incentivised to trade
at the intraday market. Their willingness to participate is reflected by the generated profit
that is shown in Figure D.2.
9Here we assume that the small consumers’ compensation paid by the aggregator covers only their cost
of providing flexibility.
6The total traded quantities in Scenario 2 and Integrated system are the same, since the aggregator
internalises all cost and profits like in the integrated system case.
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In Scenario 1, the aggregator’s and large consumer’s profits are the lowest and decrease with
the increasing number of large consumers in the market, i.e. increasing competition. In all
cases of Scenario 2, the aggregator has more power and bids at the intraday market on large
consumers’ behalf. In this way, the increasing number of it’s clients results in higher profits.
However, the steep curve in Scenario 2b is not likely to be sustainable in the long run,
because large consumers face losses and, eventually, would refuse to pay to the aggregator
and cease to offer flexibility at all. In Scenario 2a, large consumes receive zero profits, while
in Scenario 2b and 2c their profit reduces with increased competition among each other7.
From the graph we see that for a large consumer it is not profitable to enter the market
and place bids directly at the intraday market, if the number of its competitors reaches
20. This means that only the concentrated market would guarantee the sufficient revenues
to cover the average cost of flexible demand in a direct bidding case. Also, the individual
trading quantities should be relatively large. When large consumers have an option to form
a cooperative, they can generate positive profits even when the number of members reaches
100.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the variation in input data can slightly change the market
participants’ preference to some scenarios. For example, the number of large consumers n
can change the ranking of scenarios for the small consumers depending on their provided
amount of flexibility.10 Also, when the value of n is low enough (n < 21), all market
participants receive a non-negative profit in all scenarios and none of them leaves the market,
which means that scenario 3b becomes not relevant. Here we distinguish two intervals
resulting in a slightly different scenario ranking: n < 6 and 6 ≤ n < 21. When n ≥ 21, the
market participants preferences remain the same as in Table 4.
Table 4 presents the best and the worst scenarios for different market players when the
number of large consumers n is low enough (n < 21) to keep non-negative profits for all
market participants and stay in the market and when n < 6 (values are shown in brackets)
7Large consumer’s profit is the same in Scenario 1 and 2b, as well as Scenario 2c and 3a due to the
aggregator’s compensation policy.
10We assume that the small consumers are better off when they can offer larger amounts of flexibility and
get compensation from the aggregator, even though the compensation only covers the consumption shifting
cots.
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Table 4: The worst and the best scenarios for different market players in the long run when
6 ≤ n < 21 (when n < 6, if different)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2a Scenario 2b Scenario 2c Scenario 3a Scenario 3b
Large consumers medium worst medium best best x
The aggregator worst best 2nd best medium 2dn worst x
Small consumers best (medium) worst worst worst medium (best) x
Final consumers best worst worst worst medium x
and the small consumers’ preferences are slightly different.11
The best option for the large consumers is still to form a cooperative and share fixed cost with
other cooperative members or provide their flexibility to the aggregator and be compensated
based on the profit in a cooperative. As large consumers receive a positive profit bidding
in the market individually, it is their second best option. It is also equally good to provide
their flexibility to the aggregator and be compensated based on their profit when bidding
individually. When the large consumers cannot choose any of these options, they can offer
their flexibility to the aggregator which absorbs all the profit. Obviously, this is the least
attractive option for the large consumer and the best for the aggregator. The aggregator’s
profit is the lowest when it has to compete with the individually bidding large consumers.
Thus, the aggregator prefers to compete with the cooperative. Or, if it is possible, to trade
flexibility on behalf of the large consumers, pay compensations and receive an even higher
profit. The aggregator’s small consumers prefer when the aggregator is in a competition
with individually bidding large consumers (when 6 ≤ n < 21) or the cooperative (when
n < 6). The smallest amount of small consumers’ flexibility is used when the aggregator
has market power and is the only one offering flexibility in the market. This scenario is the
worst for the final consumers too, as they prefer competition in the market and receive the
highest consumer surplus in Scenario 1. All in all, when the number of large consumers n
is low, none of the scenarios is the best for all market participants, as before. If the large
consumers have an option to form a cooperative, the most likely scenario is Scenario 2c,
which brings the highest overall welfare, but is the worst option for the small and final
consumers.
11The aggregator leaves the market when n reaches 22 in Scenario 1 and when n reaches 23 in Scenario
3a.
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5.3.2 The fixed cost φ and variable cost ψ
The lower fixed cost of accessing the intraday market and coordinating the flexible demand
φ may help market participants to stay in the market. For the aggregator, the increase of
efficiency in coordination activities would bring relatively low benefits in Scenario 2, where
it absorbs all or a large share of large consumers’ profits. However, in Scenarios 1 and
3a, such cost reduction (when φa < 2,5) could result in a positive profit (see Figure D.3).
Naturally, for large consumers, the largest fixed coordination and related cost influence on
profits is seen in Scenario 1, where large consumers are bidding at the market directly and
paying coordination and market access cost individually (see Figure D.4). If φi < 2,8, a
large consumer’s profit becomes positive and they can bid in the market individually in the
long run. When these costs are shared in the cooperative, the effect of changes in φc is
very mild. Nevertheless, higher φc reduces consumer surplus due to the lower quantities
offered by the large consumers (see Figure D.5). The changes in φ do not change the market
participants’ preferences regarding scenarios except those cases, when the participants do
not need to exit the market due to high fixed cost. For example, the final consumers prefer
Scenario 1 to Scenario 3b, when the large consumers are able to bid individually with a
non-negative profit. However, this scenario is the second worst for the large consumers.
Even though the increasing variable cost of placing a bid at the intraday market ψ reduces
the market participants’ profits and the consumer surplus, it does not change the ranking
of the analysed scenarios (see Figure D.6 and Figure D.7).
5.3.3 The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s cost of shifting the load wa and
αi
The increasing aggregator’s payment to small consumers for shifting the first MW of elec-
tricity wa and the i
th large consumer’s cost of shifting the first MW of electricity αi both
reduce consumer surplus (see Figure D.9 and Figure D.10). Also, a higher cost for the
aggregator diminishes its profit and increases the competitors’ profit. For the large con-
sumers the situation is different: their higher cost increases their profit up to a certain point
(approx. αi = 1, 6) and then starts to decrease it. The reason is that the large consumers
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offer smaller quantities, but at a higher price. However, rising cost eventually lowers their
quantities even more and the higher price cannot compensate the increase in cost. Here, the
aggregator receives a higher profit due to increased prices and quantities in Scenario 1 and
Scenario 3a, but its profits are diminishing in Scenario 2a and Scenario 2c due to increased
compensations to the consumers per MW of flexibility and the lower quantities they offer
(see Figure D.8 and Figure D.11b). Nevertheless, the rating of the analysed scenarios does
not change due to different wa and αi values.
5.3.4 The slope of the inverse demand curve β1 and its intercept β0
The more price inelastic the final consumers are, the higher the profit of the market partici-
pants. Thus, lower values of β1 can encourage the market participants to stay in the market,
but the ranking of all scenarios remains unchanged (see Figure D.12 and Figure D.13).
The increasing intercept of the inverse demand curve β0, i.e. increasing demand, can increase
the market participants’ profits and encourage them to stay in the market. Similarly like
before, the ranking of scenarios would not change, except the new relevant scenarios (where
the market participants do not have to leave the market in the long run) would take their
place in the ranking (see Figure D.14 and Figure D.15).
6 Conclusions
The peculiarities of electrical power systems, in particular the need for simultaneous electric-
ity production and consumption, create conditions for specific electricity markets. Planning
and adjusting the production close to real time consumption is a usual routine for the
power generators. With increasing share of less predictable production of renewable power
sources, the planning becomes a bigger challenge and the need for regulating energy, as well
as the flexibility of demand, is growing. To ensure the sufficient amount of cheap energy at
the intraday market, consumers should be incentivised to offer their flexibility and adjust
consumption according to the system’s needs. Due to high market access cost and usu-
ally small offer sizes, large consumers are struggling to bid their flexibility at the intraday
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market. Thus, an appropriate governance structures should be put in place to help large
consumers to overcome coordination and market access issues.
The model, presented in this paper, provides a few important insights to governance struc-
tures and flexible demand trading at the Nord Pool intraday market. First of all, fixed
flexible demand coordination and market access cost is too high for a large consumer to
bid directly at the intraday market. Therefore, the largest consumer surplus, obtained
in Scenario 1, cannot be sustained in the long run, because large consumers would cease
unprofitable trading of flexibility and focus on their primary activities. Second, if large
consumers would access the market via the aggregator, all the profit would be absorbed
by the aggregator unless it would try to keep large consumers from leaving by offering a
payoff equal to the one obtained by forming a cooperative. However, in this case the final
consumers would face relatively high price and their surplus would be moderate. Third,
the cooperative of large consumers would offer the lowest price and the largest quantity
of flexible demand in the long run. Furthermore, the cooperative structure guarantees the
largest profit to large consumers. If the aggregator would not be able/allowed to aggregate
the flexibility provided by large consumers, it would be forced to increase efficiency or leave
the intraday market.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the variations in input variables used in the numerical exam-
ple would not change the ranking of the analysed scenarios, although different values of some
input variables might lead to a situation where none of the market participants exits the
market. In this case, Scenario 1, where the large consumers bid directly at the market, and
Scenario 3a, where the aggregator competes with the cooperative, would take place in the
ranking. As before, there would be no scenario that is the best for all market participants.
There is always a trade-off and there are winners and losers in each scenario. The large
consumers are incentivised to form a cooperative and share high market access cost, which
is one of the main obstacles to bid directly at the market, while the aggregator prefers an
integrated system where it trades flexibility on its small and large consumers’ behalf. Here,
the regulatory authorities should be aware of the aggregator’s market power growth and
its harm to the final consumers. Even though the aggregator is seen as a first choice to
aggregate flexible demand by the European Energy Regulators, the Member States should
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also look at alternative ways to enable demand-side flexibility in electricity markets. One
way could be encouraging the large consumers to form cooperatives and reduce the market
power of the aggregators.
The analysis could be extended by including other electricity markets with their specific
demand functions. Also, the strategies of other market players, for example, wind or con-
ventional power producers, could be investigated too. Another extension could be to include
a longer optimisation period. In our model, the equilibrium is found for one hour of trading.
However, if the flexibility providers shift the consumption instead of curtailing it, they would
take into account prices corresponding to demand and supply in a period of at least several
hours, depending on the flexibility source. Even though this would not change the main
concept of benefits gained by sharing the fixed coordination and market access cost in the
cooperative governance structure, it would result in different consumer surpluses and addi-
tional market risks to market participants, such as the uncertainty about traded quantities
and prices in other hours, where the consumption is moved.
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Appendix A Intermediation: literature review
This appendix presents a more detailed review of intermediation literature that provides
some examples of research directions. Below one can find four groups of papers based
on the intermediation type: information intermediaries, electronic intermediaries, financial
intermediaries and innovation intermediaries.
The first group of papers focus on information intermediaries. For example, Rose (1999)
analyses the economics, concept, and design of information intermediaries and applies mi-
croeconomic theory of search to derive the optimal strategy of the information intermediary.
Bhargava and Choudhary (2004) focus on infomediaries that provide matching services and
examine pricing and product line design strategies. Lee and Cho (2005) distinguishes be-
tween human and nonhuman information intermediary and identifies factors determining
the likelihood of using human information intermediaries in the context of financial invest-
ment decisions. Authors find that a lower level of expertise in financial management, a large
amount of total financial assets, and a high opportunity cost of time increase the likelihood
of using information intermediaries. Womack (2002) studies three institutional forms of in-
formation intermediaries, the for-profit firm, the nonprofit organisation and the government
agency, and comes to a conclusion that in order to encourage information consumption up
to socially optimal levels, one needs government agencies or nonprofit intermediaries.
The second group of papers analyses electronic intermediaries. They are discussed by Bai-
ley and Bakos (1997) who argue that due electronic markets some of the traditional roles
of intermediaries may become less important, however, markets do not necessarily become
disintermediated. Bakos (1991) studies economic models of search and examines how prices,
seller profits and buyer welfare are affected by lower search cost and finds that economic
characteristics of electronic markets, as well as their lower search cost, create many pos-
sibilities for the strategic use of such information systems. Later Bakos (1997) examines
buyer search cost in markets with differentiated products in the context of an electronic
market place. Also, the author investigates the incentives of buyers, sellers and independent
intermediaries to invest in electronic market places.
The third group of papers focus on financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) presents a
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theory of financial intermediation which is based on minimising the cost of monitoring in-
formation. The latter helps to deal with incentive problems between borrowers and lenders.
Moreover, the analysis can be applied for the portfolio and capital structures of intermedi-
aries. Allen and Santomero (1997) highlights an interesting observation that even though
transaction cost and asymmetric information have decreased, intermediation has increased.
They argue that the markets for financial futures and options are more for intermediaries
and not for firms or individuals. The authors discuss the role of intermediaries in the new
context focusing on risk trading and participation cost. Allen and Gale (2004) analyse finan-
cial intermediaries in terms of whether they issue complete or incomplete contracts. They
find that there might be a need for regulating liquidity provision if markets for aggregate risk
are incomplete. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) argue that in order to explain financial
intermediaries the transaction cost concept is not needed. Instead, the emergence of finan-
cial intermediaries is due to their ability to lower information production cost. Adrian and
Song Shin (2010) investigate whether financial intermediaries influence the real economy
and whether the financial sector instead of being passive is the main driver of “boom-bust
cycle”. Similarly, Smith (2003) discusses how financial intermediation affects growth and
how banking crises influence major business cycle.
A relatively new field that has attracted researchers’ attention is intermediation in innova-
tion, which is the fourth group of papers. Abbate et al. (2013) presents emerging research
fields on innovation intermediaries. Howells (2006) develops a typology and framework of
the different roles and functions of the innovation intermediaries. Hoppe and Ozdenoren
(2005) present a theoretical framework for the role of intermediaries between creators and
users of new inventions. Here, the intermediary helps to sort profitable inventions from un-
profitable. Lichtenthaler (2013) investigates the collaboration between manufacturing firms
and innovation intermediaries. The author finds that manufacturing firms may reduce their
transaction cost in technology markets if they collaborate with intermediaries. Inkinen and
Suorsa (2010) investigate the role intermediaries in high-technology product development
in Finland and, based on a survey of high-technology enterprises, find that funding services
are seen as the most important activity of intermediaries. Gassmann et al. (2011) focus on
the intermediary’s role in the cross-industry innovation process and study which capabilities
of an intermediary lead to a successful initiation of a cross-industry innovation.
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Appendix B The sequence of bidding and its influence
to the model results
This appendix provides a discussion and a numerical illustration of the bidding sequence of
market participants. In the Stackelberg game, there is a first-mover advantage, therefore,
the profit of participants depends on who moves first.
B.1 Alternative Scenarios 1
Table B.1 shows the model results using the same input data as before. In Scenario 1, the
aggregator acts as a leader. In the alternative Scenario 1, where the large consumers bid first
(simultaneously) and the aggregator bids second, the offered quantity and the profit of the
aggregator is reduced from 1,99 MWh and d-3,57 in Scenario 1 to 1,89 MWh and d-3,78. In
this situation, the aggregator is worse off because it looses the first-mover advantage. The
large consumers, on the other hand, increase their individually offered quantity from 2,13
MWh to 2,17 MWh. Nevertheless, their individual profit decreases from d-4,09 to d-4,27
compared to Scenario 1. Even though they are bidding first, they are still competing with
each other and tend to offer larger quantities. As a result, a total quantity in the market
increases by 2,06 MWh and drives the price down by 9 cents to d38,13. With lower price
a consumer surplus grows by d9,31. However, like in Scenario 1, in the long run, the large
consumers would exit the market due to a negative profit.
Table B.1: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses in Scenario 1 and
its alternative scenarios (MWh, d, d/MWh)
qa qi Q pia pii Π p CS
Scenario 1 1,99 2,13 108,50 -3,57 -4,09 -208,11 38,22 243,10
Alt. Scenario 1 (consumers bid first) 1,89 2,17 110,56 -3,78 -4,27 -217,42 38,13 252,41
Alt. Scenario 1 (simultaneous bidding) 1,95 2,13 108,49 -3,57 -4,09 -208,05 38,22 243,03
The second alternative Scenario 1 presents the situation when all market participants place
their bids simultaneously. Table B.1 shows that the results of this alternative scenario are
very close to those of Scenario 1. Thus, apart from slightly lower quantity offered by the
aggregator due to a lost position as the first-mover, the influence to the market outcomes
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is minimal.
B.2 Alternative Scenarios 3a
In Scenario 3a, the aggregator and the large consumers bid at the market simultaneously.
The alternative Scenarios 3a present situations where market participants have the first-
mover advantage (see Table B.2). The alternative Scenario 3a where the cooperative bids
first is closely related to the alternative Scenario 1 where the large consumers bid first,
only in this case they bid as a cooperative. Similarly, the aggregator’s offered quantity
decreases by 0,07 MWh and each large consumer increases the offered quantity by 0,04
MWh compared to Scenario 3a. Like before, the total offered quantity increases, the profits
of all participants drop, the price becomes 8 cents lower and consumers enjoy higher surplus
(d247,53 vs. d238,25).
Table B.2: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses in Scenario 3a and
its alternative scenarios (MWh, d, d/MWh)
qa qi Q pia pii Π p CS
Scenario 3a 1,99 2,11 107,41 -3,46 2,76 134,50 38,26 238,25
Alt. Scenario 3a (cooperative bids first) 1,92 2,15 109,49 -3,64 2,58 125,39 38,18 247,53
Alt. Scenario 3a (aggregator bids first) 2,03 2,11 107,43 -3,46 2,76 134,43 38,26 238,31
The alternative Scenario 3a where the aggregator has the first-mover advantage does not
differ much from the Scenario 3a apart from a slightly larger quantity offered by the aggre-
gator and slightly larger consumer surplus. The alternative Scenarios 3a do not reflect the
market situation in the long run because the aggregator would leave the market due to a
negative profit.
B.3 Alternative Scenarios 2b and 2c
Scenarios 2b and 2c are affected by the changes in large consumers’ profits in the alternative
Scenarios 1 and 3a. In Scenario 2b, the aggregator pays a compensation to large consumers
for the provided flexibility equal to their profit that could be obtained by bidding directly at
the market (i.e. Scenario 1) to prevent them from leaving the aggregator. As the consumers’
108
profit in the alternative Scenarios 1 remains negative, alternative Scenarios 2b will not reflect
large consumers’ behaviour in the long run, which means that large consumers would stop
offering their flexibility. Thus, the outcome would be the same as in Scenario 2b.
In Scenario 2c, the aggregator pays a compensation to large consumers, which is equal to
their profit that could be obtained by forming a cooperative. As in the alternative Scenarios
3a the aggregator receives a negative profit, it would leave the market in the long run. Thus,
in order to stay in the market it would have to offer a compensation equal to the profit that
could be obtained by forming a cooperative without competition (i.e. Scenario 3b). As a
result, the outcome would remain the same as in Scenario 2c.
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Appendix C Estimation of β0 and β1
The inverse demand function at the intraday market is expressed as p(Q) = β0 − β1Q.
To find the intercept β0 and the slope β1, we need two points indicating quantities and
respective prices for a particular hour, since the demand function differs for each hour of a
day.
From Nord Pool data we know, that the total amount of traded energy during the analyzed
hour was 259 MWh and the lowest accepted bid was 32,0 d/MWh, which determines the
first point. The second point is indicated by the highest accepted bid, i.e. 42,7 d/MWh, and
zero quantity. Thus, we are solving a simple system of two equations with two unknowns:32, 0 = β0 − 259β142, 7 = β0 − 0β1 , (52)
which gives β0 = 42, 7 and β1 = 0, 0413.
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Appendix D Figures for Sensitivity analysis section
D.1 The number of large consumers n
(a) Total quantity
(b) Consumer surplus
Figure D.1: Total quantity and consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the number
of large consumers n
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(a) Aggregator’s profit
(b) Large consumer’s profit
Figure D.2: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and the
number of large consumers n
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D.1.1 The fixed cost φ and variable cost ψ
(a) All scenarios
(b) Scenarios 1 and 3a
Figure D.3: The aggregator’s profit depending on a scenario and fixed coordination and
market access cost φa
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(a) Scenario 1
(b) Scenario 3
Figure D.4: A large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and fixed coordination and
market access cost φi and φc
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Figure D.5: Consumer surplus depending on a scenario and fixed coordination and market
access cost φc
Figure D.6: Consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the variable cost of placing a
bid at the intraday market ψ
115
(a) The aggregator’s profit
(b) A large consumer’s profit
Figure D.7: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and the
variable cost of placing a bid at the intraday market ψ
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D.2 The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s cost of shifting the
load wa and αi
(a) The aggregator’s profit
(b) A large consumer’s profit
Figure D.8: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and the
aggregator’s payment to small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity wa
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Figure D.9: Consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the aggregator’s payment to
small consumers for shifting the first MW of electricity wa
Figure D.10: Consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the ith large consumer’s cost
of shifting the first MW of electricity αi
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(a) The aggregator’s profit
(b) A large consumer’s profit
Figure D.11: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and
the ith large consumer’s cost of shifting the first MW of electricity αi
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D.3 The slope of the inverse demand curve β1 and its intercept
β0
(a) The aggregator’s profit
(b) A large consumer’s profit
Figure D.12: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and
the slope of the inverse demand curve β1
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(a) Total quantity
(b) Consumer surplus
Figure D.13: The total quantity and consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the
slope of the inverse demand curve β1
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(a) The aggregator’s profit
(b) A large consumer’s profit
Figure D.14: The aggregator’s and a large consumer’s profit depending on a scenario and
the intercept of the inverse demand curve β0
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Figure D.15: Consumer surplus depending on a scenario and the intercept of the inverse
demand curve β0
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Chapter 3
Flexible electricity demand aggregator in the intraday
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Abstract
Flexible electricity demand aggregators are likely to participate not only in day-ahead
and balancing markets, but also in a rapidly growing intraday market. This paper
examines whether the presence of a flexible demand aggregator in the intraday market
can harm power buyers and increase the competing producer’s profit. Equilibrium
market outcomes in the Monopoly case and in the Stackelberg competition case are
found using a game theoretic approach. The solutions indicate that under certain
market conditions and power production cost levels, the aggregator’s participation
in the intraday market can increase the producer’s profit and reduce the consumer
surplus of power buyers. Due to the aggregator’s trading patterns, in particular the
increased demand in one hour and increased supply in another, the producer is able
to use the change in demand and increase its profit by adjusting the amount of offered
energy depending on its production cost in both hours. A numerical example is based
on Nord Pool intraday market data for two trading hours in the DK2 bidding area
and is complemented with a sensitivity analysis.
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1 Introduction and literature review
The importance of the intraday market is growing with the increasing share of intermittent
renewable energy sources in the European power systems. Usually, the production of wind
power deviates from the volumes traded day-ahead and these discrepancies must be offset
after the closure of the day-ahead market. Thus, the intraday market, being a place for
such contracts, is one of the key tools allowing to increase the share of renewable energy in
the energy mix (Nord Pool, 2017b; Haas et al., 2013).
In comparison to the electricity day-ahead market, futures market and the balancing market,
the intraday electricity market has received much less attention in the academic literature
(Lazarczyk, 2016; Karanfil and Li, 2017). One reason could be relatively small volumes
traded at this market; in 2016, the total traded volume at the Nordic and Baltic day-ahead
market was 391 TWh, while the volume traded at the Nordic, Baltic and German intraday
market accounted for 5 TWh, which is 1,3% of the day-ahead market volume (Nord Pool,
2016a). However, during the last decade the intraday market expanded five times and is
expected to grow further.1
The intraday market will grow not only in terms of traded volumes, but it will also include
new market participants – the aggregators of flexible electricity demand. The behaviour
of these new players differs from the one of the usual market participants. Unlike others,
the aggregator can act as both buyer and seller (Shafie-khah et al., 2016). In order to use
its consumers’ flexibility and sell power in one hour, the aggregator must buy the same
(or larger, if, for example, heating or cooling processes require more energy to restore the
temperature) amount of power in the next hours to compensate for the delayed consumption.
Demand-side management is seen as a way to reduce power consumption during peak times
and lower power prices, contributing to the system’s stability. It is considered, that it is
beneficial for both sides, since the aggregator of flexible demand gains from offering its
consumers’ flexibility to the market and generates profit. For example, Ayo´n et al. (2017a)
focus on the flexibility of aggregated demands of buildings with different characteristics.
In the model an aggregator participates directly in the day-ahead market and optimises
1The interested reader is referred to Appendix A for further discussion on the intraday markets.
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the load schedule taking into account the building occupant comfort. Their results show
the potential of demand aggregation in order to increase flexibility and the aggregator’s
profits in the day-ahead market. Moreover, the aggregator can participate not only in the
intraday but also in other markets, such as reserves markets, and, for example, for the plug-
in electric vehicles’ flexibility aggregator reserves market is the main source of its income.
Heleno et al. (2016) study a bottom-up aggregation of residential demand-side flexibility
associated with thermostatically controlled loads. This flexibility is aggregated into reserve
bids and is traded at the day-ahead tertiary reserve markets. Meanwhile, Shafie-khah et al.
(2016) show that the participation in the intraday market can increase the aggregator’s
profit and improve its strategy in energy and reserves markets.
Recently, several studies have analysed the aggregator’s behaviour in multiple markets: day-
ahead, intraday and/or balancing markets. For example, Ottesen et al. (2018) investigates
the optimal bidding for a flexibility aggregator participating in three sequential markets:
flexibility reservation, a spot market and a flexibility market for near real-time dispatch.
The authors present the decision models as multi-stage stochastic programs and include sce-
narios for the possible realisations of prices. They calculated the value of flexibility, showed
a positive net profit and analysed how the different markets generate profits. Shafie-khah
et al. (2016) propose a multi-stage stochastic model of a plug-in electric vehicles aggrega-
tion agent that participates in both day-ahead and intraday markets. Their model captures
several uncertainties like the behaviour of plug-in electric vehicles owners, electricity mar-
ket prices, and activated quantity of reserve by the system operator. MacDougall et al.
(2017) also studies the flexibility of electric vehicles and its trading on the German day-
ahead and intraday markets. The authors investigate the impact of applying a predictive
control trading strategy, which actively offers aggregated flexibility to the markets, from a
monetary and network stability perspectives. They use an artificial neural network to fore-
cast the available ramp up and down capacity of a virtual power plant of electric vehicles.
Heydarian-Forushani et al. (2014a) focus on the day-ahead and intraday market too. They
present a framework to optimise the participation of a demand response aggregator in both
markets, where it optimises its participation schedule and bidding strategy according to its
consumers’ behaviour. The authors use a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model for
the customers’ participation. They also take into account the uncertainties of market prices
129
and the behaviour of consumers.
Ayo´n et al. (2017b) present a probabilistic optimisation method that produces optimal bid-
ding curves that an aggregator submits to the day-ahead and intraday markets. They also
take into account uncertainties in forecasted market prices, demand and renewable energy
sources. Zhou et al. (2017) assume that the trading in the day-ahead market is already
settled and propose an optimal scheduling method for the aggregator to arbitrage in the in-
traday market using its flexible thermostatically controlled loads and renewable generation.
Their two-level scheduling method has the upper level, which is a model predictive control
optimisation minimising the sum of energy and capacity cost of imbalances under thermal
constraints; and the lower level, which adopts the typical temperature priority list (TPL)
control. In all these studies the results indicate gains for the aggregator. However, neither
of them model the behaviour of other market participants and the effects to the original
power buyers.
Even though some authors, for instance, Zhou et al. (2017), Ayo´n et al. (2017b) or Mathieu
et al. (2015), who investigate the potential for aggregations of residential thermostatically
controlled loads to arbitrage intraday wholesale electricity market prices, assume that the
aggregator does not participate in market price formation since its offered quantities are too
small, the entrance of a new player in the intraday market may affect all existing market
players and final consumers. In contrast to the majority of studies, advocating the benefits
of flexible demand aggregation this research draws attention to possible disadvantages of
the aggregator’s participation in the intraday market. This paper investigates whether the
flexible demand aggregator’s presence in the intraday market could increase the competing
producer’s profit and reduce the consumer surplus of power buyers.
A game-theoretic approach is used to compare market equilibrium outcomes in a situation
where a flexible demand aggregator participates in the intraday market with a situation
where there is no aggregator. To determine the effect of the aggregator’s entry to the market
a simplified model of a real world intraday market is set: in the first case, a producer is
a monopolist; in the second case, the aggregator is in a Stackelberg competition with the
producer that acts as a leader. The model allows to conclude whether the producer can
benefit from the aggregator’s presence at the intraday market and whether power buyers can
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be harmed when the aggregator starts selling flexibility in the intraday market. The results
show that under certain market conditions the producer is able to reduce its production cost
more than its reduced revenue due to the competition with the aggregator and in this way
increase its profit. Unfortunately, in some cases, the consumer surplus of the original power
buyers may shrink when the aggregator is trading flexibility, as the quantities of electricity
available to them in each hour differ in both cases and those quantities have different weights
that reflect their value.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. It starts with
a description of electricity demand and supply in the intraday market and then presents two
analysed cases: the Monopoly and Stackelberg cases. The equilibrium analysis is provided
in Section 3. Section 4 includes numerical estimates for the general solutions obtained in
the previous section. It discusses input data, which includes Nord Pool intraday market
data, marginal production cost data and demand flexibility data. Also, it provides results
and sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion.
2 Model
The aggregator of flexible demand is denoted by A, while the producer, a power generator,
by P . These two market participants trade a homogeneous good, electricity, in the intraday
market. They maximise their profits for one period of time, which consists of 2 hours
denoted by n, n = 1, 2.
2.1 Electricity demand
Demand in the intraday market is formed by all traders who, due to inaccurate forecasts,
purchased less power than needed in the day-ahead market. It is assumed that in the
analysed period all electricity providers underestimated their consumers needs and have
to buy more power in the intraday market. Sometimes, due to technical reasons, power
producers cannot provide the energy sold in the day-ahead market. In such cases, producers
would buy energy in the intraday market, too, or eliminate their imbalance in the regulating
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market.
As I have analysed the intraday market where the participants make their decisions about
traded quantities for the same day, it is assumed that the demand for the coming hours is
known in advance. The inverse demand function can be expressed as:
p(Q) = β0 − β1Q, (1)
where β0 and β1 are constants (β0 > 0 and β1 > 0) and Q is power demand for one hour.
It is a standard downward sloping demand function, implying that electricity buyers react
to prices and that they have an option to buy power in the regulating power market and in
this way eliminate imbalance.2
The aggregator’s traded volumes influence the demand in those hours, when the aggregator
buys power to compensate the reduction in consumption made in the other hour. Thus,
when the aggregator buys power in the market, the demand function shifts to the right by
the aggregator’s shifted consumption qa:
p(Q, qa) = β0 − β1(Q− qa). (2)
2.2 Electricity supply
The effects of the aggregator’s presence in the intraday market on market equilibrium out-
comes are analysed by using a simplified model. In this model, electricity is supplied by the
producer, that is the only power supplier in the Monopoly case, and the aggregator, that is
shifting the available flexible demand within the analysed period and competing with the
producer in the Stackelberg case. While the producer supplies power to the market in both
hours of the optimisation, the aggregator sells power in one hour and buys it in another to
keep the balance in its consumers’ consumption.
2Real world data supports the assumption about the downward sloping demand curve (see Appendix B
Figure B.1 illustrating the aggregated demand for one hour in Nord Pool intraday market).
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2.2.1 Producer
There is only one producer that is able to generate and offer electricity in the analysed
period.3 The producer’s cost function in hour n, n = 1, 2 is:
cpn(qpn) = αpnqpn, (3)
where αpn is a constant marginal cost of production (cpn > 0). The marginal cost of
production does not change with increasing quantity, since fuel cost for a particular hour
remains the same. However, it can vary for different hours. For example, a gas power plant
might buy gas at fluctuating hourly prices resulting in different electricity production cost
for different hours.
2.2.2 Aggregator
The aggregator is an electricity provider, which has consumers that react to hourly energy
prices and offer their flexibility of consumption in return to financial compensation. Thus,
the aggregator uses flexibility of its consumers, compensates them for every shifted kilowatt
hour of energy and trades this energy in the intraday market. It has a quadratic cost
function with a linear marginal cost. The aggregator’s cost function is:
ca(qa) = αaq
2
a, (4)
where 2αaqa is a marginal cost of shifting consumption (αa > 0). The quadratic form of the
function guarantees that every additional kilowatt hour of shifted consumption is worth more
than the last one. This is related to the consumer’s disutility of postponing consumption to
the next hour (or consuming earlier than planned). The shape of this function also implies
that at some point flexibility becomes too expensive and the consumer is close to his or her
inflexible4 consumption level. In the model, consumption can be shifted by only one hour,
similarly like in refrigeration systems.5
3In order to simplify the model, it is assumed that all other producers have already traded their available
capacity at the day-ahead market or need to buy power and compensate for already sold power shortage
that appeared due to unexpected events, while all electricity providers are either in balance or need to
purchase power at the intraday market.
4Inflexible consumption cannot be shifted to other hours.
5Grein and Pehnt (2011) claim that the maximum duration of load shifts of domestic refrigerators can
vary between 30 to 80 minutes.
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2.3 Monopoly and Stackelberg cases
I investigate two cases: in the first case, Monopoly, the producer is the only power seller
in the intraday market; in the second case, Stackelberg, the aggregator enters the intraday
market and competes with the producer in a Stackelberg competition. In the Stackelberg
case, the aggregator is relatively small comparing to the producer, therefore, the producer
acts a leader and the aggregator – as a follower. The bidding sequence issue, as well as
the extreme scarcity issue in the main scenario, is addressed in the alternative scenarios in
Appendix C.
Alternative scenarios are provided in Appendix C and Appendix D. Appendix C analyses
a situation when, in the first case, there is more than one producer offering power at the
intraday market and competing in Cournot competition. In the second case, I introduce the
aggregator, which also competes with power producers in Cournot competition. Appendix
D presents a situation, where a monopolistic producer, in addition to producing power,
acts as an aggregator. I compare the market outcomes in two cases: when a monopolistic
producer is also an aggregator vs. being only a monopolistic producer.
Figure 1 illustrates the intraday market structure in both cases. While on the sellers’ side
there is the producer and the aggregator (or only the producer), on the buyers’ side there
are suppliers of electricity that bought less power than needed at the day-ahead market, pro-
ducers that cannot meet the day-ahead traded volumes due to some incidents in production,
and traders/brokers.
Figure 2 shows how bid or ask orders are placed in the intraday market in both cases.
Market participants decide about their orders in the intraday market after the gate closure
of the day-ahead market. Each market participant places its orders for the analysed period.
This means that it places one order for hour n = 1 and another for hour n = 2 at the same
time. Buyers are bidding in the market continuously.
In the case of monopoly, the producer decides on its quantities qpn, n = 1, 2 and places
two ask orders, each for hour n = 1 and n = 2 at the same time. In the Stackelberg case,
the producer is a leader and moves first and decides on its quantities qpn, n = 1, 2. After
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Figure 1: Intraday market structure in the Monopoly and Stackelberg cases
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Figure 2: Timelines of trading in the intraday market in the Monopoly and Stackelberg
cases
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observing the producer’s decision, the aggregator chooses its quantity qa, which it sells in
one hour and buys in another. The producer knows that the aggregator’s bought and sold
quantities in the analysed period are equal.
3 Equilibrium analysis
This section provides the equilibrium outcomes of the two previously described cases:
Monopoly and Stackelberg. First, the general solutions for equilibrium quantities, prices
and players’ profits are shown for each case, then consumer surplus is analysed in a separate
subsection.6 Also, this section includes propositions that under certain market conditions
and marginal production cost the aggregator’s presence at the market can be beneficial
to the producer, can harm the original power buyers, or can make all market participants
better off compared to the Monopoly case.
3.1 Monopoly case
The Monopoly case defines the situation where the producer is the only supplier in the
intraday market. The prices in the analysed period are determined by the inverse demand
function pn(qpn) = β0n − β1n(qpn), n = 1, 2.
The producer maximises the standard profit function for both hours in the analysed period:
pip(qp1, qp2) = (β01 − β11(qp1))(qp1)− αp1qp1 + (β02 − β12(qp2))(qp2)− αp2qp2, (5)
where (β01 − β11(qp1))(qp1) is its revenue and αp1qp1 is its cost in hour n = 1, while (β02 −
β12(qp2))(qp2) and αp2qp2 are its revenue and cost in hour n = 2.
Proposition 1. A solution to the Monopoly problem:
(i) The equilibrium quantities supplied by the producer are
q∗p1 =
β01 − αp1
2β11
, (6)
6The interested reader is referred to Appendix E for a discussion on price elasticity of demand at the
equilibrium outcomes.
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q∗p2 =
β02 − αp2
2β12
. (7)
(ii) The market prices are
p∗1 =
β01 + αp1
2
, (8)
p∗2 =
β02 + αp2
2
. (9)
(iii) The producer’s profit is
pi∗p =
β11(αp2 − β02)2 + β12(αp1 − β01)2
4β11β12
. (10)
3.2 Stackelberg case
In the Stackelberg case, the producer is the leader and moves first. It anticipates the
aggregator’s response function and decides about its own quantities accordingly.
The profit function for the aggregator is:
pia(qa, qp1, qp2) = (β01 − β11(qp1 + qa))qa − αaq2a − (β02 − β12(qp2 − qa))qa, (11)
where qa can be positive or negative. Positive value means that the aggregator is selling
power in hour n = 1 and buying in hour n = 2; negative – that it is buying power in n = 1
and selling in n = 2. Hence, when qa is positive, (β01 − β11(qp1 + qa))qa is the aggregator’s
revenue for sold power in hour n = 1 and (β02 − β12(qp2 − qa))qa is its cost of buying power
in hour n = 2. Also, it pays compensation to its consumers for shifted load qa, which is
equal to αaq
2
a. When qa is negative, (β01 − β11(qp1 + qa))qa becomes the aggregator’s cost
for bought power in hour n = 1 and (β02 − β12(qp2 − qa))qa becomes revenue for sold power
in hour n = 2. αaq
2
a remains positive and accounts for the cost of load shifting paid to its
consumers.
The offered and required quantities by the aggregator depend on the producer’s offered
quantities in both hours. The decision problem for the aggregator is:
pi∗a(qa, qp1, qp2) = max
qa
pia(qa, qp1, qp2). (12)
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The best-response function for the aggregator is found by solving the following equation:
∂pia(qa, qq1, qp2)
∂qa
= β01 − β02 − qp1β11 + qp2β12 − 2qa(αa + β11 + β12) = 0. (13)
The best-response function for the aggregator is:
q∗a(qp1, qp2) =
β01 − β02 − qp1β11 + qp2β12
2(αa + β11 + β12)
. (14)
The producer’s profit function is:
pip(qa, qp1, qp2) = (β01 − β11(qp1 + qa))qp1 − αp1qp1 + (β02 − β12(qp2 − qa))qp2 − αp2qp2. (15)
Here, the producer’s profit also depends on the aggregator’s quantity qa. The best-response
functions for the producer are found by substituting qa with the aggregator’s best-response
function q∗a and maximising the producer’s profit with respect to qp1 and qp2, thus, solving
the following equations:
∂pip(q
∗
a, qq1, qp2)
∂qp1
= β01 − αp1 − β11(2qp1 + qp2)+
β11(β02 − β01 + 2qp1β11 + 2qp2(αa + β11))
2(αa + β11 + β12)
= 0, (16)
∂pip(q
∗
a, qq1, qp2)
∂qp2
=
1
2(αa + β11 + β12)
(
2β02(αa + β11) + (β01 + β02 − 2qp1β11−
4qp2(αa + β11))β12 − 2qp2β212 − 2αp2(αa + β11 + β12)
)
= 0. (17)
Proposition 2. A solution to the Stackelberg game is:
(i) The equilibrium quantities supplied by the producer and by the aggregator are
q∗p1 =
1
2
(β01 − αp1
β11
+
αp2 − αp1
2αa + β11 + β12
)
, (18)
q∗p2 =
1
2
(β02 − αp2
β12
+
αp1 − αp2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
, (19)
q∗a =
1
4
( β01 − β02
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)
2αa + β11 + β12
)
. (20)
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(ii) The market prices are
p∗1 =
αp1 + β01
2
+
β11(β02 − β01)
4(αa + β11 + β12)
, (21)
p∗2 =
2(αp2 + β02)(αa + β11) + β12(2αp2 + β01 + β02)
4(αa + β11 + β12)
. (22)
(iii) The producer’s and the aggregator’s profits in period t are
pi∗p =
1
8
(2(αp1 − β01)2
β11
+
2(αp2 − β02)2
β12
− (β01 − β02)
2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
, (23)
pi∗a =
(2(αa + β11 + β12)(αp1 − αp2) + (β01 − β02)(2αa + β11 + β12))2
16(αa + β11 + β12)(2αa + β11 + β12)2
. (24)
Further, I have focused on the producer’s profit and compared equilibrium outcomes of the
Monopoly and Stackelberg cases. Proposition 3 provides the conditions under which the
producer is better off in a competition with the aggregator than being a monopolist.7
Proposition 3. The producer is strictly better off in a Stackelberg competition with the
aggregator than being a monopolist if
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
. (25)
The producer sells the same total amount of energy in both analysed cases. However, when
the aggregator is present in the market, the producer sells more in the hour when its marginal
cost is lower and it sells less by the same amount of energy in the other hour compared to the
Monopoly case.8 Meanwhile the prices in two hours increase or drop by different amounts,
as the aggregator is competing with the producer and lowering the market price in one hour,
and increasing the demand and market price in the other hour. As long as the slopes of
the inverse demand functions are not equal, the change in market prices compared to the
Monopoly case differ. This means that the producer sells the same total amount of energy
at different prices. Appendix G shows that the producer’s total revenue in the Stackelberg
case is always lower or equal to the total revenue in the Monopoly case. Nevertheless, the
total producer’s cost in the Stackelberg case is also lower or equal to the its total cost in the
7The proofs of Proposition 3, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 are provided in Appendix F.
8When the producer’s marginal cost in both hours are equal, the producer’s traded quantities do not
differ in the analysed cases.
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Monopoly case. Thus, the difference in profits depends on the magnitude of both effects,
i.e. whether the reduction in revenue is outweighed by the reduction in cost, or not.
Figure 3 shows when the producer is better off to compete with the aggregator in one hour
and sell power to the aggregator in another.9 The likelihood of the producer to profit from
the aggregator’s participation in the intraday market depends on marginal cost and market
conditions reflected by ∆αp, ∆β0 and φ. Here, ∆αp = αp1 − αp2 denotes the difference
between the producer’s marginal costs in hours n = 1 and n = 2; ∆β0 = β01 − β02 denotes
the difference between the inverse demand function intercepts, or the highest bid orders in
hours n = 1 and n = 2; and φ = 2αa+β11+β12
2αa+2(β11+β12)
accounts for the aggregator’s marginal cost
factor αa and the slopes of inverse demand functions β1 in hours n = 1 and n = 2.
It is favourable to the producer when the difference between its marginal cost ∆αp in hours
n = 1 and n = 2 is larger, the difference in the highest bid orders ∆β0 in those hours is
smaller, and when φ is lower. The dependence of φ on the aggregator’s marginal cost factor
αa and the sum of slopes of demand β1 in n = 1 and n = 2 is shown in Appendix H Figure
H.2. Thus, it is better for the producer when the aggregator’s marginal cost is lower and
the sum of the slopes of demand is larger.
(a) φ = 0, 4 (b) φ = 0, 9
Figure 3: Areas illustrating when the producer benefits from being in a competition with
the aggregator in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0 and φ
9For a 3D graph see Appendix H Figure H.1.
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3.3 Consumer surplus
The total expected consumer utility, where the total volume of energy offered in the market
in one hour is Q, is
∫ Q
0
(β0 − β1u)du. In equilibrium, the consumers pay (β0 − β1Q∗)Q∗.
Thus, the expected consumer surplus is CS(Q∗) = β1
2
(Q∗)2.
The aggregator influences demand curve in the hour when it buys power to compensate its
consumers for the shifted load. Therefore, the calculation of consumer surplus also depends
on the hour of the aggregators purchase of power. When the aggregator sells power in hour
n = 1, the total consumer surplus in the analysed period is:
CSn=1(q
∗
p1, q
∗
p2, q
∗
a) =
β11
2
(q∗p1 + q
∗
a)
2 +
β12
2
(q∗p2 − q∗a)qp2. (26)
Similarly, when the aggregator sells power in hour n = 2, the total consumer surplus in the
analysed period is:
CSn=2(q
∗
p1, q
∗
p2, q
∗
a) =
β11
2
(q∗p1 + q
∗
a)qp1 +
β12
2
(q∗p2 − q∗a)2. (27)
Since the aggregator sells energy in one hour and buys it in another, it receives some part
of the consumer surplus too. Thus, the adjusted consumer surplus, excluding the benefit
for the aggregator, is:
CSadj(q∗p1, q
∗
p2, q
∗
a) =
β11
2
(q∗p1 + q
∗
a)
2 +
β12
2
(q∗p2 − q∗a)2. (28)
It is the same in both situations: when the aggregator is buying power in hour n = 1 or in
hour n = 2.
Proposition 4 provides a solution for consumer surplus in the Monopoly case and adjusted
consumer surplus in the Stackelberg case.
Proposition 4. The consumer surplus:
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(i) in the Monopoly case is:
CSMon =
1
8
((αp1 − β01)2
β11
+
(αp2 − β02)2
β12
)
, (29)
(ii) in the Stackelberg case is:
CSadj,Stack =
1
32(αa + β11 + β12)2((2αaβ01 + β11(3β01 − β02) + 2β01β12 − 2αp1(αa + β11 + β12))2
β11
+
(−2β02(αa + β11) + β12(β01 − 3β02) + 2αp2(αa + β11 + β12))2
β12
)
. (30)
(a) µ = 1, 1 (b) µ = 1, 8
(c) µ = 2, 8
Figure 4: Areas illustrating when the adjusted consumer surplus is reduced due to the
presence of the aggregator in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0 and µ
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Since the producer, under certain market conditions, can increase its profit when the aggre-
gator enters the intraday market, it is likely that the surplus of the original power buyers,
i.e. excluding the aggregator, might be reduced. Proposition 5 reveals under which circum-
stances it is true.
Proposition 5. The adjusted consumer surplus is reduced when the aggregator enters the
intraday market if
(i) αp1 > αp2 and β01 > β02 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
, (31)
or
(ii) αp1 < αp2 and β01 < β02 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
. (32)
The original consumers’ consumer surplus depend on the quantity of electricity available to
them in each hour. The quantities in both hours can be lower or higher in the Stackelberg
case compared to the Monopoly case. Also, as the price elasticity of demand in both hours
is not the same, available quantities have different weights: β11/2 in hour n = 1 and β12/2
in hour n = 2. Therefore, the total effect of both hours is not obvious from the first glance.
Proposition 5 indicates under which circumstances the total effect is negative.10
Graphical illustration of conditions for the reduction of the adjusted consumer surplus in the
Stackelberg case is shown in Figure 4.11 The original power buyers are likely to be harmed by
the aggregator’s entrance in the intraday market if the difference in the producer’s marginal
cost in different hours is higher, the difference in highest bids at the market is lower, and
µ = 4αa+5(β11+β12)
4αa+4(β11+β12)
, accounting for the aggregator’s cost and the slopes of demand, is lower.
Changes in µ due to changing αa and β1 in hours n = 1 and n = 2 are shown in Appendix
H Figure H.5: lower αa and higher sum of β11 and β12 give higher µ.
10See Appendix I for more details.
11For 3D graphs see Appendix H Figure H.3 and Figure H.4.
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Even though the aggregator harms the original power buyers in some cases, is it also possible
that all market participants are better off. The conditions when all intraday market par-
ticipants benefit from the aggregator’s presence in the market are provided in Proposition
6.
Proposition 6. All market participants benefit from the aggregator’s presence in the intra-
day market if
(i) β01 > β02:
• β01 > β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
(β01 − β02)
√
2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
< αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
,
(33)
or
• β01 > β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
; (34)
Or
(ii) β01 < β02:
• β01 < β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
, (35)
or
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• β01 < β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
(β01 − β02)
√
2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
< αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
.
(36)
(a) µ = 5, ρ = 0, 1 (b) µ = 2, ρ = 0, 5
(c) µ = 1, 1, ρ = 0, 9
Figure 5: Areas illustrating when all market participants gain from the aggregator’s partic-
ipation in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0, ρ and µ
Thus, Proposition 6 shows the conditions under which the sum of the offered quantities to
the original consumers multiplied by respective weights in each hour can be higher in the
Stackelberg case, and, at the same time, the producer’s reduced cost outweigh the reduction
in revenues in the Stackelberg case, while the aggregator receives a positive profit.
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Here, the graphical illustration in Figure 5 slightly differs from the ones provided earlier –
the indicators reflecting the aggregator’s cost and the slopes of demand in both hours differ
in left and right sides of the inequalities: ρ =
√
2αa+β11+β12
2αa+2(β11+β12)
=
√
φ and µ = 4αa+5(β11+β12)
4αa+4(β11+β12)
.
As a result, the illustrated areas depend on ∆αp, ∆β0 and two other variables, ρ and µ.
The higher µ, the lower ρ and the larger the difference in the producer’s marginal cost ∆αp
is, the more likely is it that all market participants will be better off. With low µ and
high ρ values, it is more favourable to the market participants to have small differences in
the highest bids in the market ∆β0. With higher µ and lower ρ values, negative ∆β0 are
preferred to be small, while positive values are preferred to be larger. The dependence of
ρ on αa and the sum of demand slopes β11 and β12 are shown in Appendix H Figure H.6:
higher αa and lower sum of β11 and β12 result in higher ρ.
4 Numerical estimates
To illustrate that under certain conditions the producer is able to benefit from the aggregator
participating in the intraday market and that the adjusted consumer surplus can be reduced,
the real world data analysis of one period, or hours n = 1 and n = 2, is provided in the
following sections. The necessary conditions for the producer to gain and the adjusted
consumer surplus to be lower are satisfied on January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00.
4.1 Input data
Input data includes intraday market data, the producer’s marginal cost and demand flexi-
bility data determining the aggregator’s marginal cost. All parameter values are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter β01 β02 β11 β12 αp1 αp2 αa
Value 27,2 27,0 0,188 0,05 20,25 19,00 0,28
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4.1.1 Intraday market data
Hourly intraday market data for DK2 area is retrieved from the Nord Pool website (Nord
Pool, 2017c). It includes hourly information about highest and lowest accepted bids and
traded energy volumes in all Nord Pool bidding areas. In the analysis I focus on hours 02.00
and 03.00, when the highest and lowest bids in the intraday market are 27,2 d/MWh and
22,5 d/MWh in hour 02.00, and 27,0 d/MWh and 26,0 d/MWh in hour 03.00, respectively.
Traded volumes correspond to 25,0 MWh and 20,0 MWh.
This data is used to calculate parameters β0 and β1. β0 is simply the highest bid order in the
intraday market: 27,2 d/MWh in hour 02.00 and 27,0 d/MWh in hour 03.00. Meanwhile,
the slope of demand β1 is derived using highest and lowest bids and trades volumes (see
Appendix J) and is equal to 0,188 and 0,05 in hours 02.00 and 03.00.12
4.1.2 Marginal production cost
In the numerical example, the producer is a gas power plant. Since power generation
marginal cost corresponds to the fuel cost, in this case natural gas, the producer’s marginal
production cost αp in hours 02.00 and 03.00 is equal to the natural gas “within-day” price
in those hours, αp1 = 20, 25 d/MWh and αp2 = 19, 00 d/MWh (The European Energy
Exchange, 2017).
4.1.3 Demand flexibility data
The flexibility in refrigeration processes is used to estimate the potential amount of flexible
demand available to the aggregator. The interested reader is referred to the Appendix K for
further details on the use of refrigeration processes for the demand-side management and
the reasons why the flexibility from this source is chosen for this particular example.
12A linear approximation of the demand curve might not always reflect the ask orders at the intraday
market, because in real world the demand function is a step function. However, a linear approximation
helps to present the concept of the model without additional complications and leaves the investigation of
other approximations of the demand curve for future research.
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It is assumed that the load of domestic refrigerators can be shifted only by one hour and
with zero energy loss. The aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa depends on the day
ahead prices for the hours where the load is moved, because it is considered that the con-
sumer is paying for consumed energy according to the day-ahead prices. Therefore, if the
consumption is moved to the hour with a higher day-ahead price, the consumer must be
compensated for the difference, otherwise there would be no incentive to participate in flex-
ibility programs. For the analysed hours, the day-ahead prices are 27,14 d/MWh and 27,42
d/MWh resulting in 0,28 d/MWh difference, which is the cost of moving the first MWh of
load (Nord Pool, 2017a). Due to the disutility of postponing the consumption (or consuming
earlier), the marginal cost of using flexibility is increasing as shown in (4).13
4.2 Results
The data for January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00, is used to calculate the producer’s
and the aggregator’s equilibrium quantities, profits, intraday market prices and consumer
surpluses in two cases, the Monopoly case and the Stackelberg case. The results are provided
in Table 2.
Table 2: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses based on data from
January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00, bidding area DK2 (MWh, d, d/MWh)
qp1 qp2 qa Qtotal pip pia p1 p2 CS CSadj
Monopoly 18,484 80,000 - 98,484 384,232 - 23,725 23,000 192,116 -
Stackelberg 17,701 80,783 0,880 99,364 384,712 0,401 23,707 23,005 193,824 192,066
The producer’s profit pip in the analysed period is higher in the Stackelberg case comparing
to the Monopoly case: d384,712 versus d384,232. Even though the difference is small,
the real world data confirms that the conditions, necessary to satisfy Proposition 3, can
appear in the real world and the producer can be better off being in a competition with an
aggregator than a monopolist in the intraday market. In the analysed period, the producer’s
13The concept is similar to the one presented in the first chapter “Aggregation of demand-side flexibility
in electricity markets: the effects of portfolio choice” section Model setup.
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generated power satisfied almost all demand in both cases (total covered demand is denoted
as Qtotal in Table 2): 18,484 MWh and 80,000 MWh in the Monopoly case and 17,701 MWh
and 80,783 MWh in the Stackelberg case.
The aggregator’s profit in the Stackelberg case is relatively low, d0,401, since its traded
quantities are also very low – only 0,880 MWh. This can be explained by rapidly increasing
marginal cost with every additional MWh of used flexibility. However, the profit is still
positive, which guarantees the aggregator’s participation in the intraday market. Positive
value of the aggregator’s quantity indicates that it was selling power in hour 02.00 and
buying in hour 03.00. One should also notice that even small amounts of flexibility offered
by the aggregator can change the market outcomes and affect its participants. Thus, the
aggregator is able to act strategically.
The larger difference in equilibrium prices for both hours can be seen in the Monopoly case:
23,725 d/MWh and 23,000 d/MWh. When aggregator enters the market, it sells energy in
the first hour, increases supply and reduces the price to 23,707 d/MWh in the Stackelberg
case. In the second hour, the aggregator increases the demand, because it has to buy energy
to cover the shifted consumption of its consumers. Thus, the the price increases from 23,000
d/MWh in the Monopoly case to 23,005 d/MWh in the Stackelberg case.
The total consumer surplus, denoted as CS in Table 2, is lower in the Monopoly case,
d192,116, and slightly increases to d193,824 when the aggregator starts trading in the
market. Despite that, the original power buyers are harmed, since their surplus is reflected
by the adjusted consumer surplus which excludes the aggregator’s surplus in the second
hour when it is buying power. The adjusted consumer surplus is slightly lower than in
the Monopoly case – d192,066. This confirms that the conditions, necessary to satisfy
Proposition 5, can appear in the real world and the presence of the aggregator in the
intraday market might harm the original power buyers.14
14Considering the proposed model setting, the original power buyers would be harmed in 11 two-hour
periods during January 2017. Calculations are made for 409 moving two-hour periods, because out of 744
hours of January, bids were placed in both gas and electricity markets in only 409 hours.
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis for general solutions can be found in section Equilibrium analysis (see
Figures H.1–H.5). Here, I provide a numerical example to illustrate the difference in the
producer’s profit ∆pip = pi
Stack
p − piMonp as well as the adjusted consumer surplus ∆CSadj =
CSadj,Stack−CSMon, depending on the producer’s marginal cost αp, the aggregator’s marginal
cost parameter αa, the highest bids in the market β0 and the slopes of demand β1.
4.3.1 Producer’s marginal cost of production αp
The difference in the producer’s profit ∆pip and and the adjusted consumer surplus ∆CS
adj
depend on the difference of the producer’s marginal cost αp and the level of its marginal
cost: when the marginal cost becomes too high, the producer stops bidding in the market.
Thus, the sensitivity analysis presents the effects of changing the producer’s marginal cost
in hour n = 2, which captures both the difference in its marginal cost in two hours and the
level of cost in hour n = 2.
Figure 6 shows that the producer is mostly better off in a competition with the aggregator
than being a monopolist no matter whether marginal production cost αp in hour n = 2 drops
or rises, since the difference in its profits remains positive most of the time (see Figure L.1
in Appendix L illustrating the producer’s profits in both cases). Only when the producer’s
marginal cost in hour n = 2 comes close to its marginal cost in hour n = 1 (αp1 = 20, 25
d/MWh), in a small interval between 20,07 and 20,42 d/MWh, the Monopoly profit is
slightly higher than in the Stackelberg case. Recall that the smaller difference in αp in two
hours reduces the producer’s chances to benefit from the aggregator’s participation in the
market.
When the gap between marginal cost in two hours is increasing, the difference in profit
is growing at an increasing rate. In Figure 6 ∆αp is increasing moving to the left from
αp1 = αp2 = 20, 25, while the negative difference ∆αp is increasing moving to the right.
When αp2 reaches 26,60 d/MWh, the producer stops selling power in hour n = 2 in the
Stackelberg case. Thus, further increase in αp2 does not affect it’s total profit, because the
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producer is selling power only in hour n = 1. Now the aggregator is buying power in hour
n = 1 and selling in hour n = 2. In the Monopoly case, the producer stops selling power
in hour n = 2, when αp2 rises to 27,00 d/MWh. From this point, the difference in profits
does not depend on the producer’s marginal cost in the second hour. The reason why the
producer stops selling power in hour n = 2 earlier in the Stackelberg than in the Monopoly
case is related to the aggregator’s traded quantities. By leaving the market earlier and
letting the aggregator sell more power in hour n = 2 the producer receives higher profit in
hour n = 1 when the aggregator has to buy energy.
Figure 6: Difference between the producer’s profit in the Stackelberg case and the Monopoly
case ∆pip depending on its marginal cost αp2, d
The adjusted consumer surplus CSadj is decreasing with increasing marginal cost of produc-
tion αp2 in both cases (see Figure L.2 in Appendix L). The original power buyers are better
off in the Monopoly case while αp2 is lower than 20,03 d/MWh – the difference is negative
(see Figure 7). When αp2 exceeds this value, original power buyers prefer to have the ag-
gregator in the intraday market. When the producer stops selling power at αp2 = 26, 60,
the difference in CSadj jumps, because the CSadj remains unchanged in the Stackelberg
case while it keeps shrinking in the Monopoly case, until αp2 = 27, 00 and the producer
stops selling power in the second hour in the Monopoly case, too, and after this point the
difference in CSadj remains constant. This illustrates how, depending on the producer’s
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marginal cost, the original power buyers can be better off or worse off when the aggregator
is trading in the intraday market.
Figure 7: Difference between the adjusted consumer surplus ∆CSadj depending on the
producer’s marginal cost αp2, d
4.3.2 Aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa
The aggregator’s marginal cost also influences the producer’s gain (see Figure L.3 in Ap-
pendix L). Growing aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa results in lower quantity it
offers to the intraday market. Thus, the producer is increasing its market share and getting
closer to becoming a monopolist, which means that the difference between the profit in the
Stackelberg case and the Monopoly case is shrinking (see Figure 8). The results indicate that
in this case the producer’s profit is larger when its competitor’s, the aggregator’s, marginal
cost parameter αa is lower.
Meanwhile, the difference in the adjusted consumer surplus is decreasing and the original
power buyers are harmed (∆CSadj is negative) less when the aggregator’s marginal cost
becomes higher (see Figure 9 Figure L.4 in Appendix L).
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Figure 8: Difference between the producer’s profit in the Stackelberg case and the Monopoly
case ∆pip depending on the aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa, d
Figure 9: Difference between the adjusted consumer surplus in the Stackelberg case and the
Monopoly case ∆CSadj depending on the aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa, d
4.3.3 Highest bid order in the intraday market β0
Figure 10 shows that the difference between the producer’s profits is positive, thus, the
producer is better off in a competition with the aggregator, when the highest bid order in
hour n = 2 is in the interval (25, 78; 28, 62). When β0 values are out of this interval, the
producer is better off being a monopolist. This, once again, illustrates Proposition 3 that the
producer has better changes to have higher profit in competition compared to the Monopoly
case, if the difference in highest bids in the market is lower. Indeed, ∆pip is maximised when
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Figure 10: Difference between the producer’s profit in the Stackelberg case and the Monopoly
case ∆pip depending on the highest bid order at the intraday market β02, d
Figure 11: Difference between the adjusted consumer surplus in the Stackelberg case and
the Monopoly case ∆CSadj depending on the highest bid order at the intraday market β02,
d
β02 = β01 = 27, 2. When the negative difference in the highest bids in the market ∆β0
is increasing and we are moving to the right from the point where β02 = β01 = 27, 2, the
difference in profits is decreasing and becomes negative. Similarly, when moving to the left
from the point where ∆β0 = 0, i.e. in the direction of increasing ∆β0, the difference in
profits is shrinking and becomes negative, too. When the highest bid order in hour n = 2
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drops to d19,00, the producer stops selling power in hour n = 2, since its marginal cost
becomes too high (αp2 = 19, 00) (see Figure L.5 in Appendix L).
As it is illustrated in Figure 11, the original consumers are worse off in the Stackelberg case
if β02 is in the interval (26, 08; 27, 2). Otherwise, they gain from the aggregator’s presence
in the market. The further from that interval β02 is, the faster ∆CS
adj grows. Although,
the growth rate of ∆CSadj becomes lower when β02 drops below d19,00 and the producer
stops selling power in hour n = 2 (see Figure L.6 in Appendix L).
4.3.4 Slope of demand β1
The increase in the slope of demand β12 leads to a lower profit for a seller (see Figure L.7
in Appendix L) and reduces the difference between the producer’s profits in the Stackelberg
case and the Monopoly case (see Figure 12). In the analysed period, the producer is better
off in a competition with the aggregator, since ∆pip stays positive when β12 grows. Similarly,
with higher β12 values, the adjusted consumer surplus decreases in both cases (see Figure
L.8 in Appendix L), since prices are getting higher in both hours and the producer’s traded
quantities are lower in hour n = 2. The difference in the adjusted consumer surplus remains
negative when β12 increases (see Figure 13).
Figure 12: Difference between the producer’s profit in the Stackelberg case and the Monopoly
case ∆pip depending on the slope of demand β12, d
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Figure 13: Difference between the adjusted consumer surplus in the Stackelberg case and
the Monopoly case ∆CSadj depending on the slope of demand β12, d
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the flexible demand aggregator’s presence in the intraday
market can negatively affect power buyers and bring benefit to the competing producer.
A game theoretic approach is used to compare market equilibrium outcomes in two cases:
the Monopoly case, where only the producer sells power in the intraday market, and the
Stackelberg case, where the producer competes with a smaller aggregator.
The general equilibrium solutions indicate that under certain market conditions and the
producer’s marginal cost in different hours, the producer is strictly better off being in a
competition with the aggregator than selling power in the intraday market as a monopolist.
The reason for this unexpected outcome is the aggregator’s trading pattern: the aggregator
sells power in one hour, but buys it in another to compensate its consumers for the shifted
load. Therefore, in one hour the aggregator increases power supply and in another – power
demand. The total amount of energy offered to the market by the producer is the same
either it is a monopolist or in a competition with the aggregator. Nevertheless, because
of the aggregator’s presence in the market and increased demand in one of the hours, the
producer shifts some part of its production from one hour to another, where the marginal
production cost is lower. Under favourable market conditions, such as certain slopes of
demand and highest bid orders in the market, certain producer’s marginal cost in different
hours and certain aggregator’s cost parameters, the producer is able to reduce its production
cost more than its reduced revenue due to the competition and in this way increase its profit.
Under certain market conditions, the adjusted consumer surplus, that excludes the surplus
absorbed by the aggregator, might become smaller than in the Monopoly case. The reason
for this reduction is that the quantities of electricity available to the original power buyers
in each hour differ in both cases and those quantities have different weights that reflect their
value. On the other hand, another outcome is possible, too: all market participants can be
better off when the aggregator is trading flexible load in the intraday market.
The numerical estimation presents an example of two trading hours in the Nord Pool intra-
day market when the producers benefit from the aggregator’s presence at the market and
the adjusted consumer surplus is reduced. Here, two hypothetical players – the producer, a
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gas power plant, and the aggregator, that offers flexibility of refrigeration processes – com-
pete in DK2 bidding zone on January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00. Numerical results
show that the producer’s profit is indeed higher in the Stackelberg case compared to the
Monopoly case. Even though the difference in profits is low, sensitivity analysis suggests
that higher variation in hourly gas prices could significantly increase the difference between
the producer’s profits in the Monopoly and Stackelberg cases. The total consumer surplus
increases when the aggregator trades in the market. However, the adjusted consumer sur-
plus, which is the surplus that does not include the aggregator’s surplus when it acts as a
buyer, is slightly lower in Stackelberg case. This illustrates that under certain conditions, in
some hours, the aggregator’s presence in the intraday market might harm power consumers.
Further research could move in several directions. First, other demand flexibility sources
could be included in the aggregator’s portfolio. Different load shifting patterns with longer
than one hour load shifting periods could make the aggregator less predictable and reduce
the producer’s advantage. Second, further analysis could include other power markets,
day-ahead and balancing market, to investigate changes in market participants’ bidding
behaviour. Finally, further real world data investigation, including other bidding zones and
longer periods of time, could bring useful insights whether the aggregator’s benefits for the
society can be affected significantly by its possible harm in certain time periods.
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Appendix A Intraday market
The benefits of trading in the intraday market are argued by several authors. Many of
them focus on renewable energy sources (RES) behaviour in the intraday market (Chaves-
A´vila and Fernandes, 2015) and on wind power generators (Skajaa et al., 2015; Heydarian-
Forushani et al., 2014b; Usaola and Moreno, 2009; Chaves-A´vila et al., 2013; Henriot, 2014),
some on pumped hydro power plants (Braun and Hoffmann, 2016) and thermal power
generators (Aı¨d et al., 2016). These benefits and successful wind power integration in the
power system can be achieved only if there is enough liquidity in the intraday market (Weber,
2010). Also, the profitability of market participants depends on whether one- or two-price
system has been applied for imbalance settlement, the latter being more beneficial for both
the buyers and the sellers (Scharff and Amelin, 2016).
The activity of trading varies between different price zones and mostly depends on the
share of wind power in the power system, transmission capacity for the intraday trading
and the level of balancing prices (Scharff and Amelin, 2016). In order to know if the intraday
market is functioning effectively, one should know what causes the difference in day-ahead
and intraday market prices. In the effectively functioning intraday market, the difference in
day-ahead and intraday market prices is caused by the wind and conventional generation
forecast errors: the relative intraday prices decrease when the wind forecast errors become
lower (Karanfil and Li, 2017). On the other hand, the price formation in the intraday
market can lead to different optimal strategic bidding at the day-ahead market (Soysal
et al., 2017).
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Appendix B Illustration of aggregated demand for one
hour in the intraday market
Each trader at the intraday market has an access to the market information provided by
Nord Pool. Figure B.1 shows the market information screen for Swedish SE3 bidding zone.
The first column indicates the product type and time of the delivery, as well as gate closure
time. Bid and Ask columns show bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices for a particular product that
are the best at the moment. Meanwhile, Order Depth provides information about all orders
places on Bid or Ask. In this graphical representation, the Y axis ”gives an approximation
as to the quantity of an order relative to the other orders in the order depth.”; and the X
axis ”shows how far apart the Bid/Ask prices are from one another, relative to the other
orders in the order depth” (Nord Pool, 2016b). Green indicates bid and red indicates ask
orders. Thus, from here we can see that the approximation of the demand function for one
hour is downward sloping.
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(a) Market information screen
(b) Order depth
Source: (Nord Pool, 2016b)
Figure B.1: Nord Pool intraday market information screen, 8 Nov 2016
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Appendix C Many producers and the aggregator
In this appendix I analyse the market situation when there is more than one producer offering
power at the intraday market and the aggregator enters the intraday market. Let’s compare
equilibrium market outcomes in two cases: “Many producers”, where several producers are
selling power at the market, and “Many producers and the aggregator”, where the aggregator
enters the market and offers its consumers’ flexibility.
Let’s assume that there are K producers that are identical in terms of their characteristics,
facing production cost function as in equation 3. The total quantities of power offered by
all the producers to the market in hours n = 1 and n = 2 are Qp1 and Qp2.
In the first case, Many producers, all producers are competing in a Cournot competition
and make their decisions about individually offered quantities qip1 and q
i
p2, i = 1, ..., K in
period t to the market at the same time. The ith producer maximises its profit function:
piip(q
i
p1, q
i
p2, Q
−i
p1 , Q
−i
p2 ) = (β01 − β11(qip1 +Q−ip1 ))qip1 − αp1qip1+
(β02 − β12(qip2 +Q−ip2 ))qip2 − αp2qip2, (37)
where its profit depends on its own and on its competitors’ quantities. The decision problem
for the ith producer is
pii∗p (q
i
p1, q
i
p2, Q
−i
p1 , Q
−i
p2 ) = max
qip1,q
i
p2
piip(q
i
p1, q
i
p2, Q
−i
p1 , Q
−i
p2 ). (38)
The reaction functions of all producers are found by solving the following set of equations:
∂piip(q
i
p1)
∂qip1
∣∣∣∣
qip1=q
i∗
p1
= β01 − αp1 − qip1β11 − (qip1 +Q−ip1 )β11 = 0, (39)
∂piip(q
i
p2)
∂qip2
∣∣∣∣
qip2=q
i∗
p2
= β02 − αp2 − qip2β12 − (qip2 +Q−ip2 )β12 = 0, (40)
where qip1 + Q
−i
p1 is equal to q
i
p1K and q
i
p2 + Q
−i
p2 is equal to q
i
p2K, since all producers have
symmetrical costs, which result in identical solutions.
166
Proposition 7. A solution to the case Many producers is:
(i) The equilibrium quantities supplied by the ith producer are
qi∗p1 =
β01 − αp1
β11(1 +K)
, (41)
qi∗p2 =
β02 − αp2
β12(1 +K)
. (42)
(ii) The market prices are
p∗1 =
β01 + αp1K
1 +K
, (43)
p∗2 =
β02 + αp2K
1 +K
. (44)
(iii) The ith producer’s profit is
pii∗p =
(αp2 − β02)2β11 + (αp1 − β01)2β12
(1 +K)2β11β12
. (45)
When the aggregator enters the market, it is competing with power producers in a Cournot
competition. All market participants make their decisions about offered quantities at the
same time.
The aggregator face the same cost function as before. Its profit function in the case Many
producers and the aggregator is:
pia(qa, Qp1, Qp2) = (β01 − β11(Qp1 + qa))qa − αaq2a − (β02 − β12(Qp2 − qa))qa, (46)
where its profit depends on its own and on all producers’ quantities. The decision problem
for the aggregator is:
pi∗a(qa, Qp1, Qp2) = max
qa
pia(qa, Qp1, Qp2). (47)
The reaction function of the aggregator is found by solving
∂pia(qa)
∂qa
∣∣∣∣
qa=q∗a
= β01 − β02 −Qp1β11 +Qp2β12 − 2qa(αa + β11 + β12) = 0, (48)
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and is equal to
q∗a =
β01 − β02 −Qp1β11 +Qp2β12
2(αa + β11 + β12)
. (49)
The ith producer’s profit function is
piip(q
i
p1, q
i
p2, Q
−i
p1 , Q
−i
p2 , qa) = (β01 − β11(qip1 +Q−ip1 + qa))qip1 − αp1qip1+
(β02 − β12(qip2 +Q−ip2 − qa))qip2 − αp2qip2. (50)
The reaction functions of all producers are found by solving the following set of equations:
∂piip(q
i
p1)
∂qip1
∣∣∣∣
qip1=q
i∗
p1
= β01 − αp1 − (qa + 2qip1 +Q−ip1 )β11 = 0, (51)
∂piip(q
i
p2)
∂qip2
∣∣∣∣
qip2=q
i∗
p2
= β02 − αp2 + (qa − 2qip2 −Q−ip2 )β12 = 0, (52)
and are equal to
qi∗p1 =
β01 − αp1 − qaβ11
β11(1 +K)
, (53)
qi∗p2 =
β02 − αp2 − qaβ12
β12(1 +K)
. (54)
Proposition 8. A solution to the case Many producers and the aggregator is:
(i) The equilibrium quantities supplied by the ith producer and the aggregator are
qi∗p1 =
1
β11(1 +K)
(
β01 − αp1 + ((αp2 − αp1)K − β01 + β02)β11
2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12)
)
, (55)
qi∗p2 =
1
β12(1 +K)
(
β02 − αp2 + ((αp1 − αp2)K + β01 − β02)β12
2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12)
)
, (56)
q∗a =
(αp1 − αp2)K + β01 − β02
2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12)
. (57)
(ii) The market prices are
p∗1 =
1
1 +K
(
αp1K + β01 +
((αp2 − αp1)K − β01 + β02)β11
2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12)
)
, (58)
p∗2 =
1
(1 +K)(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12))(
(αp2K + β02)(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)β11)+
(β01 + β02 +K(αp1 + αp2 + αp2K + β02))β12
)
. (59)
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(iii) The ith producer’s and the aggregator’s profits are
pii∗p =
1
1 +K
((αp1 − β01)2
(1 +K)β11
+
α2p2
β12
− α
2
p2K + 2αp2β02 − β202
β12(1 +K)
−
2αa((αp1 − αp2)K + β01 − β02)2
(2 +K)(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12))2
+
((4 + 3K)(αp1 − αp2)− (3 + 2K)(β01 − β02))((αp1 − αp2)K + β01 − β02)
(1 +K)(2 +K)(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12))
)
. (60)
pi∗a =
((αp1 − αp2)K + β01 − β02)2(αa + β11 + β12)
(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12))2
. (61)
Proposition 9 provides the conditions when a producer i is strictly better off when in addition
to other producers the aggregator is participating in the intraday market comparing to the
situation when the only competitors are other producers.
Proposition 9. A producer i benefits from the aggregator’s presence in the intraday market
if
(i) αp1 > αp2:
• αp1 > αp2 and β01 > β02 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4(1 +K)αa + (3 + 2K)(β11 + β12)
4(1 +K)αa + (4 + 3K)(β11 + β12)
, (62)
or
• αp1 > αp2 and β01 < β02 and
(αp1 − αp2)K > −β01 + β02; (63)
Or
(ii) αp1 < αp2:
• αp1 < αp2 and β01 > β02 and
(αp1 − αp2)K < −β01 + β02, (64)
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or
• αp1 < αp2 and β01 < β02 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4(1 +K)αa + (3 + 2K)(β11 + β12)
4(1 +K)αa + (4 + 3K)(β11 + β12)
. (65)
Proposition 9 can be proven similarly as Proposition 3 – a producer i is strictly better off
in a competition with the aggregator in the intraday market if its profit in the case Many
producers and the aggregator is larger than in the case Many producers. The necessary
conditions include the difference between the producer’s i marginal cost αp in both hours,
the difference between the highest bids in the market in both hours and a ratio, accounting
for the aggregator’s cost indicator αa, demand slopes β1 in both hours and a number of
producers in the intraday market K.
The adjusted consumer surpluses in two analysed cases are shown in Proposition 10. Simi-
larly like in the Monopoly and Stackelberg cases, consumers may be hurt by the aggregator’s
participation in the intraday market (i.e. CSMPA − CSMP < 0) under certain market con-
ditions, provided in Proposition 11. Proposition 11 can be proven similarly as Proposition
5.
Proposition 10. The adjusted consumer surplus:
(i) In the case Many producers is
CSMP =
K2((αp2 − β02)2β11 + (αp1 − β01)2β12)
2(1 +K)2β11β12
, (66)
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(ii) In the case Many producers and the aggregator is
CSMPA =
1
(2(1 +K)2(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)(β11 + β12))2(
1
β12
(
(K(αp2 − β02)(2αa(1 +K) + (2 +K)β11) + (αp1K + αp2K(1 +K) + β01−
(1 +K)2β02)β12)
2
)
+
1
β11
(
(β02 − β01)β11 −K2β01(2αa + β11 + β12)+
αp1K((1 +K)(2αa + β11) + (2 +K)β12) +K(αp2β11 − 2β01(αa + β11 + β12))
)2)
.
(67)
Proposition 11. The consumer surplus is reduced when the aggregator enters the intraday
market if
(i) αp1 > αp2:
• αp1 > αp2 and β01 > β02 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4K(1 +K)αa + (1 + 2K(2 +K))(β11 + β12)
4K(1 +K)αa +K(3 + 2K)(β11 + β12)
, (68)
or
• αp1 > αp2 and β01 < β02 and
(αp1 − αp2)K > −β01 + β02; (69)
Or
(ii) αp1 < αp2:
• αp1 < αp2 and β01 > β02 and
(αp1 − αp2)K < −β01 + β02, (70)
or
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• αp1 < αp2 and β01 < β02 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4K(1 +K)αa + (1 + 2K(2 +K))(β11 + β12)
4K(1 +K)αa +K(3 + 2K)(β11 + β12)
. (71)
Table C.1 shows the numerical results using the same input data as before (see Table 1)
and a new parameter K = 5, determining the number of producers in the intraday market.
With higher competition in the market, the traded quantities are about 65% larger and
reach 165,423 MWh (see Table 2 and Table C.1). Prices drop from 23,000–23,725 d/MWh to
20,333–21,408 d/MWh. Consequently, the adjusted consumer surplus is significantly higher:
d533,474–d533,656. The results show that, similarly like in the case of one producer, the
aggregator participation in the market increases producer’s i profit from d42,692 to d42,778
and adjusted consumers surplus from d533,656 to d533,474. Thus, under certain market
conditions, even though there are more power suppliers in the market, the aggregator might
harm the original power buyers and increase the profit of its competitors.
Table C.1: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses based on data
from January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00, bidding area DK2 (MWh, d, d/MWh), two
cases: Many producers and Many producers and the aggregator
qip1 q
i
p2 qa Q
total piip pia p1 p2 CS CS
adj
Many producers 6,161 26,667 - 164,140 42,692 - 21,408 20,333 533,656 -
Many producers and
the aggregator 5,947 26,881 1,283 165,423 42,778 0,853 21,368 20,344 537,745 533,474
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Appendix D The producer as an aggregator
This appendix provides the analysis of the market situation when the producer in addition
to producing power acts as an aggregator and is the only power seller in the intraday market.
Let’s call this case “The producer as an aggregator”.
The producer faces the same cost function for producing power as before (see (3)). Also,
it compensates its consumers for provided flexibility (see the aggregator’s cost function in
(4)). The aggregator maximises its profit function in the analysed period:
pip(qp1, qp2, qa) = (β01 − β11(qp1 + qa))(qp1 + qa)− αp1qp1 + (β02 − β12(qp2 − qa))(qp2 − qa)
− αp2qp2 − αaq2a. (72)
Unlike the aggregator in previous cases, the producer does not need to buy power in the
intraday market in order to compensate for the shifted load – instead it produces that
amount of power and provides it to its consumers that offer flexibility. As a result, the
demand curve does not shift.
Proposition 12. A solution to the case The producer as an aggregator is:
(i) The equilibrium quantities supplied by the producer are
q∗p1 =
αaβ01 + αp2β11 − αp1(αa + β11)
2αaβ11
, (73)
q∗p2 =
−αp2 + β02 + (αp1−αp2)β12αa
2β12
. (74)
q∗a =
αp1 − αp2
2αa
. (75)
(ii) The market prices are
p∗1 =
αp1 + β01
2
, (76)
p∗2 =
αp2 + β02
2
. (77)
(iii) The producer’s profit is
pi∗p =
αa(αp2 − β02)2β11 + (αa(αp1 − β01)2 + (αp1 − αp2)2β11)β12
4αaβ11β12
. (78)
173
The following proposition states that the producer is never worse off to have consumers
providing flexibility and producing power comparing to being only a power producer. This
is intuitive, since the producer increases its chances to receive a higher profit when it has
an option to use flexibility provided by its consumers.
Proposition 13. The producer is never worse off to have consumers providing flexibility
and producing power comparing to being only a power producer.
Proof. The producer is never worse off to act as an aggregator in addition to producing
power if pi∗PAp −pi∗Monp > 0, where the expressions for the producer’s profit when it also acts
as an aggregator pi∗PAp and when it is only a producer pi
∗Mon
p are provided in Proposition 7
and Proposition 1. Thus, the inequality pi∗PAp − pi∗Monp > 0 can be written as:
αa(αp2 − β02)2β11 + (αa(αp1 − β01)2 + (αp1 − αp2)2β11)β12
4αaβ11β12
−
β11(αp2 − β02)2 + β12(αp1 − β01)2
4β11β12
> 0
Through algebra, it can be simplified as:
(αp1 − αp2)2
4αa
> 0,
which is always true.
The consumer surplus is shown in the following proposition. One can notice, that it is the
same as in the Monopoly case. Therefore, the final consumers are indifferent if the producer
has an access to flexibility providers or not.
Proposition 14. The consumer surplus when the producer acts as an aggregator in addition
to producing power is
CSPA =
β11(αp2 − β02)2 + β12(αp1 − β01)2
8β11β12
. (79)
Naturally, the producer never receives a lower profit in The producer as an aggregator case
comparing to the Stackelberg case.
Proposition 15. The producer never receives a lower profit in The producer as an aggre-
gator case comparing to the Stackelberg case.
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Proof. The producer never receives a lower profit in The producer as an aggregator case
comparing to the Stackelberg case if pi∗PAp − pi∗Stap > 0, where the expressions for the pro-
ducer’s profit when it also acts as an aggregator pi∗PAp and when it is competing with an
aggregator pi∗Stap are provided in Proposition 7 and Proposition 2. Thus, the inequality
pi∗PAp − pi∗Stap > 0 can be written as:
αa(αp2 − β02)2β11 + (αa(αp1 − β01)2 + (αp1 − αp2)2β11)β12
4αaβ11β12
−
1
8
(2(αp1 − β01)2
β11
+
2(αp2 − β02)2
β12
− (β01 − β02)
2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
> 0
Through algebra, it can be simplified as:
1
8
( (β01 − β02)2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2(αa + β11 + β12)
αa(2αa + β11 + β12)
)
> 0,
which is always true.
Since the consumer surplus in The producer as an aggregator case is equal to the consumer
surplus in the Monopoly case, the conditions under which the adjusted consumer surplus
is reduced when the aggregator enters the intraday market correspond to those provided in
Proposition 5.
Table D.1 shows the numerical results using the same input data as before (see Table 1).
The first two lines include previously analysed Monopoly and Stackelberg cases, while the
third shows the results when the producer acts as an aggregator. The producer’s profit in
the latter case is higher – d385,627 versus d384,232 and d384,712 in the Monopoly and
Stackelberg cases. This illustrates the proposition that the producer will be never worse off
by having an option to sell aggregated flexibility. The consumer surplus, however, remains
the same as in the Monopoly case – d192,116. Even though the total quantity produced
including the amount of shifted load is higher than in the Monopoly case (d100,716 versus
d98,484), part of it is not traded in the market: when the producer shifts its consumers’ load,
it does not need to buy it back in the market, instead it produces energy itself. Also, one
can notice that the amount of shifted energy is significantly larger than in the Stackelberg
case – 2,232 MWh versus 0,880 MWh.This can be explained by the producer’s ability to use
it directly, without buying it back in the market, since the cost of flexibility becomes only
the compensation to consumers for the shifted load and pure production cost.
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Table D.1: Equilibrium quantities, profits, prices and consumer surpluses based on data
from January 19, 2017, hours 02.00 and 03.00, bidding area DK2 (MWh, d, d/MWh),
three cases: the Monopoly, the Stackelberg, and The producer as an aggregator.
qp1 qp2 qa Qtotal pip pia p1 p2 CS CSadj
Monopoly 18,484 80,000 - 98,484 384,232 - 23,725 23,000 192,116 -
Stackelberg 17,701 80,783 0,880 99,364 384,712 0,401 23,707 23,005 193,824 192,066
The producer as
an aggregator 16,252 82,232 2,232 100,716 385,627 - 23,725 23,000 192,116 -
All in all, we see that under certain market conditions for the society it is better to have a
producer who can act as an aggregator than an additional market player which trades only
demand flexibility.
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Appendix E Price elasticity of demand
This appendix provides a discussion about the price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium
outcomes.
E.1 Equilibrium outcomes and price elasticity of demand when
β01 = β02 = β0
From the main analysis we know that when the producer’s marginal cost αp1 and αp2 differ
and the highest bids in the market β01 and β02 are equal (β01 = β02 = β0), then the producer
is always better off in the Stackelberg case compared to the Monopoly case (see Proposition
3).
Proposition 16. When the highest bids in the market in both hours are equal, β01 = β02:
• the equilibrium prices in the Stackelberg case are the same like in the Monopoly case:
p∗Stack1 = p
∗Mon
1 and p
∗Stack
2 = p
∗Mon
2 ;
• the traded quantities can be written as: q∗Stackp1 + q∗a = q∗Monp1 and q∗Stackp2 − q∗a = q∗Monp2 .
Proof. The equilibrium prices, as well as quantities, in both cases are shown in Proposition
1 and Proposition 2. In the Monopoly case, the equilibrium prices are equal to:
p∗Mon1 =
β01 + αp1
2
, (80)
p∗Mon2 =
β02 + αp2
2
. (81)
Meanwhile, in the Stackelberg case, the equilibrium prices are equal to:
p∗Stack1 =
αp1 + β01
2
+
β11(β02 − β01)
4(αa + β11 + β12)
, (82)
p∗Stack2 =
2(αp2 + β02)(αa + β11) + β12(2αp2 + β01 + β02)
4(αa + β11 + β12)
. (83)
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When β01 = β02 = β0,
p∗Stack1 =
αp1 + β0
2
= p∗Mon1 .
When β01 = β02 = β0, p
∗Stack
1 can be rewritten as:
p∗Stack1 =
2(αp2 + β0)(αa + β11 + β12)
4(αa + β11 + β12)
=
αp2 + β0
2
= p∗Mon2 .
The equilibrium quantities in the Monopoly case are:
q∗Monp1 =
β01 − αp1
2β11
, (84)
q∗Monp2 =
β02 − αp2
2β12
. (85)
The equilibrium quantities in the Stackelberg case are:
q∗Stackp1 =
1
2
(β01 − αp1
β11
+
αp2 − αp1
2αa + β11 + β12
)
, (86)
q∗Stackp2 =
1
2
(β02 − αp2
β12
+
αp1 − αp2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
, (87)
q∗a =
1
4
( β01 − β02
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)
2αa + β11 + β12
)
. (88)
When β01 = β02 = β0,
q∗Stackp1 + q
∗
a =
1
2
(β0 − αp1
β11
+
αp2 − αp1
2αa + β11 + β12
)
+
1
4
( β0 − β0
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)
2αa + β11 + β12
)
=
=
β0 − αp1
2β11
= q∗Monp1 ,
q∗Stackp2 − q∗a =
1
2
(β0 − αp2
β12
+
αp1 − αp2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
− 1
4
( β0 − β0
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)
2αa + β11 + β12
)
=
=
β0 − αp2
2β12
= q∗Monp2 .
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The formula for the point-price elasticity of demand E is:
E =
1
β1
p
Q
, (89)
where β1 is the slope of the demand, p is the price and Q is total traded quantity.
15 In the
Monopoly case, the price elasticity of demand at equilibrium outcomes in two hours is:
E∗Mon1 =
1
β11
p∗Mon1
q∗Monp1
, (90)
E∗Mon2 =
1
β12
p∗Mon2
q∗Monp2
. (91)
In order to write the expressions for the price elasticity of demand in the Stackelberg case,
let’s analyse two situations: when the aggregator is buying power in hour n = 1, i.e. qa is
positive, and when it is buying power in hour n = 2, i.e. qa is negative. When β01 = β02 = β0,
qa is positive when αp1 > αp2 and negative when αp1 < αp2 (see equation 88).
So, when qa > 0, the price elasticity of demand in two hours at the equilibrium outcomes
are:
E∗Stack1,qa>0 =
1
β11
p∗Stack1
q∗Stackp1 + qa
, (92)
E∗Stack2,qa>0 =
1
β12
p∗Stack1
q∗Stackp2
, (93)
Since q∗Stackp1 + qa = q
∗Mon
p1 and p
∗Stack
1 = p
∗Mon
1 , E
∗Stack
1,qa>0 = E
∗Mon
1 .
Since q∗Stackp2 > q
∗Mon
p2 (q
∗Stack
p2 = q
∗Mon
p2 + qa) and p
∗Stack
2 = p
∗Mon
2 , E
∗Stack
2,qa>0 < E
∗Mon
2 .
When qa < 0, the price elasticity of demand in two hours at the equilibrium outcomes are:
E∗Stack1,qa<0 =
1
β11
p∗Stack1
q∗Stackp1
, (94)
E∗Stack2,qa<0 =
1
β12
p∗Stack1
q∗Stackp2 − qa
, (95)
Since q∗Stackp1 > q
∗Mon
p (q
∗Stack
p1 = q
∗Mon
p1 − qa) and p∗Stack1 = p∗Mon1 , E∗Stack1,qa<0 < E∗Mon1 .
15The price elasticity of demand usually has a negative value due to the negative slope of demand.
However, in this paper, β1 value is positive because of the inverse demand function (see equation 1).
Therefore, the value of E becomes positive, too.
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Since q∗Stackp2 − qa = q∗Monp2 and p∗Stack2 = p∗Mon2 , E∗Stack2,qa<0 = E∗Mon2 .
Thus, when β01 = β02 = β0, the equilibrium prices in the Stackelberg case are equal to
the equilibrium prices in the Monopoly case. If qa > 0, the producer competes with the
aggregator in hour n = 1. Price elasticity of demand in hour n = 1 is the same in both
cases. Also, we know that the producer sells less power in the Stackelberg case than being
a monopolist. In hour n = 2, the aggregator increases the demand and the producer sells
more power in Stackelberg case than in the Monopoly case. Also, the producer targets less
price elastic buyers compared to the Monopoly case. As a result, in the Stackelberg case
in hour n = 1 the producer’s profit is lower than in the Monopoly case: it sells less power
at the same price. However, in hour n = 2, the producer sells more power than in the
Monopoly case at the same price and its profit in hour n = 2 is higher. We can also prove
that the positive change in the producer’s profit is always larger then the negative change.
If qa > 0, the producer competes with the aggregator in hour n = 2. The price elasticity
of demand in hour n = 2 is the same in both cases. Also, we know that the producer sells
less power in the Stackelberg case compared to being a monopolist. In hour n = 1, the
aggregator increases the demand and the producer sells more than in the Monopoly case.
The producer targets less price elastic buyers compared to the Monopoly case. As a result,
in the Stackelberg case in hour n = 2, the producer’s profit is lower than in the Monopoly
case: the producers sells less power at the same price. Meanwhile, in hour n = 1, the
producers sells more power at the same price and receives a larger profit in the Stackelberg
case. We can prove that the positive change in the producer’s profit is larger than the
negative change. Therefore, the producer is always better off in the Stackelberg case when
the highest bids in the market in two hours are equal.
Proposition 17. When the highest bids in the market in both hours are equal, β01 = β02,
the producer is always better off being in a Stackelberg competition with the aggregator than
being a monopolist.
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Proof. The producer is better off in the Stackelberg case when pi∗Stack − pi∗Mon > 0.
pi∗Stack−pi∗Mon = (p∗1−αp1)q∗Stackp1 +(p∗2−αp2)q∗Stackp2 − (p∗1−αp1)q∗Monp1 − (p∗2−αp2)q∗Monp2 =
= (p∗1 − αp1)(q∗Stackp1 − q∗Monp1 ) + (p∗2 − αp2)(q∗Stackp2 − qMonp2 ) =
=
(−αp1 + β0)(−αp1 + αp2) + (−αp2 + β0)(αp1 − αp2)
4(2αa + β11 + β12)
=
(αp1 − αp2)2
4(2αa + β11 + β12)
.
Since (αp1 − αp2)2 > 0 and 4(2αa + β11 + β12) > 0, pi∗Stack − pi∗Mon > 0.
E.2 Price elasticity of demand and a numerical example
In a general case, analysed in the paper, one cannot tell if the price elasticity of demand
at equilibrium outcomes is higher or lower in a certain case – that depends on all input
variables. Therefore, instead of a general analysis, I provide a numerical example and a
sensitivity analysis using the same input data as before (see Table 1).
Proposition 18. The price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium outcomes in two hours:
(i) in the Monopoly case is:
E∗Mon1 =
αp1 + β01
−αp1 + β01 , (96)
E∗Mon2 =
αp2 + β02
−αp2 + β02 ; (97)
(ii) in the Stackelberg case:
• when qa > 0 is:
E∗Stack1,qa>0 =
2αaβ01 + (β01 + β02)β11 + 2β01β12 + 2αp1(αa + β11 + β12)
2αaβ01 + (3β01 − β02)β11 + 2β01β12 − 2αp1(αa + β11 + β12) , (98)
E∗Stack2,qa>0 = −
(2αa + β11 + β12)(2(αp2 + β02)(αa + β11) + (2αp2 + β01 + β02)β12)
2(αa + β11 + β12)((αp2 − β02)(2αa + β11)− (αp1 − 2αp2 + β02)β12) ,
(99)
• when qa < 0 is:
E∗Stack1,qa<0 =
2(αp1 + β01) +
(−β01+β02)β11
αa+β11+β12
2(−αp1 + β01 + (−αp1+αp2)β112αa+β11+β12 )
, (100)
E∗Stack2,qa<0 =
2(αp2 + β02)(αa + β11) + (2αp2 + β01 + β02)β12
2β02(αa + β11)− β01β12 + 3β02β12 − 2αp2(αa + β11 + β12) . (101)
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The expressions in the Proposition 18 are based on (89)–(95).
In the numerical example, the price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium is -6,83 and
-5,75 in hour n = 1 and hour n = 2 in the Monopoly case. In the Stackelberg case, the
producer competes with the aggregator in hour n = 1 and they target slightly less elastic
buyers compared to the Monopoly case (the price elasticity of demand is -6,79). In hour
n = 2, the aggregator is increasing demand and the producer targets less elastic consumers
than being a monopolist (the price elasticity of demand is -5,70).
The sensitivity analysis shows how the price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium de-
pends on the slopes of demand, the highest bids in the market, and the producer’s and the
aggregator’s cost.
Figure E.1 illustrates the price elasticity of demand E∗Mon in the Monopoly case. In both
hours, it depends only on two parameters – the highest bid in the market in that hour β0
and the marginal cost of production in that hour αp. The dependency in both hours is
the same, therefore, the graph represents the effects on E∗Mon in both hours: the producer
targets more elastic buyers when the highest bid in the market is lower and the marginal
cost of production is higher.16
In the Stackelberg case, the price elasticity of demand is affected by all parameters which
often drive the elasticity in opposite directions. For example, the price elasticity of demand
is decreasing with the increasing slope of demand in that hour and increasing with the
increasing slope of demand in the other hour (see figures E.2–E.3). Similarly, it is decreasing
with the increasing highest bid in the market in that hour and increasing with the increasing
highest bid in the market in the other hour (see figures E.4–E.5). The producer targets more
elastic buyers when the marginal cost of production is increasing in that hour and decreasing
in the other (see figures E.6–E.7). Finally, the increasing aggregator’s cost parameter αa
results in the higher price elasticity of demand in both hours (see figure E.8).
Figures E.9–E.15 illustrate the differences in the targeted buyers’ price elasticity in the
Monopoly and in the Stackelberg cases ∆E = E∗Mon − E∗Stack. The price elasticity of
16Notice that in figures E.1–E.15 the value of the price elasticity of demand is shown as positive.
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demand is higher in the Monopoly case, but difference decreases when the slope of demand
in that hour is lower and the slope of demand in the other hour is higher (see figures E.9–
E.10). Depending on the highest bids in the market, the producer can choose more or
less elastic buyers in the Stackelberg case in hour n = 1, i.e. when it is competing with
the aggregator. In hour n = 2, the difference in elasticity is increasing with decreasing
highest bids in the market in two hours (see figures E.11–E.12). Similarly, in hour n = 2,
the producer can choose more or less elastic buyers in the Stackelberg depending on its
marginal cost of production in both hours. In hour n = 1, the difference in elasticity is
decreasing with decreasing marginal cost in hour n = 1, while the marginal cost in hour
n = 2 has only a very mild effect (see figures E.13–E.14). The higher aggregator’s cost
parameter leads to lower differences in elasticity in both hours (see figure E.15).
From the sensitivity analysis we see that one cannot tell whether the producer will target
more or less price elastic buyers in the situations when it is better off in the Stackelberg case
compared to being a monopolist. In the Stackelberg case, the price elasticity of demand at
equilibrium outcomes depends on all parameters affecting it in the opposite directions and
cannot be used as a predictor of higher or lower profit for a producer.
Figure E.1: The price elasticity of demand E∗Mon1 in hour n = 1 in the Monopoly case
depending on the highest bid in the market β01 (d/MWh) and the producer’s marginal cost
of production αp1 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1
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Figure E.2: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack1 in hour n = 1 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the slopes of demand β11 in hour n = 1 and β12 in hour n = 2
Figure E.3: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack2 in hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the slopes of demand β11 in hour n = 1 and β12 in hour n = 2
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Figure E.4: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack1 in hour n = 1 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the highest bids in the market β01 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and β02 (d/MWh)
in hour n = 2
Figure E.5: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack2 in hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the highest bids in the market β01 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and β02 (d/MWh)
in hour n = 2
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Figure E.6: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack1 in hour n = 1 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the producer’s marginal cost αp1 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and αp2 (d/MWh)
in hour n = 2
Figure E.7: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack2 in hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg case
depending on the producer’s marginal cost αp1 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and αp2 (d/MWh)
in hour n = 2
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Figure E.8: The price elasticity of demand E∗Stack1 in hour n = 1 and E
∗Stack
2 in hour n = 2
in the Stackelberg case depending on the aggregator’s cost parameter αa (d/MWh)
Figure E.9: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E1 = E
∗Mon
1 −E∗Stack1 in hour
n = 1 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the slopes of demand β11 in
hour n = 1 and β12 in hour n = 2
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Figure E.10: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E2 = E
∗Mon
2 − E∗Stack2 in
hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the slopes of demand β11
in hour n = 1 and β12 in hour n = 2
Figure E.11: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E1 = E
∗Mon
1 − E∗Stack1 in
hour n = 1 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the highest bids in the
market β01 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and β02 (d/MWh) in hour n = 2
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Figure E.12: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E2 = E
∗Mon
2 − E∗Stack2 in
hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the highest bids in the
market β01 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and β02 (d/MWh) in hour n = 2
Figure E.13: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E1 = E
∗Mon
1 − E∗Stack1 in
hour n = 1 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the producer’s marginal
cost αp1 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and αp2 (d/MWh) in hour n = 2
189
Figure E.14: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E2 = E
∗Mon
2 − E∗Stack2 in
hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on the producer’s marginal
cost αp1 (d/MWh) in hour n = 1 and αp2 (d/MWh) in hour n = 2
Figure E.15: The difference in the price elasticity of demand ∆E1 = E
∗Mon
1 − E∗Stack1 in
hour n = 1 and ∆E2 = E
∗Mon
2 − E∗Stack2 in hour n = 2 in the Stackelberg and Monopoly
cases depending on the aggregator’s cost parameter αa (d/MWh)
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Appendix F Proofs
F.1 The proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The producer is strictly better off in a Stackelberg competition with the aggregator
than being a monopolist if pi∗Stap − pi∗Monp > 0, where the expressions for the producer’s
profit as a monopolist pi∗Monp and in a Stackelberg competition with the aggregator pi
∗Sta
p are
provided in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Thus, the inequality pi∗Stap −pi∗Monp > 0 can be
written as:
1
8
(2(αp1 − β01)2
β11
+
2(αp2 − β02)2
β12
− (β01 − β02)
2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
−
β11(αp2 − β02)2 + β12(αp1 − β01)2
4β11β12
> 0.
Through algebra, it can be simplified as:
(αp1 − αp2)2
4(2αa + β11 + β12)
− (β01 − β02)
2
8(αa + β11 + β12)
> 0.
Since 4(2αa + β11 + β12) > 0, it can be written as:
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
,
where 0 < 2αa+β11+β12
2αa+2(β11+β12)
< 1.
F.2 The proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the Stackelberg case, the adjusted consumer surplus is reduced when the aggre-
gator enters the intraday market if CSadj,Stack − CSajd,Mon < 0. The adjusted consumer
surpluses are provided in Proposition 6 and the latter inequality can be written as:
1
32(αa + β11 + β12)2
((2αaβ01 + β11(3β01 − β02) + 2β01β12 − 2αp1(αa + β11 + β12))2
β11
+
(−2β02(αa + β11) + β12(β01 − 3β02) + 2αp2(αa + β11 + β12))2
β12
)
−
1
8
((αp1 − β01)2
β11
+
(αp2 − β02)2
β12
)
< 0. (102)
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Through algebra, it can be simplified as:
(β01 − β02)
(
4(αa + β11 + β12)(αp2 − αp1) + (β01 − β02)(4αa + 5(β11 + β12))
)
32(αa + β11 + β12)2
< 0. (103)
Since 32(αa + β11 + β12)
2 > 0, then:
(β01 − β02)
(
4(αa + β11 + β12)(αp2 − αp1) + (β01 − β02)(4αa + 5(β11 + β12))
)
< 0. (104)
For the latter inequality to hold, we must have:
(i) (β01 − β02) > 0 and
4(αa + β11 + β12)(αp2 − αp1) + (β01 − β02)(4αa + 5(β11 + β12)) < 0 or
(ii) (β01 − β02) < 0 and
4(αa + β11 + β12)(αp2 − αp1) + (β01 − β02)(4αa + 5(β11 + β12)) > 0.
Since 4(αa + β11 + β12) > 0, through algebra it can be written as:
(i) β01 > β02 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) or
(ii) β01 < β02 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) .
Notice that 4αa + 5(β11 + β12) < 4αa + 4(β11 + β12), therefore
4αa+5(β11+β12)
4αa+4(β11+β12)
> 1. In order
for both inequalities in (i) or (ii) to hold, we must have that
(i) αp1 > αp2 and
β01 > β02 and αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) .
If αp1 ≤ αp2, then one of the inequalities in (i) would not hold.
(ii) αp1 < αp2 and
β01 < β02 and αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) .
If αp1 ≥ αp2, then one of the inequalities in (ii) would not hold.
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F.3 The proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The conditions for the producer to increase its profit when the aggregator participates
in the intraday market are provided in Proposition 3. The conditions for the reduction of
the adjusted consumer surplus are stated in Proposition 5. Following these conditions, one
can find the intervals where all intraday market participants benefit from the aggregator’s
presence at the market. Thus, we know that the producer is better off when:
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
, (105)
Similarly, like in the proof of Proposition 5, for the adjusted consumer surplus to be higher,
CSadj,Stack − CSMon > 0, we must have:
(i) β01 > β02 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) ;
Or
(ii) β01 < β02 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) .
Notice that 4αa + 5(β11 + β12) > 4αa + 4(β11 + β12), therefore
4αa+5(β11+β12)
4αa+4(β11+β12)
> 1. In order
for both inequalities in (i) or (ii) to hold, we must have that
(i) β01 > β02:
• β01 > β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) , or
• β01 > β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) , which is always satisfied;
Or
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(ii) β01 < β02:
• β01 < β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) , which is always satisfied, or
• β01 < β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 > (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) .
In order for all market participants to be better off:
(i) β01 > β02:
• β01 > β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) (condition for CSadj,Stack > CSMon)
and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa+β11+β122αa+2(β11+β12) (condition for the producer to benefit)
Since αp1−αp2 and β01−β02 are positive values, after taking square roots we can
write the latter inequalities as:
(β01 − β02)
√
2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
< αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
;
(106)
or
• β01 > β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa+β11+β122αa+2(β11+β12) (condition for the producer to benefit).
αp1− αp2 < (β01− β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) is always satisfied and CSadj,Stack > CSMon;
Or
(ii) β01 < β02:
• β01 < β02 and αp1 > αp2 and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa+β11+β122αa+2(β11+β12) (condition for the producer to benefit).
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αp1− αp2 > (β01− β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) is always satisfied and CSadj,Stack > CSMon;
or
• β01 < β02 and αp1 < αp2 and
αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa+5(β11+β12)4αa+4(β11+β12) (condition for CSadj,Stack > CSMon)
and
(αp1 − αp2)2 > (β01 − β02)2 2αa+β11+β122αa+2(β11+β12) (condition for the producer to benefit).
Since αp1 − αp2 and β01 − β02 are negative values, after taking square roots we
can write the latter inequalities as:
(β01 − β02)
√
2αa + β11 + β12
2αa + 2(β11 + β12)
< αp1 − αp2 < (β01 − β02)4αa + 5(β11 + β12)
4αa + 4(β11 + β12)
.
(107)
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Appendix G The differences in the producer’s revenue
and cost in both cases
G.1 The difference in the producer’s revenue
The producer’s total revenue in the Monopoly case R∗Monp is:
R∗Monp = q
∗Mon
p1 p
∗Mon
1 + q
∗Mon
p1 p
∗Mon
1 =
1
4
(β201 − α2p1
β11
+
β202 − α2p2
β12
)
. (108)
The producer’s total revenue in the Stackelberg case R∗Stackp is:
R∗Stackp = q
∗Stack
p1 p
∗Stack
1 + q
∗Stack
p1 p
∗Stack
1 =
1
4
(β201 − α2p1
β11
+
β202 − α2p2
β12
)
− 1
8
( (β01 − β02)2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
. (109)
Thus, the difference in the producer’s total revenue in the Stackelberg and the Monopoly
case ∆Rp is:
∆Rp = R
∗Stack
p −R∗Monp = −
1
8
( (β01 − β02)2
αa + β11 + β12
+
2(αp1 − αp2)2
2αa + β11 + β12
)
. (110)
From the latter equation we see that the difference is never positive and the producer’s total
revenue in the Stackelberg case is always lower or equal to its total revenue in the Monopoly
case.
G.2 The difference in the producer’s cost
The producer’s total cost in the Monopoly case C∗Monp is:
C∗Monp = q
∗Mon
p1 αp1 + q
∗Mon
p1 αp2 =
αp1(β01 − αp1)
2β11
+
αp2(β02 − αp2)
2β12
. (111)
The producer’s total cost in the Stackelberg case C∗Stackp is:
C∗Stackp = q
∗Stack
p1 αp1 + q
∗Stack
p1 αp2 =
αp1(β01 − αp1)
2β11
+
αp2(β02 − αp2)
2β12
− (αp1 − αp2)
2
2(2αa + β11 + β12)
.
(112)
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Thus, the difference in the producer’s total cost in the Stackelberg and the Monopoly case
∆Cp is:
∆Cp = C
∗Stack
p − C∗Monp = −
(αp1 − αp2)2
2(2αa + β11 + β12)
. (113)
From the latter equation we see that the difference is never positive and the producer’s
total cost in the Stackelberg case is always lower or equal to its total cost in the Monopoly
case.
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Appendix H Additional figures for Equilibrium anal-
ysis section
Figure H.1: Area illustrating when the producer benefits from being in a competition with
the aggregator in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0 and φ (3D graph)
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Figure H.2: Changes in φ due to changing αa and β1 in hours n = 1 and n = 2
Figure H.3: Area illustrating when the adjusted consumer surplus is reduced due to the
presence of the aggregator in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0 and µ
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Figure H.4: Area illustrating when the adjusted consumer surplus is reduced due to the
presence of the aggregator in the intraday market depending on ∆αp, ∆β0 and µ (a different
angle)
Figure H.5: Changes in µ due to changing αa and β1 in hours n = 1 and n = 2
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Figure H.6: Changes in ρ due to changing αa and β1 in hours n = 1 and n = 2
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Appendix I The difference in the original consumers’
consumer surplus
The original consumers’ consumer surplus in the Monopoly and the Stackelberg case differ
due to different quantities that the producer and the aggregator are offering to them in
each hour. The quantities available to the original consumers are denoted Q∗adj,Stack1 and
Q∗adj,Stack2 and are equal to:
Q∗adj,Stack1 = q
∗Stack
p1 + q
∗
a, (114)
Q∗adj,Stack2 = q
∗Stack
p2 − q∗a. (115)
The difference in the original consumers’ consumer surplus in the Stackelberg and the
Monopoly case ∆CS∗adj can be written as:
∆CS∗adj =
β11
2
(Q∗adj,Stack1 −Q∗Mon1 ) +
β12
2
(Q∗adj,Stack2 −Q∗Mon2 ). (116)
Here Q∗Mon1 and Q
∗Mon
2 are the producer’s offered quantities in both hours. It is hard to
tell from the first glance, whether the difference is positive or negative. For example, if
the producer’s marginal cost is higher in the first hour, it sells less in hour n = 1 and
more in hour n = 2 compared to the Monopoly case; if the aggregator is selling power
in the first hour, i.e. q∗a is positive, it is not obvious whether Q
∗Mon
1 is more or less than
Q∗adj,Stack1 . Similarly, in the second hour, it is hard to tell if in the Stackelberg case the
producer increases its offered quantity by a larger amount than bought by the aggregator.
In addition, the total effect to the difference in original consumers’ consumer surpluses is
affected by different weights for the quantities in each hour, β11/2 and β12/2. Proposition 5
and Proposition 6 show that under certain market conditions this difference can be negative
or positive.
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Appendix J Estimation of β0 and β1
The inverse demand function at the intraday market is expressed as p(Q) = β0 − β1Q. To
find the intercept β0 and the slope β1 for one hour, we need two points indicating quantities
and respective prices.
The total amount of traded energy at the intraday market in hour 02.00 on January 19, 2017
is 25,0 MWh and the lowest accepted bid order is 22,5 d/MWh, which determines the first
point. The second point is indicated by the highest accepted bid order, 27,2 d/MWh, and
zero quantity. Thus, we are solving a simple system of two equations with two unknowns:
22, 5 = β0 − 25, 0β127, 2 = β0 − 0β1 , (117)
which gives β0 = 27, 2 and β1 = 0, 188.
Similarly, for hour 03.00, the system of equations is:
26, 0 = β0 − 20, 0β127, 0 = β0 − 0β1 , (118)
which gives β0 = 27, 0 and β1 = 0, 05.
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Appendix K Demand flexibility data and the use of
refrigeration processes in the demand-
side management
Refrigerator is one of the home appliances that accounts for a considerable amount of annual
household energy consumption. According to the DONG Energy El & Gas AS report on
electricity consumption of households in Denmark (DONG Energy, 2013), an average annual
consumption of a household living in a house is 4500 kWh. Depending on the size, type
and production year, the consumption of a refrigerator can vary between 71 kWh to 548
kWh per year: refrigerator with freezer, 220+90 l, old – 548 kWh; refrigerator with freezer,
220+66 l, new – 293 kWh; refrigerator, 240 l, old – 290 kWh; refrigerator, 290 l, new – 71
kWh.
Energy consumption pattern, or refrigeration cycle, is another important factor determining
the potential for load shifting. An ordinary household refrigerator with fresh food storage
compartment and frozen food storage compartment, 141 l and 79 l respectively, modelled in
(Cheng et al., 2011), uses 186 kWh per year (0,51 kWh per 24 hours). Its total cycle time
is 61,6 minutes: on-time – 21 minute, off-time – 40,6 minutes.
In the presented numerical example, the aggregator controls a number of refrigerators, each
consuming 0,0335 kWh per hour. Thus, for instance, to accumulate 10 MWh of shiftable
load per hour the aggregator should have an access to control around 300 thousands domestic
refrigerators. In order to pool larger amounts of shiftable refrigeration load, the aggregator
could also include small commercial refrigerators and commercial refrigeration systems in
refrigerated warehouses and food retailing (Grein and Pehnt, 2011).
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Appendix L Additional figures for Sensitivity analysis
section
Figure L.1: The producer’s profit pip in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on
its marginal cost αp2, d
Figure L.2: The adjusted consumer surplus CSadj in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases
depending on the producer’s marginal cost αp2, d
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Figure L.3: The producer’s profit pip in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on
the aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa, d
Figure L.4: The adjusted consumer surplus CSadj in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases
depending on the aggregator’s marginal cost parameter αa, d
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Figure L.5: The producer’s profit pip in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on
the highest bid order at the intraday market β02, d
Figure L.6: The adjusted consumer surplus CSadj in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases
depending on the highest bid order at the intraday market β02, d
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Figure L.7: The producer’s profit pip in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases depending on
the slope of demand β12, d
Figure L.8: The adjusted consumer surplus CSadj in the Stackelberg and Monopoly cases
depending on the slope of demand β12, d
208
Conclusion
This Ph.D. thesis contributes to the demand-side management literature by providing the
analysis of the flexible demand aggregator’s effects on the electricity markets and the welfare
of power consumers. The three chapters examine the entrance of the aggregator in the
power markets from different perspectives: the aggregator’s, a large power consumer’s and
the producer’s.
The first chapter focuses on the performance of the aggregator, which has a portfolio of
different flexibility sources: EVs, HPs and/or such home appliances like washing machines,
dryers and dish washers. I investigated the effects of the portfolio choice on the imbalance
payments and compensation to consumers that provide flexibility using Nord Pool power
market data for Denmark’s bidding area DK2. The results show that different compositions
of flexibility sources influence both the imbalance payments and compensation to consumers.
However, there is no significant additional value in combining all flexibility sources in one
portfolio unless there is a fixed contract cost. Thus, it is likely that the aggregator would
choose to specialise in certain types of flexibility sources. In addition, I found that the
compensation for provided flexibility is very low and would hardly incentivise the consumers
to participate in demand-side management programs.
The second chapter studies the aggregator’s presence in the market from a large power
consumer’s with flexible load perspective. It investigates whether the cooperative gover-
nance structures in flexible electricity demand aggregation and trading could bring value to
the market participants and final power consumers compared to situations where demand
flexibility is traded individually or via the investor owned aggregator. A large consumer is
not likely to offer its flexibility directly to the intraday market, since the transaction cost,
that include fixed flexible demand coordination cost and market access fees are too high.
The results show that when large consumers have no possibility to form a cooperative and
offer their flexibility to the aggregator, the aggregator absorbs the profit. However, large
consumers yield a profit if they form a cooperative and compete with the aggregator. Thus,
cooperative governance structures lowers the equilibrium market prices and leads to the
highest consumer surplus.
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The third chapter analyses the aggregator’s presence in the intraday market from the pro-
ducer’s perspective and investigates whether the flexible demand aggregator’s presence in
the intraday market can reduce the consumer surplus of power buyers and increase the
profit to the competing producer. A game-theoretic approach is used to compare market
equilibrium outcomes two cases: Monopoly case, where only the producer sells power in
the intraday market, and Stackelberg case, where the producer competes with a smaller
aggregator. The results suggest that under certain market conditions and the producer’s
marginal cost in different hours, the producer is strictly better off being in a competition
with the aggregator than selling power in the intraday market as a monopolist. However, un-
der favourable market conditions, another outcome is also possible: all market participants
can be better off when the aggregator is trading flexibility in the intraday market.
The demand-side management and the aggregation of flexible demand will undoubtedly
contribute to the successful integration of large renewable energy amounts in the power
systems and will be a useful tool to deal with the power system stability challenges. However,
in terms of implementing the demand-side management, it is important to understand that
among many advantages of a new market player offering flexible demand aggregation services
there are some negative aspects too that need to be investigated further.
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